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Abstract 
Writing instruction, particularly at the post-secondary level, stands at a 
crossroads. Since the attainment of some level of post-secondary education has become a 
near mandatory requirement for participation in the contemporary economy, students 
increasingly describe their decision to go to college as a foregone conclusion. The 
university level first-year writing course, itself a traditional gate-keeper to post-secondary 
education, thus occupies a critical space at the confluence of these powerful and 
interrelated forces.  Further, because of this alignment to the economic demands of 
college preparedness, most if not all levels of writing instruction will be affected in 
various ways. Unfortunately, these elements enter into a dangerous contradiction when 
the economic growth everything is predicated upon falters--precisely what has occurred 
during the "Great Recession" that started in 2007. 
Based on fieldwork conducted in a high school level college preparation writing 
class, this dissertation explores the consequences of these contradictions. In particular, 
this project starts with an observed phenomenon in the classroom in which many students 
simply "preferred not to" work on their writing assignments. Using this "Bartleby 
Syndrome" as a mechanism of problematizing the field of post-secondary writing 
instruction, this project builds a philosophical critique of the relationship between human 
action and the social, political, and economic environment in which students write. 
Central to this task is a reconsideration of what American Pragmatism, specifically John 
Dewey’s work, can offer the field of composition. In doing so, this study not only offers a 
different perspective on some of composition’s most vexing challenges, but also builds 
on the Pragmatist tradition to suggest ways the field of writing instruction can retain and 
revitalize its long standing project of expanding democracy in the United States. 
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Note on Citations 
The works of both John Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce are voluminous to say the least. 
Thankfully, the development of "collected works" editions for both Dewey and Peirce has greatly 
enabled and enhanced contemporary scholarship drawing on classical Pragmatists. Without these 
resources, the task of usefully penetrating the mountains of writing would be arduous at best. 
However, the collected works for both Dewey and Peirce have their own citation style. In an 
effort to maintain some level of coherence with other scholarship utilizing these resources, I have 
adhered to these conventions in this dissertation. 
 
References to the work of Charles Sanders Peirce are from The Collected Papers, Vols. I-VI. Ed. 
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), 
Vols. VII-VIII ed. Arthur W. Burks (same publisher, 1958), published as an online database by the 
Intelex corporation. In-text citations utilize the following format: CP Volume:Paragraph. For 
example, (CP 4:12) refers to Volume 4 of the Collected Papers, paragraph 12. While some follow 
this by the date in which the texts were written, I will not be utilizing a broad enough historical 
sampling of his work to warrant this. Where needed, I have mentioned the year of the text in the 
prose itself.  
 
References to the work of John Dewey are from The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953 
(2nd Release). Ed. Jo Ann Boydston & Larry A Hickman (Charlottesville, VA, 1996), published 
as an electronic database by the InteLex corporation. This mass collection contains three 
previously published collections of Dewey's work:  
 
The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. 5 vols. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1972. 
 
The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924. 15 vols. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1978. 
 
The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. 17 vols. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1985. 
 
A citation style has been developed to maintain continuity within these collections across various 
editions and publication platforms. Citations utilize the following format: Collection, 
Volume:Page Number. For example, (MW 6:85) refers to the Middle Works, volume 6, page 85. 
All page numbers refer to the original printed publications of the collections.  
 
Unfortunately, especially with the collected works of Dewey, such citation styles do not indicate 
which specific work they are referring to, nor do they indicate the year of original publication. 
The absence of these two bits of information creates an unfortunate situation in which a unified 
whole is suggested. This is unfortunate simply because the thinking of both Dewey and Peirce 
evolved over their very long careers--especially with Dewey who maintained an impressive 
output for seventy years. In order to mitigate this while preserving the continuity of the citation 
style, I have sought to provide the name of texts I utilize as well as dates of original publication in 
the prose as well as footnotes as necessary.  







 In the state of the union address delivered in January of 2011, President Obama 
not only noted an ever-deepening crisis in the ability for the United States to compete 
economically on a global stage, but also strongly suggested that a major remedy for this 
crisis of competition is education. Obama, in his speech, framed it this way: "Think about 
it. Over the next 10 years, nearly half of all new jobs will require education that goes 
beyond a high school education. And yet, as many as a quarter of our students aren’t even 
finishing high school." However, for students involved in the matrix of "the college 
educated," from those preparing for it to those engaged in it to those graduating from it 
(often with heavy student debt loads), this political rhetoric might rightfully be seen as 
some sort of cruel joke. By the fall of 2010, unemployment figures for holders of a 4 year 
college degree, regardless of age, had doubled from their levels prior to the catastrophic 
economic downturn starting in 2007. Worse, unemployment figures for 20-24 year olds 
with college degrees--supposedly those in the best position to obtain employment due to 
their "fresh" education--went from 3.4% in 2007 to a staggering 9.6% by September of 
2010 (Konczal). Further, these numbers do not take into account the level of under-
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employment (having a job but only working part time) nor inquire into the qualitative 
aspects of contemporary work--that is, how fulfilling might this employment be?  
 Literacy education and writing instruction in particular thus finds itself at a 
crossroads. On one hand, the university level first-year writing course has traditionally 
served as one of the major gate-keepers to a post-secondary education and as such writing 
instruction at all levels have and will continue to align to this singular purpose. On the 
other hand, the narrow repurposing of higher education to economic growth and 
prosperity encounters a dangerous contradiction during times of economic distress. 
Unfortunately, the "Great Recession" that started in 2007 is one for the history books by 
most accounts. In these times, what is now needed is a reconsideration of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the field known as composition and rhetoric. This dissertation takes up 
that task. 
 My project here is very simple: to work through a Pragmatist critique of writing 
instruction in schools, particularly as it pertains to the post-secondary instruction of 
writing. The impetus for this stems from a long-standing feeling that something is absent 
from much of the mainstream theoretical work being conducted in the area of 
composition and rhetoric. For example, we have asked who are the students taking these 
writing courses, what are the values composition instructors implicitly or explicitly 
transmit in the act of teaching, and how exactly is writing to be done? From these basic 
categories, a bewildering array of subtlety and nuance have developed in the field. While 
this dissertation recognizes the importance of such inquiries and indeed relies upon them, 
given the depth to which we are in the midst of a major social crossroads, my question is 
a far more basic and fundamental question: why this enterprise should be undertaken in 
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the first place? Pragmatism, as I will demonstrate, offers an incredibly deep history of 
ideas and theories through which we can reconstruct not only how we understand the 
teaching of writing, but also why it matters. 
 What exactly is Pragmatism, though? According to Cornel West, American 
Pragmatism "can be understood as what happens to the Emersonian evasion of 
epistemology-centered philosophy when forced to justify itself within the professional 
perimeters of academic philosophy" (42). Unlike European philosophers (Descartes 
through Hegel) who saw knowledge as a set of representations to be justified or 
grounded, Emerson instead saw knowledge as "instrumental effects of human will as it is 
guided by human interests, which are in turn produced by transactions with other humans 
and nature" (36). Thus we can see the historical trajectory of American Pragmatism as a 
concern with re-working of all of philosophy, politics, ethics, and aesthetics once we shed 
ourselves of the way that western philosophy had fetishized the "given," or, knowledge as 
mere recollection. It is a distinctly American philosophy, deeply informed by a growing 
awareness of the own historical situation these thinkers found themselves in. Rorty and 
West both, at times, point out that part of what American Pragmatism has tried to 
accomplish in various ways is to "explain America to itself." While "Pragmatism" has 
meant drastically different things in the hands of different thinkers--and any attempt to 
place such diversity in one tent will always be controversial--this is arguably the central 
core from which all pragmatist thinkers start. 
 It is from here that some very basic commitments that Pragmatists hold come into 
view. Pragmatists adopt an anti-foundationalist stance and as such reject the idea that 
there is any fixed, eternal, and objective point from which to ground thinking. At the 
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same time, though, pragmatists also reject philosophical skepticism that holds that if there 
is no foundation to knowledge (an "Archemedian point" as Bernstein refers to it), then 
everything must start with universal doubt. Generally, Pragmatists accomplish this by 
noting a deep connection between truth and social inquiry (see especially Misak, 2000). 
In other words, just because there is no ultimate objective "truth" out there, it does not 
follow that "truth" simply does not exist. Instead, Pragmatists understand truth as the 
product of the social relations of human beings tempered through the actual lived 
consequences of those truths. Truth, in this light, is not something that is simply 
discovered but something that is used.  
 The full implications of these starting points are things that Pragmatists disagree 
on, often forcefully so. For my purposes, though, it is in John Dewey's work that 
Pragmatism reaches its full maturity. It is in his work, astonishing for its breadth, that 
these basic concepts are applied to psychology, politics, aesthetics, epistemology, 
education, and practically everything in between.  More importantly, though, it is Dewey 
who makes the realization that if we can no longer appeal to universal values and static 
conceptions of "truth," then nothing less than full and radical democracy will do as a 
political system to ensure social inquiry can be brought to bear on the most pressing 
social problems of our times. It is because of this that Dewey's work can be utilized not 
only as a means to interpret and understand the theoretical problems we currently face in 
the field of composition and rhetoric, but to also provide a framework for proposing new 
directions to go in.  
 My basic argument throughout this dissertation is that the contemporary political 
and economic structure of society fails to provide—and indeed, seeks to deny—the 
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crucial elements needed for success in writing instruction as it has been historically 
conceived. What has been missing in the current blame game of educational reform 
discourse is a discussion of the condition of democracy itself in America. When it comes 
to the inevitable portion of educational reform discourse in which the source of problems 
is debated, many things come up: teachers, funding, unions, policy, students, culture, 
accountability, standards, and efficiency. What is not often discussed (or rather, never) is 
a broader interrogation built from a systemic social analysis; or, in other words, the final 
tragic result of what C. Wright Mills referred to as "the ending of political reflection itself 
as a public fact" (Politics 257).  If we want to understand the ills of schools and 
schooling, we will have to take a hard look at the sort of society that schools are an 
expression of. 
 To this end, my dissertation grounds itself where composition itself moves from 
theory to actuality: the writing classroom. Deep within the recession in the fall of 2010, I 
sat in on a high school "college preparation" writing classroom. My initial reasons for 
conducting this fieldwork stemmed from a hunch that many of the conundrums post-
secondary instructors of composition faced had their roots in something outside of the 
composition classroom: the previous educational experiences of students that had given 
meaning and shape to the idea of "writing." My goal, perhaps somewhat naive in 
retrospect, was to basically see for myself what writing instruction looked like in a 
typical high school. In other words, I wanted to see what my students had gone through 
prior to coming into my own composition classes. This hunch was born out of a personal 
frustration I had with my own students who seemed to resist attempts at pedagogical 
innovation that ran afoul of their expectations of what a writing classroom should be. I 
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hoped I could get a better understanding of where, how, and why these expectations 
formed through immersing myself in the last contact they had with primary and 
secondary education. 
 What I found, though, was something quite different. There were things I was 
prepared to see as well as ideas of my own I was on the look out for. Many of these 
things appeared in much the way I expected them to. There were palpable divisions 
among social groups within the classroom, there were interactions between students and 
between teacher and students that were dripping with issues of power, gender, race, and 
identity. There were the rituals of high school that seemed to permeate everything: the 
fall football season and subsequent attention to "school spirit," the ebb and flow of 
activities, the tensions and anxieties over college admissions, the grinding down of 
everything as the semester progressed and the nights got even longer in the coldness of 
winter. I had read about many of these things in other studies and thus was not surprised 
to see them. And then something changed in this class. I don't know if I had inadvertently 
"gone native" at some point during the semester, but all the sparks (and sometimes 
fireworks) from these elements became subdued in the classroom. It was in this quiet 
space of late autumn that I realized something else was going on. 
 In most of my thinking about the teaching of writing, I generally start with 
students writing. I think most theories of writing instruction start here, simply because 
without student writing, not much can happen. However, these students in this high 
school class, for the most part, were definitely not writing. I first noticed it during a 
"peer-conferencing" session about 6 weeks into the semester. The teacher had set a 
deadline to bring in two copies of an "early draft" of the assignment they were working 
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on. In class, they were to exchange these copies with other students who were to then 
read and respond to them. Except, out of 30 students, I could find only 4-5 who actually 
had written anything to bring in. This would become the major theme of the entire class, 
a problem that vexed both the teacher and the students. When it came to the big "research 
paper" required of these students (5-7 pages) that they spent 6 weeks on, a majority of the 
students started the paper with less than a week before the deadline. Many students did 
not meet the deadline and a few simply never wrote anything at all. 
 Drawing inspiration from a recent Gregory Palmerino essay in College English, I 
have been referring to this as the Bartleby Syndrome. However, and very much unlike 
Melville's archetypal character, this was not simply one or two students engaging in a 
quiet and non-aggressive stance of non-participation. The Bartleby Syndrome, once 
rooted in the class, seemed to affect everyone, even the students who were attempting to 
engage in the class. When I tell people this, usually they laugh and then say something 
like "that's not surprising." I suppose it isn't. The idea of schools as these "temples of 
ennui" is as old as mandatory schooling itself and older (think of Rousseau's Emile). 
However, it is precisely because this is not surprising to those in the field of literacy 
education that this phenomena deserves critical attention. On a practical level, it deserves 
critical attention because it represents an obstacle to all forms of literacy education.  
 More specifically to this dissertation, the argument I will be advancing in regard 
to the Bartleby Syndrome proceeds as thus: the problem of non-participation is at its root 
a question of human action. That is, why do people act? To this, I turn to John Dewey 
and his account of human action to make an argument that the actualities of praxis are 
inextricably linked to ends-in-view, which for Dewey--and myself--are thoroughly social 
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and products of the environment humans find themselves thrown into. These ends-in-
view can be thought of as a sort of imagined future, or that is, deliberate action (precisely 
of the sort required in schools) is built upon actors imagining the actual, lived and 
practical results of the actions. Accordingly, this raises the question of what exactly are 
these "ends-in-view" or imagined futures of the students? Drawing from my fieldwork in 
the classroom, I point to two omnipresent things I kept running into while trying to figure 
this out: the imagined futures of students are either built from (frankly) depressing yet 
accurate understandings of what the economy holds for them or are so nebulous that they 
simply cannot form a solid enough picture from which to base action on. In this light, 
then, the Bartleby Syndrome is indeed not surprising at all. While not surprising, though, 
it does represent an incredibly important challenge to those such as myself who still see 
the writing classroom and literacy instruction as one of the more powerful sites of leftist 
educational praxis. 
 
Method, Methodologies, and Data 
 Since empirical fieldwork will be an important component of this project, some 
consideration must be given in regard to how I conceive of my method and 
methodologies, specifically concerning the word "ethnography." Clifford Geertz writes 
that "[d]oing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of "construct a reading of') a 
manuscript--foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and 
tendentious commentaries, but written not in conventionalized graphs of sound but in 
transient examples of shaped behavior" (10). In one sense, then, my work here shares an 
important commonality with ethnography in which my goal throughout is to reconstruct a 
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fragmented narrative. However, and very much unlike Ethnography proper, the object of 
my analysis is not individuals and their communities or even the setting of human 
interaction. Put bluntly, the role of my time in the field was not so much to discover 
something about high-school classrooms that other theorists have missed, or to distill an 
insight into human interaction that has been ignored, or even something about what 
students do in classrooms that other educational ethnographers have overlooked. Rather, I 
discovered that what I was really exploring while in that classroom was ourselves, and by 
ourselves I mean those in the field of composition studies. Accordingly, this study is 
about the bigger context in which these projects are all carried out.  
 My time at the high school, my time spent talking with the students, talking with 
the teacher, and in general being a part of the daily ebb and flow of this institution has 
pointed me in the direction of the problem to track down. The problem I'm focusing on, 
though, isn't located in the high school. What I saw in the high school is an extension, a 
symptom if you will, of this larger problem addressed in this dissertation. The reason I 
say this is manifold. For one, even though I ended up being in the classroom nearly every 
day (both because it was interesting and because I felt a sense of solidarity with these 
students and with the teacher), it was hardly enough time to truly capture the 30 some 
different spheres of individual circumstance, struggle, and history that all interacted with 
each other on a daily basis. Additionally, my time was spent in one particular classroom, 
and as such, my contact with other areas of the lives of students and the teacher was 
accordingly limited. I was aware of this limitation heading in to the field and am not 
surprised with this. That aside, the reward in all this fieldwork was clarifying the problem 
to pursue. I realized pretty soon in this whole endeavor that I was not there to study the 
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students or to study the teacher or even study the school. Rather, I was there to listen and 
witness with these people and to, with their help, make visible that which I should pursue 
in inquiry. Accordingly, even though my fieldwork is located in the secondary level, this 
dissertation focuses on writing instruction at the post-secondary level, the field of 
knowledge known as composition studies that informs this endeavor, and the function 
and role of higher-education through which writing instruction occurs. 
 While the data collected in this fieldwork is not the main object of my inquiry, I 
will share and refer to it often, as I believe it offers tremendous insights into these larger 
socio-political forces at play. This data will include things such as narratives of moments 
in the classroom recorded via field notes; formal (recorded) and informal interviews with 
the teacher and students in the class; documents from the class such as assignments, tests, 
guides, and readings; and the writing the students themselves produced. These methods 
of data collection serve my larger methodological strategy, which I locate in the tradition 
of pragmatist critique. Specifically, my methodology falls largely in line with Dewey's 
historical-philosophical strategy in several of his works, such as his 1920 collection of 
essays titled Reconstruction in Philosophy. In this work, like many others, Dewey sets 
out by using contemporary ruptures and impasses in thought as an occasion for historical 
reflection. This historical reflection is aimed at untangling the roots of contemporary 
ideas by locating their emergence and subsequent evolution as responses to the times in 
which they came from. This move serves two important purposes: first, it historicizes 
ideas and thus takes them out of the realm of the eternal and the objective; second, it 
paves the way for outlining the limits of these now historicized ideas in contemporary 
times. The result of such a move is to resolve (or, as many have noted, dissolve) 
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seemingly impassable contradictions.  
 
Chapter Breakdown 
 The basic path I will be taking in this dissertation will be as follows. I will first 
start by theoretically grounding this project within the tradition of Pragmatism. From 
there, I will turn to an exploration of writing in the classroom, guided by my fieldwork, to 
set up the issues and problems to be worked through. In the remaining three chapters, I 
utilize a pragmatist critique to explore three levels or sphere of interpretation and 
explanation: at the local level in regard to human action and activity, at a slightly broader 
level in regard to the project of writing instruction and literacy crises, and finally at the 
broadest level—an examination of the social, political, and economic context in which 
these others spheres exist.  
 The first chapter, "Democracy as Writing," sketches the theoretical foundation for 
the dissertation. In this chapter, I start by suggesting the affinities between sociocultural 
literacy studies, composition studies and Pragmatism as a means to suggest Pragmatism's 
role in extending such conversations. I then turn to the work of classical Pragmatists C.S. 
Peirce and John Dewey as a means to sketch the relationship between education, political 
democracy, scientific inquiry and the tradition of Western liberalism, a topic that will be 
explored more fully in later chapters. I end with a discussion of Pragmatism's 
contributions to composition studies as well as where Pragmatism has yet to be fully 
explored. 
 In chapter two, "Welcome to College English," I introduce the ethnographic 
fieldwork I carried out in a high school level college preparation writing classroom. In 
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describing the class and offering an analysis of what goes on in such a class, this chapter 
posits the major theoretical (as well as practical) issue I encountered while collecting 
data: an alarming lack of student interest, motivation, and purpose within the class. I refer 
to this as the "Bartleby Syndrome." I introduce the idea that the Bartleby Syndrome is, in 
actuality, a specific type of literacy practice, as opposed to some form of lack or 
deficiency. I end the chapter by suggesting that a full understanding of these literacy 
practices necessitates an understanding of human action and activity. 
 In the third chapter, "Of Agents and Actors," I work through a Pragmatist account 
of activity and agency. This chapter starts with a discussion of the need for a theory of 
agency and activity within theories of literacy. After this, I move to consider cultural-
historical activity theory as one such answer to this need. However, I then move to 
discuss limitations of this approach and in doing so, suggest where Pragmatism, and in 
particular, Dewey's philosophy grounded in a concept of "organic unity" offers an 
important way to understand human activity. flesh out the general unspoken theory of 
human action within discussions about writing instruction. My purpose in doing this is to 
suggest a powerful lens through which to understand the data I collected while doing 
field work. This chapter posits a strong relationship between the nature and strength of 
"democracy" as outlined in the first chapter and the actions of students in classrooms that 
will be explored in the final two chapters. 
 Chapter four, "College, Crises, and Discontent," takes a closer look at the 
different ways the purpose and objective of a college preparation writing classroom is 
understood by different parties. Specifically, I analyze and contrast the way "college 
preparation" is understood by teachers and by students through data collected during my 
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fieldwork. I start by situating the phenomena of college preparation within a long history 
of various “literacy crises.” I also explore three current “genres of discontent” in regard 
to academic scholarship investigating the shift between secondary and post secondary 
writing. I then return to the data I collected during my fieldwork to problematize many of 
the assumptions (implicit and explicit) inherent to writing instruction directed towards 
college instruction. In doing this, I argue that a class focused on a future potentiality (i.e., 
college) removes meaning and purpose within the class for both student and teacher. 
Instead of an aberration or a failure of instruction, I argue that this is precisely the goal of 
education within a neoliberal framework, something I explore more fully in the next 
chapter. 
 In the final chapter, "Bartleby Redux: Composition, Liberalism, and Inquiry," I 
examine the deep connection between "inquiry," "liberalism," and "democracy" and the 
potential relevance it holds for writing instruction. My purpose in this chapter is to 
expand the lens of my Pragmatist Critique to its largest field of view. In this chapter, I 
argue that a full and complete understanding of the Bartleby Syndrome can only be 
understood within the context of neoliberalism. To do this, I turn to Dewey's own 
understanding of liberalism and how he understood his place in it to set up a framework 
for understanding neoliberalism. I then turn to work through the theoretical legacy of the 
tradition of liberalism within composition, particularly as it relates to attempts of writing 
theorists to use the composition classroom as a space for democratic and emancipatory 
projects. Specifically, I argue that it is an internal contradiction within Liberal theory that 
best explains some of the most contentious debates within composition theory. This 
internal contradiction, which I refer to as the "honor-maxim" severely limits any leftist 
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conception of the writing classroom and must be dealt with if an answer or solution to the 
contemporary situation in writing instruction is to be addressed. Drawing on the concept 
of inquiry in Dewey and Peirce's philosophy, I argue that Pragmatism, and in particular 
its conception of inquiry, presents a viable way out of this quagmire.  





Chapter 1 	  
Democracy as Writing 
Introduction 
 The theoretical underpinnings for this project are informed by the philosophical 
tradition of Pragmatism and writers, theorists, and philosophers within this tradition. 
Pragmatism, as with any ism with a long tradition, resists and at times outright rejects 
simple definitions. Among the three major "classical" Pragmatists of Peirce, James, and 
Dewey, there was much internal disagreement. Further, neither Peirce nor Dewy used the 
word "Pragmatism" to define their work; Peirce referring to it as "pragmaticism" and 
Dewey often referring to his work as "instrumentalism," "experimentalism," and even 
"experimental instrumentalism." My goal in this chapter is to outline just what I mean by 
Pragmatism for this research, which Pragmatists I am drawing on, what conversations I 
am entering into in regard to Pragmatism and writing instruction, and the relevance of 
such a theoretical underpinning for my work in this dissertation. Before all that, though, 
is a perhaps more pressing question: why Pragmatism at all? After all, my work in this 
project is largely contained within two other complimentary fields of inquiry: literacy 
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studies and composition studies. After all, both fields of inquiry have their own rich and 
deep traditions with an impressive resume of important research. What, then, does 
Pragmatism offer such established areas? 
 In regard to literacy studies, my work aligns very closely with those working in 
the area of sociocultural theory and literacy. This arc of scholarship interested in 
"literacy," especially in relationship to education, has largely owed its own theoretical 
existence to numerous scholars working in the early parts of the formation of the Soviet 
Union: Vygotsky, Bakhtin, Voloshinov, Leont'ov, A. N. Luria, and so forth. Additionally, 
this area has successfully drawn on other threads of critical theory, post-structuralist 
theory (despite many antimonies between the two), as well as critical sociolinguistics 
that, in contrast to structural linguistics like what we might find with Noam Chomsky's 
work, worked towards an understanding of language as being constituted through social 
structures1. The crucial insight I see in this arc of scholarship is precisely the 
understanding that "literacy" is itself not the mere application of eternal and universal 
laws of language, but rather, and as Voloshinov points out in his Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language, that the laws of language generation are sociological. This has 
profound implications for the study of literacy. Instead of simply focusing on an analysis 
of the language of the text itself, sociocultural research in literacy has sought to 
understand the social relationships embedded in as well as concealed by the text. In other 
                                                
1 As Kress noted, “If, like Chomsky, we treat what speakers actually do, their 
performance, as mere 'noise,' as 'distortions' of the real, an exceedingly sparse inner, 
mentalist organization, then there really is nothing to explain. If, like Saussure, we think 
that what speakers do - parole - has no effect on the system, then we have no serious 
reason for investigating it. If, however, we think that what people do needs to be 
understood, then we have a series of questions. These are, as I said earlier, questions 
around the role of the social, about the possibilities for real action by an individual acting 
in social environments” (33). 
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words, instead of understanding "literacy" as a skill, sociocultural literacy theorists 
understand it as a social practice. The pedigree of such a vantage point no doubt owes a 
great debt to Marx, particularly in his insight that value within any commodity is simply 
congealed human labor, abstracted so that it is no longer visible in the commodity itself 
(what he termed commodity fetishism). Thus, much scholarship in sociocultural literacy 
research has sought to find ways to un-abstract the social relations hidden within the act 
of producing language. This has lead to various methodological techniques such as ethno-
linguistics, ethnography of communication, discourse analysis, and critical discourse 
analysis with theorists such as Halliday, Cazden, Hymes, Labov, Mehan, and later 
linguistic theorists such as Norman Fairclough and James Gee producing important 
works that deal specifically with language as constituted by society. Additionally, other 
scholars have turned to anthropological work to enact diachronic social analyses of 
language usage. In this vein, the work of Shirley Brice Heath; Sylvia Scribner and 
Michael Cole; Brian Street; and more recent works by Niko Besinor, Deborah Brandt, 
and Cynthia Lewis have all produced important contributions to the understanding of the 
social contexts generative of literacy. 
 This understanding of language as situated within culture, as mind as situated 
within culture, and as action situated in culture and derivative of it shares, as we will see, 
a striking similarity with some of the major thrusts of Pragmatist philosophy. Michael 
Cole and James Wertsch rightfully point out that this argument of the primacy of cultural 
mediation is shared between Vygotsky and Dewey (Beyond The). Beyond a brief 
meeting of Vygotsky and Dewey when the latter visited the Soviet Union before 
Vygotsky’s death, direct references between the Pragmatists and the Soviet Psychologists 
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are painfully rare. This gulf should be understood within three historical contexts. First, 
obviously, was the social and political context of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
For example, while Vygotsky was a direct contemporary of Dewey (dying of TB in 
1937), English translations of Bakhtin and Vygotsky were not readily available until long 
after Dewey's death in 1952. It is likely that, while Vygotsky was in some form familiar 
with the work of Dewey, it is very unlikely that much of Dewey's work would have been 
readily available in the early Soviet Union (it must be remembered that Dewey presided 
over the trial of Trotsky in 1937, something that would not have endeared him to the 
official Soviet State apparatus). Second, Dewey's work in psychology (much like that of 
William James) never held any sort of "orthodoxy" status within the emerging field of 
psychology and as such was very quickly overshadowed by that of Sigmund Freud and 
later (and especially in educational circles) Jean Piaget. It is likely that, especially with 
Vygotsky, Pragmatist psychology was simply not seen as the proper conversant. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, Pragmatism has only recently reemerged after spending 
decades in a state of ill-repute with philosophers, particularly to those within the analytic 
tradition. Even in Dewey's time, his actual philosophy was seen as weak and "muddy." 
While no one questioned Dewey's status as a public intellectual and a figurehead of the 
progressive movement who seemed to be capable of opining on practically anything, it 
was primarily this that he was known for instead of the philosophical work that 
undergirded such political ideals. The idea that under such political sentiments is a robust 
philosophy worthy of serious study has only really come around in the past 30 years or 
so. This is probably the most important reason as to why such connections between 
Pragmatism and sociocultural research has been slow, uneven, and superficial. None of 
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these contexts, though, suggest any major incompatibility between the two traditions. 
 While sociocultural literacy research owes its existence and disciplinary identity 
to a particular object of inquiry (that is, "literacy"), composition studies owes its 
existence to a rather peculiar practice: the teaching of writing in the post-secondary 
educational environment. I say peculiar because this is a phenomenon that is nearly 
unique to North America and has very specific social, cultural, and historical roots. In 
particular, composition's identity, function, and purpose are inextricably linked to the site 
in which it most often occurs: the American public research university. The identity of 
composition studies has further been formed by its long association with Literature 
Studies within English Departments as well as the study of Rhetoric2 (thus explaining its 
common moniker of "comp/rhet"). This is not to say that composition studies has not 
produced scholarship of its own. Within the broader field of composition studies, there is 
a strand that has (not so unlike sociocultural literacy research) sought to understand the 
relationships between the production of meaning through language and broader social 
dynamics. For example, seminal texts within this tradition such as Richard Ohman's 
English in America, Lester Faigley's Fragments of Rationality, Judith Goleman's Working 
Theory, Tom Fox's Defending Access, and Nancy Welch's recent Living Room have all 
sought to understand the ways in which practices of teaching writing situate students in 
different ways for different ends. Other texts such as James Berlin's Rhetoric and Reality 
and Sharon Crowley's Composition in the University have sought to understand the 
history of the field and how various practices around teaching writing have been 
inextricably linked to larger social and political movements. Further, scholars in this 
                                                
2 See especially Harvey Graff’s Professing Literature, James Berlin’s Rhetoric and 
Reality, and Sharon Crowley’s Composition in the University for further discussion 
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tradition such as James Sledd, Joe Harris, Tony Scott, and Marc Bouscquet have also 
explored the ways in which the structure of labor for the teaching of writing as well as the 
university as a whole exerts influence upon the ways in which we define and practice 
writing. Importantly, what ties these works together is an overarching concern for 
evaluating the possibilities and potential for realizing democracy through writing 
instruction as well as identifying barriers to this project. This claim may seem more 
radical than it really is. Even "conservative" composition theories such as "current-
traditional rhetoric" are still in some sense concerned with "democracy," if only in that 
they seek to exclude those from it in a (misguided) belief that this might strengthen the 
state of democracy.3 Consequently, I know of no explicitly "anti-democratic" strands 
within the history of composition studies. Importantly, though, composition's democratic 
project is entering a crucible concerning the manifestly undemocratic nature of the 
growing dominance of neo-liberalism, a topic I will return to in the final chapter.  
 As I mentioned in the introduction, the theorization of the relationship between 
writing instruction and democracy defines the broader horizon of my scholarship. As a 
researcher in composition studies, my ultimate concern is an evaluation of the state of 
writing instruction at the post-secondary level with a mind towards the possibilities of 
such democratic work while identifying the barriers to such a project. While I will be 
using many of the methods of sociocultural literacy research, and in particular an 
ethnographic examination of the various social relationships that are constituent of 
literacy as realized through writing, I am primarily a scholar of composition studies. 
Because of this, the end point of my inquiry is focused on practice. More formally, the 
                                                
3 See in particular Berlin’s Rhetoric and Reality, p44-46. 
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ends of my research are grounded in political praxis, particularly as it pertains to the 
relationship of the act of writing to the expansion of democracy within the United States 
through the function of higher-education. It is precisely here that Pragmatism, especially 
as I will be formulating it in the rest of this chapter, is the crucial component of this work. 
The thread of Pragmatism I will be working with is not only a set of claims about 
knowledge, but also a tradition of writers attempting to work out the full implications of 
such claims. As Dewey realized very early, and would become one of his major 
preoccupations, these implications invariably lead to a rather radical conception of 
democracy. It is here that I define Pragmatism's work as composition's work. It is this 
that I have in mind with the title of this chapter: democracy as writing.  
 Because of this, I will not be employing Pragmatism as a replacement of 
sociocultural literacy research, but rather as an important extension of it. While literacy 
research in this vein has produced terribly important work concerning broad social 
dynamics such as race, class, gender and their relationship to literacy practices, such 
findings from research do not and cannot on their own make normative claims on the 
value of such social relations and the literacy practices they produce. As I will argue, 
Pragmatism offers us a way to build a strong case for working against the conditions 
which produce such literacy practices. Consequently, while I will not be focusing on 
elements such as gender, race, class, and so forth, such concerns remain firmly planted in 
my rearview mirror. The larger claim I will be building in later chapters is that the forms 
of literacy unleashed by political and economic demands threaten to render the traditional 
projects of social justice, equality, and inclusiveness as dead ends. In this, I see my work 
as an important component to those committed to such leftist ideas in the area of literacy 
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studies.  
 Additionally, it is important to note that while I am claiming that composition and 
the teaching of writing in the University has a long (and often tortured) relationship with 
the drive to expand democracy, this is not to say that composition studies as a whole is 
benevolent or has always had the best ideas on how to further this goal. In fact, at the 
writing of this dissertation, there is much reason to be alarmed that composition is 
unwittingly participating in its own destruction of this tradition. This is a bold claim that 
will obviously need to be handled carefully. In this instance, much like the move I will be 
making in regard to literacy studies, Pragmatism once again provides a set of ideas that 
has the potential to help recalibrate composition's own place within the left. It is here that 
I turn to an exploration of Pragmatism itself.  
 
Origins of Pragmatism 
 I am far from the first writer to rightfully feel nervous at the prospect of defining 
Pragmatism. In one sense, Pragmatism could be defined as much by the disagreements 
between "Pragmatists" (including those who deny they are any such thing to start with) as 
there are commonalities. Apologies aside, we are lucky to have several historical 
accounts of Pragmatism's birth. We are even lucky enough to know exactly when the 
word "Pragmatism" was first used in the context of a new philosophical perspective. This 
occurred in the context of a lecture by William James in 1906 in which he attributed the 
idea of "Pragmatism" to his "dear friend Charles Peirce" in describing a new method for 
evaluating philosophical claims. This method, the "Pragmatic Method," was described by 
James as such:  
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The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its 
respective practical consequences. […] If no practical difference whatever can be 
traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is 
idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical 
difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right. (28) 
 
However, this was a slightly modified version of Peirce's original formulation of the 
pragmatic maxim, which, in 1878, he described as "Consider what effects, that might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. 
Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." In his 
historical treatment of the origins of Pragmatism, Louis Menand attributes this germ of an 
idea to a group that regularly met to discuss, consider, and debate the ideas of their day. 
In addition to James and Peirce, this group--the "Metaphysical Club"--would count as its 
members such luminaries as jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.  
 What Menand's version of the story provides is an insight into both the 
intellectual culture in the mid to late 19th century. While much philosophy and theory 
today is conducted within academic departments within Universities, such a phenomena 
was nonexistent at the time. This is not to say that an intellectual culture did not exist. 
Rather, the country was literally dotted with various clubs or groups whose purpose was 
to provide a space for interested members to converse over the fashionable intellectual 
topics of the day. For example, as Bernstein notes, there were several "Kant Clubs" and 
"Hegel Clubs" that helped lay much of the foundation for the serious study of Philosophy 
in the United States (Pragmatic Turn 89). It was from one such group that W. T. Harris, a 
man who undertook the project of translating Hegel's Philosophy of Law into English, 
would eventually start the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, a journal that would 
publish papers from all the major early pragmatists. The other important facet of these 
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groups was that the membership was often comprised of a surprising diversity of 
backgrounds and professions. In the “Metaphysical Club,” James was the only one who 
could count "philosopher" as a legitimate job title. The rest of the group was comprised 
of lawyers, scientists, biologists, and so forth. Even Peirce claimed himself to be a 
practicing scientist as well as a logician and not a philosopher. 
 This influx of Kant, Hegel, and other bits of continental philosophy would leave 
its mark on Pragmatism. However, these works were being imported into America just as 
transcendentalists within the American literary scene such as Ralph Waldo Emerson were 
mounting an attack on the idea that true knowledge has one singular source (God) that 
exists outside of nature. As Cornel West suggest in his own historical treatment of 
Pragmatism, Emerson instead saw knowledge as "instrumental effects of human will as it 
is guided by human interests, which are in turn produced by transactions with other 
humans and nature" (36). This stood in stark contrast to European philosophers who saw 
knowledge as a set of representations to be justified or grounded within universal, 
unchanging laws to be discerned by rationality. Just as important, however, was the story 
going on with science. The 1859 publication of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species 
and, in particular, his theory of evolution would prove to be a crucial inspiration for the 
early Pragmatists. 
 This environment of a multi-disciplinary group considering continental 
philosophy transposed upon a growing American tradition that sought to do away with 
dualisms all while being inspired by Darwin's work would set the stage for Peirce, James, 
and Dewey. All three, for example, would develop their own nuanced appreciation for as 
well as blistering critiques of Hegel. Common to all three was an agreement that Hegel 
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was on to something in his work to point out that disunities and contradictions were not 
ontological features of reality, but were rather transposed upon reality by humans. In this 
regard, Hegel's dialectical logic would prove to be a lasting feature of Pragmatism, 
particularly in how contradictions inherent to any position require us to move beyond 
them. In an uncharacteristically personal and emotive bit a prose written late in his career, 
Dewey explained his early attraction to Hegel:  
"It is more than difficult, it is impossible, to recover that early mood. But the 
sense of divisions and separations that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a 
consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation 
of self from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful 
oppression—or, rather, they were an inward laceration. My earlier philosophic 
study had been an intellectual gymnastic. Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, 
matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no mere intellectual 
formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation. Hegel's treatment of 
human culture, of institutions and the arts, involved the same dissolution of hard-
and-fast dividing walls, and had a special attraction for me." (LW 5.153)4  
 
Later, Dewey makes perhaps an even more uncharacteristic statement in saying that 
"[w]ere it possible for me to be a devotee of any system, I still should believe that there is 
greater richness and greater variety of insight in Hegel than in any other single systematic 
philosopher—though when I say this I exclude Plato, who still provides my favorite 
philosophic reading" (LW 5.154). As we will see, the dissolution of the divisions 
between "facts" and "values" would be one of the most important characteristics of 
Pragmatism, and serves as one foundational principle for the type of Pragmatism I am 
outlining here.  
 However, while Hegel's critique of Kant's relegation of certain kinds of 
knowledge to unknowable realms would be important for Pragmatists, it was Darwin--
and in particular his notion of natural selection--that would provide the key insight as to 
                                                
4 Originally published as “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” in 1929. 
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how to fully socialize knowledge and remove all of it from realms unattainable by 
inquiry. What Pragmatists found to be particularly useful was the way in which Darwin 
did away with arguments for overarching "purpose" that is fixed in eternity that species 
aspire to fulfill. As Dewey noted, "The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut 
straight under this philosophy. If all organic adaptations are due simply to constant 
variation and the elimination of those variations which are harmful in the struggle for 
existence that is brought about by excessive reproduction, there is no call for a prior 
intelligent causal force to plan and preordain them" (MW 4.9)5. This rejection of a fixed 
eidos for species, when applied to thought, produced a radical insight. Instead of the idea 
that rationality is slowly but surely coming ever closer to the final immutable truth, 
Pragmatists were able to see something else going on. In the same aforementioned essay, 
Dewey later made this argument:  
Moreover, the conviction persists—though history shows it to be a 
hallucination—that all the questions that the human mind has asked are questions 
that can be answered in terms of the alternatives that the questions themselves 
present. But in fact intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer 
abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives they assume—an 
abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent 
interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by 
disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed 
attitude of endeavor and preference take their place. Doubtless the greatest 
dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of 
new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific 
revolution that found its climax in the Origin of Species (MW 4.14).  
 
In short, Dewey redefined Plato’s eidos (essence) as something to be determined by telos. 
However, in this Darwinian inspired understanding, there is no ultimate beginning or 
predetermined end to the telos.  
                                                
5 Essay originally published in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays 
in Contemporary Thought, 1910. 
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 From these influences and historical circumstances, Louis Menand suggests that 
what ultimately linked these three thinkers was an "idea about ideas." As he explains,  
"They all believed that ideas are not 'out there' waiting to be discovered, but are 
tools...that people devise to cope with the world in which they find themselves. 
They believed that ideas are produced not by individuals--that ideas are social. 
They believed that ideas do not develop according to some inner logic of their 
own, but are entirely dependent, like germs, on human careers and environments. 
And they believed that since ideas are provisional responses to particular 
situations, their survival spends not on their immutability but on their adaptability. 
(xi-xii)  
 
Or, as I like to frame it, Pragmatism is a conversation about the purpose, function, role, 
and constitution of ideas, belief, and truth in every day life. It is a consideration of not just 
ideas, but how ideas work. More importantly, though, these conversations Pragmatists 
have conducted on knowledge position action as the fundamental question of 
philosophical investigation. 
 This orientation has led to several stances or positions that many Pragmatists 
adopt. Since an in-depth explication of Pragmatism is not the sole purpose of this 
dissertation, I will briefly list several of these positions here: 
• Knowledge is not "out there," independent of humans and simply waiting to be 
discovered. Instead, knowledge is something produced by humans, mediated 
through social conditions, and utilized as a mechanism for dealing with 
discontinuities in everyday experiences. 
• Ideas and beliefs form the basis for all human activity, including human activity 
that results in social institutions and structures. 
• Accordingly, culture "goes all the way down" in regard to knowledge. There can 
be no "direct knowledge" of objects that escapes trans-action6 through social 
structures.  
• The universe itself is active, in motion, and still evolving. Because of this, no idea 
or belief can be "True" in the sense that it is valid for eternity, even ones 
concerning laws of physics. Because of this, knowledge is understood as always 
being fallible.  
• Despite the emphasis on "knowledge" as a product of humanity and matched to an 
                                                
6 I use the term “trans-action” here tentatively, noting that the term “mediated” suggests 
inner/outer dualisms…something Dewey would find to be erroneous.  
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active universe, it does not follow that there is no external reality. Because all 
knowledge trans-acts with and through social conditions, and this includes 
natural environments as well as intersubjective rationality, something like 
"objectivity" is possible. In other words, you cannot put a few feathers on a bus 
and expect it to fly. Knowledge is still beholden to the environment and thus 
cannot be whatever we wish in our individual minds. 
• Even though all ideas are fallible and may eventually need to be revised, because 
of the intersubjectivity of ideas in regard to culture and nature, we can identify 
ideas, beliefs, and concepts that are better or worse than others. In other words, 
we do not have to be skeptical about everything all the time.  
• Because knowledge is understood as a tool utilized through action, evaluation of 
ideas should focus on what effects the ideas have in real, lived experience. In 
other words, if two ideas produce the same results in reality, they are in all 
practicality the same thing. 
• Since knowledge is a product of social conditions, things such as the concept of 
an "individual" itself is also a product of specific social conditions. In other 
words, it's only through specific social structures that we come to have an idea of 
"an individual."  
• Humans have found many ways to reconstruct ideas when faced with 
contradictions and doubt. These different ways of resolving doubt (inquiry) 
produce different results. We can evaluate these methods by exploring the results 
they produce in accordance to desired social ends.  
 
These very broad positions serve as the backbone for much Pragmatist thought. In the 
next two sections, I will turn to four very specific concepts situated within this Pragmatist 
outlook worked out by Peirce and Dewey that are important to my research.  
 
Truth and Inquiry 
 As mentioned above, my ultimate goal is to chart a path of explication that will 
eventually bring us to Pragmatism's rather unabashed obsession with "democracy." This 
path, though, starts in a very unlikely place. I say this because Charles Sanders Peirce, the 
man William James burdens with the responsibility of originating "Pragmatism" itself, 
and where our journey towards democracy begins, could not (and would not) be 
considered as someone who was passionate about democracy. The path starts here, 
though, not because Peirce seemed to care one little bit about the expansion of 
  29 
democracy, but rather because it is in Peirce's work that the inextricably linked concepts 
of "truth" and "inquiry" are re-worked and reconstructed in such a way that justifications 
for democracy are made possible. I also start here because this is where one of the great 
forks in the roads in Pragmatism philosophy exists. In particular, the concept of "truth" 
stands at the center of a great family debate between Pragmatist philosophers. With 
"truth" comes the thorny concept of "objectivity." On one side, we have the likes of 
Richard Rorty who sees nothing but folly in maintaining any conception of truth, facts, 
and objectivity. For Rorty, these concepts carry with them a danger analogous to 
authoritarian religion. Instead, and even though he rejected the term, Rorty relies on 
something like relativism (or, more technically, ethnocentrism). However, while Rorty 
has been uncommonly successful in popularizing his brand of Pragmatism, this view is 
not the only one. All three of the classical Pragmatists (Peirce, James, and Dewey) and 
many more recent "neo-Pragmatists" such as Putnam, Bernstein, Misak, Tallisse, 
Brandom, and even in some ways Jurgen Habermas have all sought to argue that a 
Pragmatist conception of objectivity is indeed viable. Further, it is through this 
Pragmatist conception of objectivity, truth, and inquiry that Pragmatism's political 
implications become fully apparent.  
 To understand the connections between Pragmatism, truth, inquiry, and 
Democracy, as well as this schism between relativism and objectivism, we must start 
with a consideration of how Pragmatism sought to overcome the problems with 
philosophy that contemporary science illuminated. A helpful way to understand the point 
in which Pragmatism most fruitfully intervenes in philosophy is through Richard 
Bernstein's concept of Cartesian Anxiety. As Bernstein notes, the split between 
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objectivists and relativists has been a continual plague of philosophy. Objectivism, as he 
describes, refers to the  
basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or 
framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of 
rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. [...] Objectivism is 
closely related to foundationalism and the search for an Archimedean point. The 
objectivist maintains that unless we can ground philosophy, knowledge, or 
language in a rigorous manner we cannot avoid radical skepticism. (Beyond 8)  
 
On the other side is the relativist. The relativist, appealing to any examination of the most 
fundamental concepts that philosophers have asserted, have always noted that such 
concepts are never ahistorical or universal, but "must be understood as relative to a 
specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or 
culture" (8). Where this gets interesting, though, is what philosophers have understood as 
being at stake in this split. As Bernstein points out, nowhere is this more evident than 
with the project Rene Descartes embarks upon: "With a chilling clarity Descartes leads us 
with an apparent and ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either 
there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot 
escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral 
chaos" (OR 18). The anxiety, then, is the quest for certainty as the triumph over madness 
and chaos. Bernstein paints this in stark terms:  
We may even purge ourselves of the quest for certainty and indubitability. But at 
the heart of the objectivist's vision, and what makes sense of his or her passions, is 
the belief that there are or must be some fixed, some permanent constraints to 
which we can appeal and which are secure and stable. At its most profound level 
the relativist's message is that there are no such basic constraints to which we can 
appeal and which are secure and stable. (19)  
 
  Peirce provided the crucial insight to getting around these problems: a 
modification of how we understand the process through which a "belief" becomes "fact." 
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As he wrote in 1878, "I only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have 
an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things" 
(CP 5:401). While this sentiment was the avenue in which Peirce first formulated his 
pragmatic maxim—"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object" (CP 5:402)—, his ultimate project 
was to outline a way in which we might not only clarify ideas but evaluate them. For 
Peirce, this was a necessary project as science had done away with previous ways of 
knowing and replaced it with a sort of experimentalism. In one of his early essays, "Some 
Consequences of Four Incapacities," Peirce notes that scholasticism had been replaced by 
Cartesianism but that "modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very 
different platform from this" (CP 5:265). In this, Peirce proceeds to build a case against 
the Cartesianism that dominated philosophy in his time by noting four distinguishing 
features that separated the philosophy of Descartes and the "scholasticism" that it 
replaced. First, Descartes asserted that all knowledge must begin with universal doubt. 
For Peirce, this was a stark contrast from scholasticism that relied upon some 
fundamentals and which were never questioned. Second, Cartesian philosophy asserted 
that the veracity of true knowledge was to be attained within the individual 
consciousness. Previously, the veracity of knowledge was to be located in traditions and 
authorities within the Catholic Church. Third, whereas philosophy before Descartes relied 
upon "multiform argumentation," Descartes sought to replace this with a single thread 
grounded in premises that were often inconspicuous. Fourth, and finally, while 
Scholasticism sought to "explain all created things," Cartesianism often times sought to 
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place certain elements beyond the realm of understanding, except for, as Peirce 
mockingly put it, "to say that 'God makes them so' is to be regarded as an explanation" 
(CP 5:264).  
 These four features of Cartesianism were simply untenable to Peirce. First, Peirce 
notes that such "universal doubt" is impossible. While we can position ourselves to 
methodologically doubt some things at the beginning of inquiry, there are just as many 
things that simply do not occur to us as a focus of doubt. Therefore, such "initial 
skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the 
Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs 
which in form he has given up" (CP 5:265). Second, Peirce notes that Descartes' 
emphasis on the individual mind creates a situation in which they have to essentially 
assert that "whatever I am convinced of, is true." Peirce mocks this by noting that with 
this as a foundation, metaphysicians will agree on such a standard of certainty, but will 
never be able to agree on anything else. Third, Peirce sees nothing but danger and folly in 
suggesting that there is but one thread of argumentation that must be created for all other 
knowledge to depend on. Even worse, for Peirce, is the suggestion that it start with 
premises that cannot be subjected to scrutiny. Fourth and finally, Peirce responds to the 
bracketing of some phenomena as inexplicable by arguing that "Now that anything is thus 
inexplicable can only be known by reasoning from signs. But the only justification of an 
inference from signs is that the conclusion explains the fact. To suppose the fact 
absolutely inexplicable, is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable" 
(CP 5:265).  
 For Peirce (as well as Dewey), science provided the inspiration to a way to get 
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beyond the problems of Cartesian philosophy. In his rather amazing essay "The Fixation 
of Belief," Peirce identifies the project thusly: "The object of reasoning is to find out, 
from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know" 
(CP 5:365). On its own, this proclamation is rather pedestrian. It is how Peirce works out 
the method of this object that is fascinating. He first starts by identifying the trigger of the 
whole process: doubt. For Peirce, the opposite of doubt is "belief," something which 
"guide[s] our desires and shape[s] our actions" (CP 5:371). What marks "doubt" and 
"belief" as different is that "belief" leads to a feeling of sureness about how to act 
whereas doubt never produces such an effect. Therefore, the purpose of doubt is that it 
spurs action with the intent of arriving at a belief. For Peirce, this is the basic concept 
behind inquiry. The sole purpose of inquiry is the settlement of a belief or opinion that 
can guide action and alleviate us from the feeling of doubt.  
 On the surface, this conception seems to be riddled with holes. As Peirce notes, 
"If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a 
habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking as answer to a question any we 
may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce 
to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything that might 
disturb it" (CP 5:377)? For example, Peirce recounts the advice given to him to avoid 
reading an article lest he be swayed by arguments that he did not fully understand. 
Additionally, people might simply stick to their beliefs at all costs, no matter what they 
encounter. This sort of pride in not "flip-flopping" is something we see commonly today 
in political rhetoric. Additionally, people might simply seek to ignore anything that might 
make them feel uncomfortable (something Peirce likens to an Ostrich sticking its head in 
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the sand). For Peirce, these examples are all part of a broader method of fixing belief: 
tenacity.  
 On an abstracted individual level, Peirce seems to have no fault with this method 
of tenacity. In practice, however, he thinks it is impossible. His reasons why this is so is 
perhaps one of the most crucial insights of all. As he writes: 
The social impulse is against it. The man who adopts it will find that other men 
think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him, in some saner 
moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his 
confidence in his belief. This conception, that another man's thought or sentiment 
may be equivalent to one's own, is a distinctly new step, and a highly important 
one. It arises from an impulse too strong in man to be suppressed, without danger 
of destroying the human species. Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall 
necessarily influence each other's opinions; so that the problem becomes how to 
fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community. (CP 5:378, emphasis 
mine) 
 
Once the project is restated in these terms, Peirce can start untangling the more 
interesting aspects. One solution to the question of how to fix beliefs in the community is 
to construct an authoritarian social institution that is charged with regulating, validating, 
and controlling meaning. Peirce clearly has in mind the Catholic Church as an example 
par excellence here. This method of fixing belief, which Peirce labels as the "method of 
authority" has been undeniably successful, despite the fact that "[c]ruelties always 
accompany this system; and when it is consistently carried out, they become atrocities of 
the most horrible kind in the eyes of any rational man" (CP 5:379). Still, according to 
Peirce, "For the mass of mankind, then, there is perhaps no better method than this. If it is 
their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then slaves they ought to remain" (CP 
5:380). As I mentioned before, no one could ever mistake Peirce for a democrat. 
 However, just like Peirce felt that the individual method of tenacity would fail 
simply because individuals would encounter other individuals with different beliefs, 
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Peirce notes that even within the most "priest-ridden society" in which meaning is strictly 
controlled, there would be those who would look beyond their own current culture to see 
that other cultures in other places, and in other times, have held different beliefs. It is 
these few individuals, then, that needed something that would go beyond tenacity or 
authority. Peirce offers one last unsatisfactory method, and that is to simply assent to 
whatever is "reasonable." He refers to this as the a priori method. This method, though, 
has been disastrous according to Peirce. For example, even though "metaphysicians" all 
seemed to rely on rationality, they still managed to disagree with each other. What is 
missing from this method is experience. But by experience, Peirce is also not referring to 
a sort of atomistic "experience" that an individual might have, but rather experience as 
something shared amongst a group of people. 
 Finally, then, we can piece this all together. Once Peirce rejected the spectator 
conception of knowledge in which "Truth" is simply discovered and denied the Cartesian 
concepts of deep skepticism and introspection, experience became the crucial linchpin of 
all knowing. Human activity is rooted in beliefs that guide not only our interpretations 
and understandings of the world we encounter, but also guide us in understanding how to 
respond to the undulations of the world (and, hence, experience). Beliefs (and our actions 
rooted in them) remain in a sort of stasis or harmony (or habit) until, due to the plurality 
of experience within social groups, we encounter different and alternative ideas. The 
result of such an encounter is doubt. Doubt is the great lever of action in the formation of 
new ideas. Over time, humans have developed several ways to deal with doubt. Since we 
are social beings, the real question is not a fixation of belief in individuals but within 
large groups. One effective solution to this has been through centralized authority. 
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However, this will always be incomplete because some members of the group will 
eventually find a way to look outside their own culture and their own time to realize there 
are indeed alternative ways of being. Because of this, Peirce looked to science as an ideal 
model for the way in which, instead of ideas having to correspond to authoritative 
traditions or personal / private reasoning, ideas were evaluated by a community of 
inquirers against a shared outer-world or "experience." Peirce’s definition of science is 
highly suggestive in understanding “truth” in a pragmatist sense and worth quoting at 
length: 
Science is to mean for us a mode of life whose single animating purpose is to find 
out the real truth [emphasis mine], which pursues this purpose by a well-
considered method, founded on thorough acquaintance with such scientific results 
already ascertained by others as may be available, and which seeks cooperation 
[sic] in the hope that the truth may be found, if not by any of the actual inquirers, 
yet ultimately by those who come after them and who shall make use of their 
results. It makes no difference how imperfect a man's knowledge may be, how 
mixed with error and prejudice; from the moment that he engages in an inquiry in 
the spirit described, that which occupies him is science [emphasis in original], as 
the word will here be used. (CP 7:54) 
  
Or, as Misak helpfully puts it,  
The core of the pragmatist conception of truth is that a true belief would be the 
best belief, were we to inquire as far as we could on the matter. We shall see that 
'best' here amounts to 'best fits with all experience and argument,' not the kind of 
'best' that other pragmatists, James and Rorty, for instance, have flirted with--
consoling, best for our lives, or most comfortable. A true belief, rather, is a belief 
that could not be improved upon, a belief that would forever meet the challenges 
of reasons, argument, and evidence. (49)  
 
However, and what is terribly important to note in this formulation, is that "truths" are 
never private and are always provisional simply because the "hypothetical end of 
inquiry" (as it is sometimes phrased) can never be reached simply because the world 
(including humanity) is always changing. Also important to note is that this conception of 
"truth" and "inquiry" does not rest on consensus or agreement, although such moments 
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may be sufficient to temporarily suspend inquiry. The end result of inquiry is belief 
which is the foundation of our actions (through habits). This last point is perhaps the 
most interesting because it shows how inquiry is always reformatory at a minimum and 
often is potentially revolutionary. 
 As such, the Cartesian Anxiety that focuses on the tension between "objectivism" 
and "relativism" is effectively dissolved. On one hand, this Pragmatist conception of truth 
agrees with the relativists that no truth exists outside of history. However, the Pragmatist 
also denies that this means truths cannot exist at all. In other words, it is through this that 
we can finally understand Hilary Putnam's oft-repeated claim "that one can be both 
fallibilistic and antisceptical is perhaps the basic insight of American Pragmatism" 
(Pragmatism: Open Question 21). In the realm of scientific knowledge, such a conception 
of truth is fairly uncontroversial. However, when applied to political and moral concepts, 
the scene dramatically shifts. Peirce himself, as Misak notes, did not think such a method 
of inquiry was fit for questions concerning morality and politics. However, other 
Pragmatists have sought to flesh out the implications of such a notion of "truth" has for 
political, ethical, and moral deliberation.  
 I want to finish out this section with an example that I will return to in Chapter 5 
of this dissertation. One victim of the belief that "objective truth" doesn't exist is that it 
precludes modern liberal democracies of envisioning a way in which conflicting 
conceptions of how to live "the good life" can be adjudicated. This is premised on an 
assumption that there exists no "objective" truth that is transcendent to the conflicting 
ends that could serve as a point of evaluation. However, as Pragmatists will point out, 
such an objective, eternal and ahistorical "Truth" is not needed; local, slightly less grand 
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"truths" produced through social inquiry work well enough. Once we rid ourselves of that 
faulty assumption, it becomes apparent that we can in fact engage in inquiring as to 
whether one person's conception of the ends of life are indeed better or worse than 
someone else's, especially where they come into conflict with each other. Putnam uses 
the example of female circumcision here, noting that some might "reject the idea that we 
can criticize traditional societies even for such sexist practices as female circumcision" 
and that "traditional societies are viewed by these thinkers as so superior to our own 
societies that we have no right to disturb them in any way" (Renewing 183). Putnam 
describes it this way: "what I think we are seeing is the revival of the myth of the noble 
savage" (183). The problem with this idea is that it ignores the possibility that women 
living in societies that practice female circumcision would want to know about alternative 
ways of thinking about the practice and are incapable of deciding for themselves which 
might be better. In short, the "noble savage myth" blocks the path of inquiry. Similarly, 
James Garrison notes that the anxiety or fear over "indoctrination" via education is 
misplaced simply because it assumes a passive instead of active mind. The active mind, 
one that is capable of inquiry, is not a mere receptacle of information to be delivered 
hypodermically. Thus, since indoctrination is inevitable in the process of education, the 
real solution is "inoculation," or rather teaching students to utilize inquiry so that further 
attempts of "indoctrination" are never accepted wholesale (Paradox 267-8). In the next 
section, I turn to an analysis of "experience" and "habit," especially as it is worked out in 
John Dewey's philosophy.  
 
Experience, Habit, and Democracy 
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 The emphasis on testing knowledge against experience is more fully explored in 
John Dewey's work. Dewey opens his major work on metaphysics, Experience and 
Nature, by discussing the difference between naturalistic sciences and western 
Philosophy. In naturalistic sciences, "experience" has such a fundamental role in what 
goes on that it is not even named. This is a departure from before when there were 
arguments over whether the experience of empirical research would win out over 
Cartesian emphases on intuition. Essentially, it breaks down like this: What is valued in 
empirical research is exactly that which is experienced. This is a stark contrast to 
philosophy that assumes the theory itself is the end point, even if it does not somehow 
lead back to experience (LW 1:11)7, something Dewey referred to as “the philosophic 
fallacy" (LW 1:35) "Experience," then, is the test of what value things have in lining up 
with our everyday moments. For instance, what leads us to accept or reject a hypothesis 
is our experience of testing it. If we try out a hypothesis and it doesn't work, then it is 
trashed. If it helps us to predict and understand something, then we keep it. This is where 
"experience" comes in. If we do not include "experience," then we would stop at the 
completion of stating a hypothesis, relying on how pretty, interesting, or "rational" it may 
be, even if it would have no useful outcome if actually tested. This is where theories, 
hypothesis, morals, whatever are thus mediated through how they actually work if we are 
to put them into practice, and using their usefulness in practice as the reason for affirming 
or denying them. Experience, then, becomes the way in which we understand everything. 
 To try to explain this another way, we can think of the statement "the most apples 
that will fit in this barrel is three." What makes this true is that we can actually put three 
                                                
7 Originally published as Experience and Nature, 1925. 
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apples in a barrel and see if there is any room for more. By using the act of trying out the 
statement as a means to believe it, we're in a better position than to just accept the 
statement out of hand using extra-empirical ways of believing (such as some sort of 
logical or rational statement that tries to assert the validity of the statement without 
recourse to actually putting apples in the barrel). The danger of an external justification 
for truth without experience is this: what if the apples evolved to become twice as large 
as before? With out including experience, we would believe in something that may or 
may not potentially hold any connection to what is useful. We would then get three 
apples and find only one fits, and have to throw away the other two. 
 Consequently, Dewey's concept of "experience" is the crucial linchpin for 
understanding how we can know and do anything after we have rejected conceptions of 
knowledge and truth that rely on static, universal forms. Since Darwin's work replaced a 
completed, unmoving world with a world and universe that was still in progress, it is this 
connection between the natural world that is constantly in flux and our everyday 
interactions with it that form the bedrock of what we know. Additionally, if the universe 
itself is still in the process of becoming, then it opens up the possibility that we possess 
the power to increase the quality of our lives instead of being trapped in a deterministic 
trajectory that only has to play itself out. In a sense, then, like Peirce, it is "science" that 
Dewey casts his lot with instead of "philosophy," for "through science we have secured a 
degree of power and prediction and of control; through tools, machinery and an 
accompanying technique we have made the world more conformable to our needs, a more 
secure abode" (LW 1:46). However, Dewey was also quick to note that not all 
"experiences" were "an experience" that would lead to knowledge and meaning. The 
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crucial distinction, made most clearly in Art as Experience, between the experiences and 
an experience was that an experience "marked out from what went before and what came 
after" (LW 10:44)8. Unlike experiences, which we are constantly bombarded with, to 
have an experience is to have a period of time marked by a singular quality "pervades the 
entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts" (LW 10:45). What is 
required to actually have an experience is a perception that joins both action and 
consequences (LW 10:52). This is critical because it is having an experience that not only 
reformulates what went before the experience, but also modifies our future responses to 
future stimuli. The accumulation of these experiences formed what Dewey referred to as 
"habit.” It is through habit that our general modes of responses to life are solidified, only 
to be changed when another experience requires it (LW 1:24). This is important as if it 
were not for habit, we would be forced to continually revise our knowledge with every 
second of every day, an exhausting thought to be sure! Consequently, Dewey is able to 
explain how we come to "know" things (experience) as well as why we act or respond in 
certain ways to external stimuli (habit). 
 For Dewey, "The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes 
of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way 
of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness of accessibility to certain classes of 
stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. 
It means will" (MW 14:32)9. Or, as Westbrook defines Dewey's Habit,  
'Habit' was yet another of those commonplace terms Dewey insisted on defining 
against the grain of ordinary usage. For him, it meant not simply routinized 
behavior (though that could be a component of a habit) but something much 
                                                
8 Art and Experience was published in 1934 
9 Originally published as Human Nature and Conduct in 1922. 
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broader. Habit was 'human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in 
that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or 
systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in 
quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued 
subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity. (Dewey and 
American Democracy, 287)  
 
In other words, it isn't just routinized activity, but rather a guiding force of future activity. 
Habit guides the ways or modes of response. 
 Dewey sees habit much like he sees physiological functions. Breathing was not 
just an act of the lungs, but also included the environment (air). Habits are through and 
through permeable to the social environment. The only difference, though, between 
breathing and habits were that habits are always social. What is also of interest to note 
here is that habits are not necessarily linguistically acquired, although they are always 
mediated through language and communication. Dewey argued that the customs of any 
society were its prevailing habits. Further, Dewey argued that individual "minds" were, in 
fact, the product of customs and not the other way around. Hence why education would 
be so dramatically important to the continuity of a society. Crucially, Dewey wrote that 
"Customs persist because individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by 
prior customs. An individual usually acquire the morality as he inherits the speech of his 
social group" (MW 14:43). 
 To risk oversimplification, we can think of it this way, starting first with a 
physiological example: A child encounters a flight of stairs in their home that they must 
traverse multiple times a day. This flight of stairs is comprised of exactly 10 steps leading 
up to a landing and another 4 after the landing. As the child grows, this particular flight 
of stairs becomes so utterly familiar that the child is able to bound up and down the stairs 
with increasing energy, knowing confidently where the steps begin and end, eventually 
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learning to skip stairs in order to move up and down them faster. The knowledge of the 
stairs in relation to physical activity becomes almost automatic. However, one summer 
the child goes away for a summer camp. While away at summer camp, the parents 
remodel the house adding a few stairs at the top and removing some on the lower landing. 
Even though the child knows of this remodeling, the first time up the stairs results in a 
rather nasty fall when the child miscalculates her footing. This pain thus triggers 
something the child has not had to do in a long time: evaluate the number of steps in each 
section of the flight of stairs. The very real and felt "pain" thus serves as the motivating 
factor for a reevaluation of something that had been entrusted to habit. Like these 
physical stairs, ideas also are internalized. And like the remodeled stairs no longer fitting 
the previously acquired habits of action, the felt effects of a changing environment spurs 
reform. The trick, for Dewey, is to not let encrusted habits get in the way of this ability to 
reform our beliefs about the world. 
 For Dewey, "habit" was not just essential in understanding human conduct, but 
was crucial to understanding how reform might happen. In the introduction to Human 
Nature and Conduct, his major work on the concept of habit, Dewey starts out by 
describing two common ways of thinking through social reform. One bases the idea of 
morality on something intrinsic or "mysteriously cooped up within personality" (MW 
14:10). Because institutions are built from individuals, good individuals are seen as 
synonymous with good institutions. Therefore, to change human institutions one must 
first purify the human heart or soul. The other is basically the opposite, that there is 
nothing stable in the human and as such we are completely porous to institutions. 
Therefore, the solution is the opposite: we must change institutions first and individuals 
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will simply follow. Dewey points out that the latter is hopeless because it leaves no room 
for leverage. We can only hope for accidental change, or we must appeal to a teleological 
source or "spirit" guiding us toward perfection. It removes intelligent action from the 
equation, and as such we must simply wait it out. Dewey finds this untenable.  
 Dewey's way out between these two unacceptable positions works by 
reformulating the starting point: "We can recognize that all conduct is interaction 
between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social" (MW 14:9). 
Why is interaction important? Because it locates social change in how we use the world 
around us, thus avoiding—to use Dewey’s terms—the basement (purify the soul) or attic 
(purify the institutions) route. It puts the emphasis on interaction as opposed to enacting 
change or waiting for change to be enacted upon you (both of which are impossible). This 
then is why education is absolutely central to the whole task. Through education we can 
modify the way in which we interact with the world around us. As Dewey says, "Then we 
shall see that progress proceeds in two ways, and that freedom is found in that kind of 
interaction which maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for 
something [...] When we look at the problem as one of an adjustment to be intelligently 
attained, the issue shifts from within personality an engineering issues, the establishment 
of arts of education and social guidance" (MW 14:9-10). Dewey ends the intro by tying 
this all into his brand of Pragmatism, noting that all action is "an invasion of the future," 
and "conflict and uncertainty are ultimate traits." However, Dewey casts his lot with 
science, writing that "A morals based on study of human nature instead of upon disregard 
for it would find the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and would 
thereby ally ethics with physics and biology" (MW 14:11). This does not mean that it 
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would fix everything forever. As the environment changes, we have to continually 
reinvestigate and re-test our ideas. Dewey was a meliorist, but notes that progressive 
development need not simply happen by accident: we can attempt to take control of it.  
 It is important to recall that Peirce detected several ways in which humans dealt 
with doubt (method of tenacity, of authority, etc), each of them producing a different 
result. This then is where Dewey's discussion of "habit" adds an interesting missing piece 
to the puzzle: why exactly is it that we (as individuals and as a community) deal with 
doubt in the ways that we do? If we keep with the idea that conduct is "interaction 
between elements of human nature and the environment," it becomes apparent why social 
structures and political arrangements matter a great deal in regard to the ways in which 
knowledge is produced. After all, "inquiry" itself is a form of human activity or conduct. 
Once we grant Dewey this position, it becomes readily apparent why radical participatory 
democracy is the ideal political structure. In The Public and its Problems, Dewey 
famously--and cryptically--wrote that "[Democracy] will have its consummation when 
free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication" 
(LW 2:351)10. This statement has generated a lot of interest and commentary; 
unfortunately, much of it has focused on the "art of full and moving communication" and 
not so much the "free social inquiry" part of the equation. This misses something subtle 
yet incredibly important, and that is what democracy was good for. As Hilary Putnam 
writes, "[For Dewey] democracy is not just one form of social life among other workable 
forms of social life; it is the precondition for the full application of intelligence to the 
solution of social problems" (Renewing 180). In other words, "Democracy" is a social 
                                                
10 The Public and its Problems was first published in 1927. 
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and political arrangement done in the service of "free social inquiry" animated through 
"the art of full and moving communication." Putnam and others such as Richard 
Shusterman and Dewey's intellectual biographer Robert Westbrook have referred to this 
as the epistemological justification of democracy. 11 
 Previous conceptions of nature, knowledge, truth, and meaning as static, given, 
and discoverable gave rise to political theories that aimed to deal with the world as it was 
understood. Dewey's radical democracy, however, was "self-correcting" in that it looked 
toward creative and new solutions for new problems instead of trying to solve new 
problems with old, worn out solutions. In short, it looked to social inquiry. In describing 
the "ideal society" in Democracy and Education, Dewey sets out two benchmarks for 
judging the quality of a society: "How numerous and varied are the interests which are 
consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association? 
(MW 9:89)12. In the first instance, Dewey claims that the best societies were marked by a 
quality that prevented some people as being educated into masters and others into slaves. 
This quality was the ability for interests to be shared by as many people as possible (MW 
9:90). Thus, the first quality of Dewey's ideal society is that all in a society should be free 
and able to participate in understanding how their interests were interconnected with the 
interests of others. In the second instance, free interplay with "other forms of association" 
was necessary for "isolation makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, for 
static and selfish ideals within the group (MW 9:93). It is worth quoting Dewey at length 
on these points: 
                                                
11 See Shusterman’s essay “Putnam and Cavell on the Ethics of Democracy” and 
Westbrook’s book Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth for further 
discussion. 
12 Democracy and Education was first published in 1916 
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"The two elements in our criterion both point to democracy. The first signifies not 
only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but 
greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social 
control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups (once 
isolated so far as intention could keep up a separation) but change in social 
habit—its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced 
by varied intercourse. And these two traits are precisely what characterize the 
democratically constituted society" (MW 9:92, emphasis mine). 
 
In regard to education, this sort of radical democracy demands its own system of 
"deliberate and systematic education." In one of the more crucial segments of Democracy 
and Education, Dewey writes: "The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar 
fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage 
cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. 
Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a 
substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. 
But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of government; it is 
primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (MW 9:93). 
Indeed Dewey did have high hopes for deliberate, systematic, and public education, for 
nothing less than the success of the entire democratic society rested on its shoulders. 
 For Dewey, having rejected any sort of transcendent teleological assumptions of 
human growth and development, the development of the democratic government was 
largely a product of random chance. In The Public and its Problems, Dewey opens the 
third chapter noting this fact and then going on to assert that if left to chance, democracy 
can go away as easily as it has come (LW 2:78). It is only with our own intelligent action 
that we can preserve democracy and, further, use it to better the world we find ourselves 
in. This intelligent action aimed at turning democracy as a random form of government 
into democracy as a deliberate way of life was the domain of education. As Dewey 
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pointed out in the beginning of Democracy and Education, all societies utilized education 
for social continuity and control, but unless we could define the ideal society, all 
education to this end would be fruitless. Having declared his conception of the ideal 
society, the questions became: what sort of education would produce this sort of radical 




 It might be easiest to understand what Dewey was thinking by quickly explaining 
how the classrooms at the Lab school in Chicago under Dewey were run. Unlike 
"traditional" classrooms in which students "learned" concepts out of textbooks and 
manuals by rote and unlike so called "new education" classrooms based on Rousseau 
where students were simply allowed to do as they please, Dewey's classroom can be 
understood as directed inquiry. Since democracy, as Dewey understood it, was not a mere 
system of governance but was a way of living with others, Dewey's classroom aimed to 
engage students in the "mode of associated living" from the very beginning. Further, 
since knowledge was, for Dewey, the result of using materials and ideas to work through 
problems, classroom activities were organized around projects and problems that the 
class, as a group, had to work together to accomplish. At the heart of this was what 
Dewey termed "occupations." These were essentially modes of activity that in someway 
run parallel to something that happens in social life. For instance, discussing one group of 
students, Westbrook describes how "the six-year-old students in the school, building on 
experiences with home activities they had had in kindergarten, concentrated their work 
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on 'occupations serving the home.' They built a model farm in the sandtable in their 
classroom, and in the schoolyard they planted a crop of winter wheat." The result of 
doing so was that "the child's interest in a particular activity of his own (building a model 
farm) served as the foundation for instruction in a body of subject matter (skills in 
measurement and the mathematics of fractions) but also how this method introduced 
children to the methods of experimental problem-solving in which mistakes were an 
important part of learning" (Dewey and American Democracy 103). It is exactly these 
"problematic situations" that were key to Dewey's classrooms as they allowed students to 
actively engage in not only building up knowledge and interests but also sharing them 
with classmates, thus satisfying both of Dewey's ideal qualities of a society. Further, and 
perhaps more importantly, we see Dewey's key concepts of experience and habit deeply 
informing the classroom. While it is clear to see how experience in working through 
these problematic situations served as the vehicle for "learning," the role of habit was just 
as important. In regard to habit it, it is important that these problems were solved through 
conjoint activity and not individually, thus helping to solidify these ways of interactions 
within the students to carry beyond the classroom. 
 The ultimate hope was not to simply teach students "content." This was a concern, 
as it is in any education, but more important was a question of reproduction. Should 
education reproduce society through inculcating certain behaviors and habits in students? 
Dewey did not think so. For him, education in a democratic society was important 
because it could serve to reconstruct society in a continuous manner, not simply 
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reproduce it (MW 8:412).13 Claims that Dewey was a gradualist liberal interested only in 
piecemeal change have to be measured against Dewey's steadfast commitment to making 
social reconstruction possible. While it was true that Dewey did not think simply 
replacing one social structure with another would yield revolution due to persistent habits 
(MW 14:77), we might ponder what might happen over the course of a single generation 
or so had Dewey's radical vision of education caught on. Unfortunately, as Westbrook is 
quick to point out, while Democracy and Education was uncompromising in its 
descriptions of education and democracy, what was lacking was any sort of political 
strategy for educational reform (Dewey and American Democracy 179), especially 
considering that the business class and industrial capitalists had already turned to 
appropriate education for their own purposes (MW 7:100)14, something contemporary 
educators are all too familiar with. 
 
Dewey and Composition Studies 
 While the name of Charles Sanders Peirce has rarely surfaced in composition 
studies, Dewey's name is not so unfamiliar. In general, there are two ways in which 
Dewey's work still appears. First, as noted earlier, Dewey's name often appears in the 
context of discussing a historical moment of progressiveness in the United States that is 
no longer relevant. However, in the past 30 years, there has been a small group of writers 
concerned with trying to incorporate Dewey's work into the field of composition and 
writing instruction. The trajectory of these "New Deweyans" as I have been calling them 
                                                
13 Originally published as “Education Versus Trade-Training: Reply to David Snedden” 
in 1915. 
14 Originally published as “An Undemocratic Proposal” in 1913. 
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is barely visible yet, since 1980, undeniably exists. After discussing the ways in which 
these writers have sought to apply Dewey to composition, I will return to this concept of 
habit and discuss why ignoring habit prevents the "Deweyan classroom" as being 
anything more than an abstract concept that from time to time makes the round in the 
relevant journals.  
 In the 1980 edited collection entitled Reinventing the Rhetorical Tradition, Janet 
Emig boldly proclaims that "John Dewey is everywhere in our work" (12). While 
Dewey's name can be found from time to time in composition literature (after all, he was 
alive for the first 60 years of composition in America), little theoretical attention was paid 
to him until this point. Usually when Dewey's name was invoked, it was done as a nod to 
a not so distant past and its own progressive movement. What marks Emig's mention of 
Dewey as different is that she is looking at the ideas of Dewey instead of simply the 
legacy he had come to represent. But for Emig, Dewey's work is only everywhere in our 
work because of his influence on Rosenblatt's 1978 book The Reader, the Text, and the 
Poem. Emig seems to see this book as being one of the most important works in the field 
at the moment--a moment that would quickly fade. But it is in Rosenblatt's work that the 
"transactional" nature of texts and readers is explicated at length. This view point, that 
both subjects and languages exist within some sort of tension that changes both is 
something that would be durable, especially with much of the post-structuralist work that 
was making its presence felt in the field starting around this time. Emig was one of the 
first, though surely not the last, to point out that the fruits of post-structuralism created a 
friendlier atmosphere for Deweyan philosophy. Emig, in constructing her own tradition, 
squeezes as much as she can out of the "transactionalist" banner, calling up a new 
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tradition populated with names like Darwin, Piaget, Vygotsky, Luria, and Polanyi 
(14,15), ignoring much of the dissonance between all these thinkers. Nonetheless, it is 
this constructed "tacit tradition" with Dewey at the helm that has become the rallying cry 
for every single writer attempting to align composition with Dewey in the past 30 years.  
 It wouldn't be until the 1990s in which a group of compositionists (Stanley Fish 
notwithstanding here) would return to this "tacit" tradition in order to more fully 
explicate what it might mean. What is striking about the work of Fishman, Russell, and 
Jones, the three major theorists trying to connect Dewey to composition in the 1990s, and 
Crick in 2003, is that all of them are primarily preoccupied with the pieces left behind by 
the "postmodern" revolution in composition. As Jones notes, "Faigley and Berlin have 
proposed composition courses that emphasize the influence of language upon a writer's 
thought," but that "[t]hese postmodern practices [...] undermine the agency of the students 
and the authority of the instructor" (Beyond). Of course, for Jones, the way forward lies 
in the "tacit tradition" of John Dewey. Similarly, Fishman, seeking to align 
"expressivists" such as Peter Elbow to the Deweyan legacy, asserts that "contrary to what 
Bartholomae, Berlin, and Bizzell have said, the goal of the expressivists--to help students 
grow in their ability to understand their own experiences--is not incompatible with 
learning disciplinary language" (Expressivism 654). This debate, then, is the occasion for 
reassessing Dewey. 
 To run the risk of oversimplifying the debate, expressivists asserted that external 
impositions were to blame for hindering a writer in "expressing" their inner self through 
written communication. For constructivists, the problem wasn't so much that things were 
"getting in the way" of a writer expressing their true self, but that a "true self" did not 
  53 
even exist and, further, was constituted by Discourse. As Crick would note much later in 
2003 while discussing the turn away from expressivist pedagogy, "We thus turn away 
from an expressivism in which artistic expression represents our inner mental states and 
toward a constructivism in which such expression re-represents the social and discursive 
structures that constitute the human subject" (256). The problem, though, is that the 
problem isn't answered or solved by moving from an internal self to an external 
Discursive element. Instead, there is only a shift of terminology whereby "[t]he only 
difference is that expressivism posits a plurality of individual minds while constructivism 
posits a single, ubiquitous mind" (Crick 258). Since the question essentially remains the 
same, the same set of problems remain in play; namely, we still have no way to theorize 
and consequently understand and enact agency and social change through writing. If we 
are to step aside and let the students express their true inner "selves," then we are in no 
position to interrogate or critique what might come out. Conversely, if we understand 
student writing as the end result of Discourse and subject formation, it isn't the student 
who is writing, but rather discourses are speaking the student, yet again shutting us off 
from being in a position to effect change. As Crick dryly notes, "such is the state of 
composition as long as it chooses to remain mired in the premises of the 
expressivism/constructivism debate" (256). 
 The way out of this seemingly impossible theoretical trap was Dewey's concept of 
experience. David Russell: "Throughout his career as an educator, Dewey insisted that 
learning must begin with the experience of the student but lead toward disciplinary 
knowledge—the activities (habits) of the groups that the student is or may be a part of" 
(Beyond). Donald Jones: "The non-foundational alternative of Deweyan pragmatism 
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heralds anti-foundationalism's subsequent emphasis on language without ignoring the 
epistemological importance of experience." Stephen Fishman: "I find that Dewey's theory 
of perception helps us understand students' experiences during revision as they attempt 
the double-task of conserving and reforming, of evaluating and building upon their 
familiar beliefs" (Explicating 316). Donald Jones, again: "For a composition pedagogy 
based on Deweyan pragmatism, student writers would learn to be agents of their ideas 
without imagining themselves to be the sole authors of their own thoughts. The starting 
point of a pragmatist writing course would be the primacy of experience" (Beyond). 
Nathan Crick: "The very act of communication requires an individual to give form to 
what had previously been formless, and in doing so changes the attitude of that person 
toward his or her own experiences." (270). Obviously, experience is key. 
 The reason for this turn to Dewey's "experience" is summed up by Crick: "the 
pragmatic alternative is a positive departure from the entrenched ideological binaries of 
the discipline; it moves discussions away from debates concerning origins and toward 
critical investigations of possible effects" (257). This, of course, is precisely how 
Dewey's "experience" works. As noted before, experience for Dewey was the bedrock of 
all knowledge. It was through "experience" in which we are able to not simply acquire 
knowledge but to utilize it. Unlike the expressivist / constructivist binary, a "composition 
as experience" approach (to borrow Crick's phrase) would put this front and center, 
experimenting with language and continually investigating it's effects in "the real world." 
It is here that we can understand what "agency" might actually look like: student writers 
continually writing and revising all while receiving feedback and input from other student 
writers in the classroom. Or, in other words, we should focus is on the experience of 
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writing and having your words read by others instead of relying on rules, conventions, 
methods, traditions, genres, and whatever else to justify what "good" writing is. "Good 
writing," after all, is a product of a certain kind of experience. This all leads Jones to 
conclude that "[a] Deweyan instructor can teach student writers to develop greater 
individual agency" (Beyond). Similarly, Fishman proclaims that "[i]deally, Dewey would 
say, students should leave their composition courses wanting to do more writing. And 
given his view that we learn best in groups of likeminded people, Dewey would also say 
students should leave freshman composition wanting to do more work in writing groups" 
(Explicating 317), something I doubt very many people would want to argue against. 
Ultimately, the turn to experience is a move to retain a sense of agency in regard to 
writing while at the same time maintaining a commitment to some form of social reform. 
 On one hand, we can attempt to read Jones' claim that "A Deweyan instructor can 
teach student writers to develop greater individual agency" in a positive light, assuming 
that by "teach" what Jones really means is to direct and guide students through 
experiences in which they can come to agency as opposed to just being handed agency 
and assuming they will use it. Unfortunately, though, the wording of this claim does not 
suggest "teach" as invitation as much as "teach" as confer. And it is here that we have a 
problem, for Jones is not referring to kindergarten students but fully formed adults. The 
question isn't whether a "Deweyan instructor can teach student writers to develop greater 
agency," but rather...can students learn to develop greater agency? For it is one thing for 
an instructor to affirm agency in writing and quite another to assume that all students are 
equally capable of employing it. What's missing is habit. Unfortunately for our purposes, 
though, the brand of education that most students receive is anything but what Dewey 
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might prescribe. After all, unlike Dewey's laboratory school in Chicago who dealt with 
very young children who had a high degree of plasticity in regard to their habits of 
interaction, we are primarily dealing with adults. Thus, the flaw in these conceptions of 
"Deweyan" pedagogy is they mistakenly presuppose radical educational reform where 
none exists. Or, in other words, the students entering the university writing classroom are, 
on the whole, not products of a Deweyan education. Fishman's grand pronouncement that 
a "Deweyan" writing class should make students "want to write more" is possible only if 
the students in his classroom are already beneficiaries of this sort of education. If critical 
strands of educational research in the past 40 years tells us anything, contemporary 
education is not at all what Dewey had in mind. Even in his own time, Dewey was well 
aware of what "education" had come to mean, pointing out that, "for the most part, adults 
have given training rather than education. An impatient, premature mechanization of 
impulsive activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits of thought and affection has been 
desired" (MW 14:69,70). 
 Partially, we might attribute this theoretical shortsidedness for confusion over 
how to apply Dewey's thoughts to education. From Emig to Crick, it is universally 
assumed that the education students have received up until the point of their entry into the 
university writing classroom has had little to no effect on the habits of thought for the 
students. This assumption that specific habits of thought in relation to how writing is 
conceived of and employed are not produced by the twelve or so years of previous 
education seems to be to be a glaring gap in understanding not only the function of 
education but its all important role in establishing these habits and reinforcing them. In 
fact, as discussed earlier, this function is precisely the reason why Dewey was so 
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interested in schooling and education. This is also why, when we look at how the "New 
Deweyans" have sought to apply Dewey to the field of composition, we ultimately see 
more of ourselves than we see Dewey. It is composition, not Dewey, who looks at writing 
as primarily a theoretical problem to be sorted out and not as an educational problem that 
would point to extensive research of the classroom space itself all the way down to the 
lowest levels of education.  
 The effects of this misstep are devastating. Dewey astutely points out that 
"whether an ability is limited to repetition of past acts adapted to past conditions or is 
available for new emergencies depends wholly upon what kind of habit exists" (MW 
14:48). For us not to first inquire into the sorts of habits our students have acquired in 
their previous educational experiences is a glaring gap. Crick smartly warns that part of 
the problem has always been that we had been looking for the "origin" of language and 
this is what led us into a dead end. My question, though, is not a question of where 
language originates from, but rather how our previous classroom experiences, through 
habit, guide our use of language. 
 This is an easy misstep to make. So easy, in fact, that Dewey himself made this 
mistake. As Shannon Sullivan points out, Dewey himself underestimated his own habits 
when he unfortunately asserted that the "natural" reaction to the unknown (in this case, 
the racial "other") is fear (34). Thus Dewey's unsatisfactory explanation of racial tension 
is simply that white America was gripped with fear simply because black Americans 
were "new" to their consciousness. Dewey's solution is an "acclimation" route, blindly 
hoping that once white America had been in the proximity of black America long 
enough, this natural "fear" would eventually abate. But, one must ask, why does Dewey 
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assume the "natural" reaction of a white person to a black person is fear? Why not 
curiosity, awe, wonderment, excitement, or indifference? Oddly, and perhaps sadly, in 
this case Dewey had simply not followed his own philosophy closely enough, or 
"simplified" his philosophy too far. After all, there is no story of America sans black 
Americans.  
 Instead of seeing this response as the result of habits acquired as a white male, 
Dewey inscribes his own socially constructed habits as universal, thus violating much of 
his own thought on habit itself. While the "new Deweyans" in comp/rhet are often very 
good at describing how a class should work and what the end results should be, they are 
at a profound loss as to describing how this might actually occur, or when they do, rely 
on age old maxims.15 I suspect the reason for this gap, the cause of explications of Dewey 
being "few and far between" is not so different than Dewey's mistake on race. The 
"reformist mind" has been assumed to be universal. After all, how couldn't students want 
to learn to write more? In short, it obscures desired outcomes and methods for reform, 
effectively putting the cart in front of the horse. 
 For example, Russell, at the end of his piece, concludes that "growth in writing 
means that students would move toward acquiring the genres, the habits of discourse, the 
voices of social groups involved in organized activities while students more and more 
fully participate in (either directly or vicariously) the activities of those groups and 
eventually contribute to and transform them—not before they participate in them." While 
Russell does make a gesture toward acquiring the habits of specific genres, he doesn't 
                                                
15 For an unfortunate example of this, see Stanley Fish’s essay “Anti-Foundationalism, 
Theory Hope, and the Teaching of Composition” in his book Doing What Comes 
Naturally. 
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seem all that interested in understanding (and thus possibly interrogating) the previously 
established habits that students might bring into the classroom. Consequently, we are left 
to wonder about what Russell might say if a student walks into his classroom and 
declares that learning to write a specific form for their work at Alliant Techsystems 
(makers of depleted uranium rounds for the armed forces) is what they desire. 
Additionally, Russell, in a rather unfortunate move, asserts that students should become 
full members of a group before they try to change it. The problem, though, is that Russell 
wants students to be fully assimilated into a group's ways of thinking before trying to 
change it, thus likely preserving the groups ideology since at that point change and 
reform would come fully from within. This is particularly troublesome as Russell makes 
no mention of "inoculating" students with new habits of associated living, which would 
imply confronting the habits students bring with them into the class.16 Consequently, this 
is not Dewey, but rather Russell's own pedagogy of writing instruction inappropriately 
drafting Dewey's name for a program that Dewey would likely find to be troublesome. 
 
Conclusion 
 There are three primary ways in which Pragmatism informs the analysis of data in 
subsequent chapters. First, and perhaps most importantly, Dewey's concept of habit is 
crucial in working out the horizons of possibility in the first year writing classroom. By 
this, I am referring to the ways in which previous educational experiences have shaped 
the ideas, beliefs, and values concerning "literacy" that students bring with them into the 
first year writing environment. My fieldwork, introduced in the next chapter, consisted of 
                                                
16 Again, Garrison’s discussion of indoctrination as a paradox in his essay “The Paradox 
of Indoctrination” is useful here. 
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going to a secondary (high school) level college preparation writing class to document 
one aspect of a common experience that many university students go through. However, 
Dewey's notion of habit is more expansive than even this. As noted before, "habits" are 
the sum expression of a society’s prevailing norms. Therefore, any investigation of the 
attitudes, beliefs, and values that students pick up while in educational environments are 
themselves expression of larger social structures. These broader social structures, as I will 
be arguing in chapter 4 and 5, do not produce the sort of literacy practices that 
composition has long sought to theorize and popularize. This is no small thing, as it 
seriously throws composition's long standing project of expanding democratic 
participation into dire straits.  
 This leads me to the second way in which Pragmatism informs this scholarship. 
As noted before, Pragmatism, particularly as I have defined it above, does provide a 
justification for democracy that is grounded in the need for free social inquiry and 
growth. While I will be utilizing this concept to argue that not all literacy practices are 
equal and we can, in fact, provide a justification for preventing certain kinds of literacy 
practices from occurring, there is another way to utilize this epistemological justification 
for democracy. We can also run this justification backwards to suggest that a lack of 
certain social structures produces a climate in which literacy practices grounded in such 
free social inquiry and growth simply make no sense. This, as I will be demonstrating 
through data collected during fieldwork, is precisely what is occurring. This situation 
leads us to a fork in the road. On one hand, we can simply assent to the new social 
structures, recalibrate our writing practices to fit this brave new world, and continue on 
our happy way. However, to do so would mean to jettison a vision of a democratic 
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society in favor of a society ruled by "free market" ideologies and an oligarchic ruling 
class. This is precisely why the epistemological justification for democracy is so 
important, for it provides a powerful reason against doing this.  
 The third way in which Pragmatism informs this scholarship is grounded in the 
notion that ideas do not exist to be discovered, but are instead created and utilized by 
humans to guide their actions. One of Dewey's more radical insights was that we can 
endeavor to better our situation through intelligence. Since there is no grand march to 
emancipation and societies can become more democratic and less democratic over time, 
leaving such important elements to chance is folly. Such has been the story of the 20th 
century. In particular, and in regard to writing, the idea that "writing can change the 
world" and "language builds realities" are themselves subject to mediation through social 
structures. In Nancy Welch's book Living Room, she recalls an experience in which she 
had to write letter upon letter to insurance administrators to get an important form of 
cancer treatment for her husband. Unfortunately, though, those letters fell on deaf ears. 
What is devastatingly tragic about this story is no matter how eloquent, no matter how 
polished, no matter what voice, tone or even imagined audience was crafted into these 
letters, it still could not transcend the shame that is our current national health care 
system. Words did not matter. Or take, for example, the closure of the General College at 
the University of Minnesota. Despite several "public input" sessions and massive letter 
writing campaigns to save the College, it still closed. It seems in retrospect that the first 
decision made by administrators was to simply not listen to any dissent from the chosen 
course of action. Again, words did not matter. From a Pragmatist stand point, these 
examples are sad but not surprising. There is no eternal or intrinsic feature of language 
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that demands that words on their own, even if carefully and correctly chosen, can cause 
the sort of social change we hope that they can. Conversely, though, this does not mean 
that it should be this way either. What a Pragmatist perspective suggests is that if we 
want a world in which these moments have a different ending, moments in which writing 
can change the world, then that will have to be a world we create and nurture. In short, to 
have good writing, we need to create a world in which good writing matters. 
 In the next chapter, I will move into the fieldwork I conducted in order to consider 
what “writing” in schools looks like in a world in which “good writing,” as I have been 
discussing it here, doesn’t matter. Understanding how this plays out and why it has come 
to be this way will comprise the remainder of this text. 




Chapter 2 	  
Welcome to College English 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will be introducing the ethnographic fieldwork I carried out in a 
high school level college preparation writing classroom.1 In describing the class and 
offering an analysis of what goes on in such a class, this chapter posits the major 
theoretical (as well as practical) issue I encountered while collecting data: an alarming 
lack of student interest, motivation, and purpose within the class. I refer to this as the 
"Bartleby Syndrome."  
 To do so, I will be starting with a scene rich in meaning and to use it as a frame to 
work backwards and re-read the class. What was this class all about and how was 
"writing" conceived of by the teacher and understood by the students? How does this 
class fit into not just other writing classes but larger social dynamics as well? What were 
the students doing during class? What was the teacher doing during class? How did both 
students and teacher think about and understand what was going on during the semester? 
Throughout this chapter, I will be attempting to address these and other questions with 
                                                
1 The fieldwork described in this and other chapters was approved by an Institutional 
Review Board in 2010. 
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the “Bartleby Syndrome” in mind. After this, I introduce the idea that the Bartleby 
Syndrome is, in actuality, a specific type of literacy practice, as opposed to some form of 
lack or deficiency. I end the chapter by suggesting that a full understanding of these 
literacy practices necessitates an understanding of human action and activity. 
 
Alumni Visit Day 
 Snow is falling outside the window and I am sitting uncomfortably on a rock hard 
chair in the media center, something schools used to call a library. Unfolding before me 
is a bizarre scene that seems to sum up everything to this point that has brought me here. 
Splayed out in front of me is a seemingly un-ending row of grinning, excited college 
students. These are the mostly victorious, the returned prodigal daughters and sons of 
Copper Valley High, invited back by teachers to tell tales of what it is like to actually be 
in college. So many have shown up, in fact, that there is no room left to sit at the table 
positioned at the head of the room. Others congregate to the sides of the table, extending 
infinitely it seems to the corners of the room. It is the last day before winter break, the 
last gasping sigh of exhaustion for those on the other side (I mean the high school 
students, but also the teachers and the staff) before taking a few days off. It is also, 
because I am one of a very few people in the room to know this, the last shot at 
redemption for quite a few students enrolled in a writing class that I am observing. Today 
is the culmination of six weeks of preparation--today is the due date for the research 
paper. 
 Fifteen weeks earlier I had come to Copper Valley High in an attempt to figure 
out a problem I kept confronting in my own role as an instructor of writing at the post-
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secondary level. The resistance to any sort of reconfigured or reconstructed notion of a 
writing class did not come from administration, from my own colleagues, or even the 
"field" of composition itself. Rather, the resistance to many of the things I kept trying out 
came from the students. Attempts to realize in practice what I formed from theory 
consistently lead to confusion and even anger from students. It was like I was not just 
changing the rules of the game in process, but switching the game all together. I sensed 
that I was bumping up against an invisible yet immovable force located within the minds 
of my students that dictated and determined how and why a writing class ought to work. I 
wanted to actually see for myself where these conception of how writing classes ought to 
work were being formed and cemented. This is what led me to Copper Valley High and 
the 5th hour class called "College English." In looking for a class I could immerse myself 
in, I purposely avoided classes like Advanced Placement sections as well as forms of 
dual-enrollment offerings in which students take college credit courses embedded within 
high schools. Students who take these classes often times "test out" of required university 
level first year writing courses. I wanted to see where FYW's students were coming from. 
At least on paper, College English (usually referred to by the initials "CE") was this high 
school's solution to "prepare" students to write in college. Leading the class was Ms 
Stein, a teacher who believed very strongly in the value of college education. Perhaps 
because of this, Ms Stein was one of the main organizers behind the question and answer 
session with the alums. Even though anyone in the school was invited, it was perhaps not 
so subtly scheduled to occur during 5th hour when College English met. All the better, as 
it allowed her to simply bring the entire class with her to the presentation. And so here we 
are: the teachers frantically trying to get the microphones working, the students still in 
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high school slowly filtering into the media center, the chattering row of alums, the snow, 
and those damned wooden chairs. There is a box by the door awaiting the CE students. 
On the box is a handwritten note directing students to place the final draft of their 
research paper in it. Slowly, CE students pass by the box. Some place a stapled 
assemblage of papers in the box--many do not. 
 One student who does not place anything in the box is Sam. I started to get to 
know Sam on the very first day of the semester when Ms. Stein gave me a seat directly 
behind him. I suspect this was not random at all, as Sam (whose name is actually Salim) 
is a very gregarious student--not at all shy about talking to me about how he understands 
what goes on around him. In other words, a researcher’s dream. Sam's story is that he 
"should actually be in CIS" (the dual-enrollment writing course) but because of 
attendance requirements for the advanced section, cannot. In fact, he completed an AP 
english course with Ms. Stein the previous year. Since students at Copper Valley have to 
enroll in an english course every year, Sam landed in CE. Unlike many of his classmates 
that had modest goals and expectations for post-secondary education (many students 
were planning on attending local colleges, 2 year schools, and vocational programs), Sam 
had his mind set on attending a major, selective east coast University and eventually 
going on to law school for business law. Because of this, it might seem that Sam would 
have a particular interest in listening to the returning alums talk about their experiences 
with college. Instead, while the Q&A session proceeds, Sam is hunched over a computer 
in the back of the room seemingly oblivious to everything else going on around him. This 
is even more curious given the fact that his older sister, a junior in college, is one of the 
returning alums participating in the activity. After the session ends and students begin to 
  67 
leave the media center for their other classes, I rush to catch up with Sam and ask him 
what he thought of everything that just transpired. Sam replies, with some measure of 
pride, that he didn't think much of it because he was busy starting and finishing his 
research paper during the period. I ask him how he thinks he is going to do grade wise on 
the project. Sam replies that he's not sure because he only handed in one and a half pages 
of writing--"that's all I had time for." The research paper assignment called for a 
minimum of 7 pages. The warning tone sounds, students evaporate from the hallways, 
and I scratch the following in my notebook: The fact that Sam's sister was there talking 
about how to succeed in college (and she talked quite a lot) all while Sam was cementing 
his failure in CE is one of those ironies that cannot go unnoticed. 
 Sam's story is not a singular story in this classroom, nor is it an unheard of story 
in the realm of composition theory. Because the great assumption of writing instruction is 
students will actually write, the entire process breaks down when students simply aren't 
writing. We as writing instructors simply have nothing to work with. However, and as I 
will discuss in chapter 3, most ways of understanding students not-writing have an 
implicit assumption that if all other constraints are removed--be it a psychological barrier, 
a cultural conflict, a topic the student doesn't personally care about--then writing will 
naturally proceed. In Sam's case, though, as well as for many others in the class, I do not 
believe it is so simple. The phenomenon of students not-writing in this class was far more 
passive, non-aggressive, and nebulous. When Ms. Stein asked her students to write, it 
was as though they simply responded with "we prefer not to." I refer to this as the 
Bartleby Syndrome. When essays were assigned, it was rare for many students to begin 
much earlier than a few days before the deadline. Many waited until the night before. A 
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few simply never did anything. Peer review and workshop sessions nearly always fell flat 
because so few students had much of anything to share. During interviews, Ms. Stein 
repeatedly mentioned how she had never seen it this bad. When I asked Ms. Stein to 
compare data from previous semesters, her sense on this was validated. In talking with 
students, they seemed as confused as anyone in regard to what was going on. Most 
attributed it to laziness or procrastination. However, and as I will discuss later in this 
chapter, I have good reasons for rejecting these explanations. 
 Before I say anything more, there are a few things I want to be very clear on when 
it comes to explaining this passive non-participation in writing and describing this class. 
First, from day one it was clear that I was in the presence of an uncommonly gifted 
educator while conducting this fieldwork. In fact, one aspect of my fieldwork that will 
unfortunately not be emphasized enough here is the incredible emotional toll this non-
participation took on the Ms. Stein, both in that she cared deeply about the success of her 
students and the frustration that the best our field of writing instruction has to offer 
simply did not seem to work. Further, while it may be tempting to explain away this non-
participation as a fault of the curriculum itself, the mechanics of this writing class would 
be immediately recognizable to a vast majority of writing instructors. In other words, this 
Bartleby Syndrome cannot so simply be attributed to a "bad class." Perhaps even more 
vexing is the confusion the students had with this. Students not writing is nothing new to 
composition, and we have had various ways of describing it over the years: writer's 
block, lack of individual motivation, resistance, or structural and cultural tensions (e.g., 
lack of time for students working). These elements were all undeniably present in the 
classroom and each of these elements at different times could help explain why many 
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individual students faltered so consistently at participating in the process of writing. That 
said, no consistent pattern ever emerged.  
 
Welcome to College English 
 If you drew a picture encapsulating every cliché about suburban high schools in 
America, Copper Valley High2 would be the obscure reflection of real America looking 
upon it. Within its school district was another larger and wealthier high school located 
barely 3 miles away that carried the district's name: Bright Hills High. Bright Hills had 
the championship football team, the nationally recognized facilities, the large and 
spacious campus, and was located in a noticeably more affluent area. Copper Valley was 
the rest. Copper Valley had more free and reduced lunch eligible students (32% of the 
student body), modest athletic facilities, an aging and nondescript building, and was 
located in an area of town surrounded by modest yet charming small family homes. 
Despite this, pride at Copper Valley ran high. Teachers often spoke of the number of 
national merit scholars their school had produced (12 finalists in 2008), talked of how 
their math scores were some of the highest of the state, and always mentioned how good 
the marching band was. I start here in describing the class I was observing because I 
believe that while Bright Hills High might be how we visualize America's High School, 
in reality it is actually Copper Valley High that is a pretty good representative of what 
high school is like for many people. 
 As I was looking for a class to observe and be a part of, I created a sort of wish 
list. I wanted the class to be populated primarily with seniors, as I was hoping to tap into 
                                                
2 All places and names are pseudonyms.  
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students right before they make the jump from high school to college. My rationale here 
was that these students would have the most concrete ideas about what "writing in 
school" was all about, but also be close enough where I could capture some thinking 
about what going to college meant to them as well. I also wanted the class to be a true 
preparation class as opposed to concurrent enrollment courses (such as college courses 
offered in the high school institution) or college credit courses (high school courses that 
produce college credits for completion). My rationale on this was that the products of 
these classes more often than not bypassed the composition classroom. As such, my 
thinking at the time was that because composition never really encountered these 
students, it might lead to inappropriately fetishising about what we wish our actual 
students were more like. Further, I did not want a classroom in a school that was overly 
wealthy, nor did I want one that was in an area of extreme poverty. My rationale here was 
to find students who may not have post-secondary education as a family tradition but to 
also find students who could fathom college as a possibility. In short, I wanted to find the 
sort of students any instructor of a first year writing course could eventually expect to see 
in their classes. 
 Copper Valley High, and in particular its course called "College English," fit 
every requirement I was looking for. Its purpose was to serve as a junior/senior level 
class that would help students prepare for college writing. In the section I was observing, 
there were 30 students; 6 juniors (3 male, 3 female), 24 seniors (16 male, 8 female). The 
members of this class were predominately (but not exclusively) white, Christian, and 
middle class. Approximately 2/3 of students were active participants in sports, and many 
were involved in multiple sports. A few other students were involved in band, drama, and 
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business clubs. Leading the class was Wendy Stein, a 10 year veteran of teaching. Ms. 
Stein held a bachelor's degree in English and a master's degree in education, both 
obtained at the local University. By her own admission, Ms. Stein was known around 
Copper Valley as the advanced writing teacher. The 5th period of CE that I was 
observing was the only non-AP, non-dual enrollment class that Ms. Stein was teaching 
that semester. This meant that every other student Ms. Stein was working with that 
semester stood to obtain actual "college credit" by completing her classes.  
 I discovered quickly in talking with high school teachers about my project that the 
class I had in mind might be hard to find. There seemed to be two general moves under 
way. The first is that "college preparation" courses were being moved down the line to 
younger students. The sort of course I had in my head was no longer a course for seniors 
at many schools but rather was a course that juniors would take. The other move under 
way was an increase in AP and dual-enrollment offerings. Paradoxically, as I would 
discover, classes formerly known as "College English" or "College Writing" were no 
longer seen as the premier preparation courses. Instead, these courses had been 
supplanted by courses that, instead of "preparing" students for college, actually took the 
place of college courses. Copper Valley High was no different. Within the school, there 
was a very definite and noticeable hierarchy of several writing specific classes for juniors 
and seniors (excluding special needs education). I asked a few students to put these 
offerings in order from most institutionally valued to least. This is the order they came up 
with:  
1. D-E composition (dual-enrollment comp: a semester long college credit writing 
class taught at the high-school with oversight from local university) 
2. AP Language/composition (semester long course using AP curriculum that 
prepares students for a test in the spring) 
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3. College English (semester long writing class created to prepare students for 
college writing) 
4. Creative Writing 
5. College Writing (entry level "college in the schools" course. Equivalent to 
University level low/no-credit "developmental" writing course. Earns college 
credit but does not fulfill freshman writing requirement at local university.) 
6. General Composition (reviewing “basic skills”) 
7. "Focus composition" (typical vocational writing course) 
 
What is striking about this list is that the order students created is not quite the same as 
how it is listed in the school's course guide. The most noticeable difference is that the 
students listed "Creative Writing" just behind College English. As for the courses the 
students listed below creative writing, most were surprised to learn that such classes even 
exist. When I pressed a couple students in CE to explain who takes what class, the 
responses were fairly predictable: creative writing was for dumb students, College 
English was for less dumb students, and D-E and AP were for smart students. Of the four 
classes, students suggested that the top three were for "college bound" students, with the 
top two being for students destined for selective colleges and CE being for students 
thinking about community colleges, vocational/technical schools, or students who "are 
good at other stuff but don't care about writing," as one student put it. Perhaps because of 
this, the reality is that only three of them seem to matter much. In fact, in talking about 
my project with Ms. Stein in early meetings, she noted that one of the difficulties she 
faced in teaching CE was that all the "higher ability" students were taken out and put into 
AP and dual-enrollment courses. In previous years, these high-end classes were offered 
rarely and were very difficult to get into, meaning that College English would still attract 
a sizable group of the academically motivated. By 2010, though, the range of these 
courses had become distorted. The top two courses were being expanded, with students 
increasingly being pushed to take them. College English, then, became the new "general 
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composition" and the other courses, because they had little to do with directly preparing 
juniors and seniors for college, were either forgotten or relegated to the forgotten. 
 As such, the official description for College English, published in the school's 
course catalogue, is fairly predictable. It reads: 
This class is designed to expose students to the level and type of writing 
assignments typically encountered in college-level classes. In this class, students 
will review methods of argumentation and locate logical fallacies; summarize, 
interpret, and analyze fiction pieces as well as popular and scholarly articles and 
respond in argumentative and expository modes; and write essays of personal 
interest for an academic audience. Through the course, students will master their 
writing process and develop the knowledge and strategies needed for editing their 
own and others' work in peer critiques. This class will require students to examine 
essays for paragraph unity and coherence, audience, purpose, medium, elements 
of voice, and persona. 
 
In reality, and perhaps because the description was written before the district started to 
market itself as being "data-driven," class time was fairly evenly divided over the course 
of the semester between grammar/mechanics activities (e.g., practice identifying parts of 
sentences in class), vocabulary practice / tests, and in-class discussions over readings. 
When possible, these three areas were combined into one activity. This is not to say that 
the other elements of the course description were simply absent, but rather that they were 
almost always enveloped within activities based on grammar/mechanics or (for stylistic 
elements) built into interpretive activities with the readings the students were asked to do. 
 This created a rather comfortable weekly routine for the semester. On Mondays, 
students would be given a list of vocabulary words that they were then expected to study 
on their own for the test on Friday. For the vocabulary quizzes, students had to both 
identify definitions for words as well as spell them correctly. In class during the week, 
students spent time doing one of two things: exercises in identifying parts of speech 
(often with words from the vocabulary test subtly tossed in) or discussing assigned 
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readings. Every three or four weeks, students would take a quiz over grammar, usually 
asking students to correctly identify parts of speech as well as finding grammatically 
incorrect sentences. The in-class discussions over readings and practice over identifying 
parts of speech were done to support the written assignments the students were working 
on during the semester. Of this, there were 4 major essays as well as a diagnostic essay at 
the start of the semester and a timed, in-class essay the students completed at the end of 
the semester. While the requirements for these essays were discussed in class, part of Ms. 
Stein's strategy was to relegate the actual writing of these essays to outside of class. Her 
rationale being that this is how college courses work. Peer-reviews and workshops 
happened approximately 4 times over the course of the semester. I say approximately 
because "peer-review" was often what the class did when a substitute teacher was 
present. 
 The essays the students worked on were "scaffolded" so that smaller essays would 
become the basis for longer, more complex essays. The first essay that students were 
asked to write was a personal narrative essay. From there, they moved onto a compare 
and contrast essay built off some nonfiction essays in popular magazines. After that, they 
worked on a slightly longer literary analysis built from short stories in a literature 
anthology and using "interpretive lenses" provided by the teacher in a handout. Finally, 
and for 6 weeks, they worked on a research paper. The basic gist of the research paper 
was for each student to identify a career or vocation they would like to do someday. 
Then, they were to "research" a conflict or controversy in that area. After that, they were 
to rely on two sources of data: basic "library research" data and primary research derived 
from an interview with an "expert" in that area. Like many other institutions, students 
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were required to submit their essays for evaluation through an electronic service that also 
checked the text for plagiarism. They would then receive comments from the teacher 
electronically from a website they were to upload their finished drafts for. Essays were 
evaluated according to a rubric of criteria, including things such as grammar/mechanics, 
tone, required elements (citations, etc) and overall subjective quality. In the next section, 
I turn to discussing the actual environment of the class itself.  
 
Being There: Methods of data collection 
 As I mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, I am purposefully avoiding 
referring to this dissertation as an "ethnography," especially as it pertains to "[exploring] 
the setting as it is viewed and constructed by its participants" (Wilcox 458). While this 
may have been my initial intention, I quickly discovered what I was exploring was not 
the immediate setting of the participants but rather broader social forces that defined the 
setting we were in and reacting to. That said, I relied upon several ethnographic methods 
of data collection during fieldwork. These included participant-observation, interviews 
(both formal and informal, in person and via electronic means), and document collection 
(assignment sheets, student texts, etc). Participant observation was conducted through 
sitting through class sessions while taking field notes. Initially, I had planed on going to 
the class every day of the week (Monday through Friday) for the first month or so. After 
that, I planned on going 2-3 days a week. However, I ended up going much more--often 
daily until mid-November--simply because I could and I found myself experiencing some 
sort of solidarity with the students I was observing. 
 To ensure my fieldwork was grounded in a spirit of collaboration, Ms. Stein and I 
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had several conversations regarding my role in the classroom prior to the semester. My 
goals were to have the ability to interact with the students whenever possible while at the 
same time to minimize any obstructions to the normal goings on of the classroom. I didn't 
want Ms. Stein to teach any differently because of my presence, yet at the same time we 
both agreed that it would be impossible to pretend as though I simply was not there. 
Eventually, we nailed down a few basic guidelines: I would generally sit towards the 
back to observe and take notes. During peer-peer interaction, I would join groups and 
interact with the students. I would not assume any sort of position that might suggest 
"authority" and would only offer intellectual contributions to class discussions when a 
question might arise that fell into an area of my own personal expertise. For example, at 
one point a question came up concerning how essays were evaluated in typical first-year 
writing courses. Ms. Stein asked for my perspective and I was happy to offer it to the 
entire class. However, these moments happened less than 5 times throughout the entire 
semester. Further, since I wanted students to feel comfortable in speaking with me, I 
asked Ms. Stein for my help in continually reiterating that anything a student said to me 
during an interview or even an informal conversation in the hallway should always be 
understood as confidential. This was also reinforced through the informed-consent 
dialogue for all students in the class. 
 Despite this, there were several limitations. For one, while the students seemed to 
accept me as a sort of tolerated outsider to the classroom circle, and were trustful enough 
to speak very honestly and frankly about the class itself (as well as Ms. Stein), it proved 
to be near impossible to gain much acceptance into the student's lives outside of school. 
On one hand, I attribute this to the limited amount of time I had to spend in the field: five 
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months is simply not enough time to earn that much trust for some students. In addition 
to that, the local suburban geography and architecture made it near impossible to find 
spaces where I could interact with the students outside of class, as such spaces simply did 
not exist. For example, at one exasperated point, I asked a student in the class what the 
hell they did when they weren't in school and where I could go to see students being 
social. This particular student looked at me with a quizzical face and responded that they 
just "hung out" at each other's houses or simply "drove around." More importantly, 
though, I sensed that these students, on the cusp of adulthood, were often in precarious 
social situations and were, as such, protective of these spheres. They were often 
incredibly frank, honest, and generous with their thoughts in and around the classroom. 
Outside of that, though, it was much more difficult to "get to know them" on a more 
personal level. I suspect my age may also have played a small role here, as I was close 
enough to their age to be an "almost-insider" yet old enough to be clearly marked as an 
outsider. Had they (the students) been younger or I been older, I think I may have had 
more success in accessing the out of school lives of these students. That said, I was able 
to get to know several students fairly well both in and beyond the classroom 
environment. I introduce them in the next section. 
 My overarching goal with my field notes was to produce them as a "written 
[attempt] to impose order on the external world of our research as well as on our personal 
lives in the field, to grow up through understanding the culture we are studying, to 
perceive the realities of the interests and motivations of those who interact with us in the 
field" (Ottenberg 141, in Sanjek). In this, I generally relied on composing hand-written 
"scratch" notes while actually observing the classroom, recording not just basic functions 
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of the class (including what activities were occurring, what time they occurred at, 
snippets of dialogue, etc) but also to record my own thoughts and musings while I was 
trying to make sense of what I was seeing. Then, after I had left the classroom, I would 
type up longer, more probing notes concerning not just thoughts and reactions as to what 
I had seen in the classroom, but also to record any evolving ideas and theories I had. In 
addition to observing the class itself most days of the week, I also spent time observing 
several "classic" rituals of high school life, including going to pep rallies, attending 
football games and concerts, and even just walking around the community on days when 
I was not needed at the University. 
 
Getting to know the students 
 While the entire class will figure prominently in the discussions I am about to 
undertake in regard to what I saw as a participant-observation, there are 5 students that 
served as quasi-"focal students" and as such I will refer to them by name. Because of that, 
I want to briefly introduce them here. The first, already discussed in the introduction to 
this chapter, is Sam. Sam was the first student I met in the class, as Ms. Stein (perhaps 
purposefully) assigned me a seat behind him. His full name is Salim, but due to his acute 
awareness of being Muslim in a predominately Christian community, chooses to go by 
"Sam" (even though nearly every student knows his full name). Early on, I noted that 
Sam is much like an ambassador for the school and for himself. During an interview, he 
described his strategy for school and social success as being modeled on marketing, and 
in particular, "branding." In other words, Sam saw himself as a "brand" to be built up, 
hoping to increase the "buzz" over his name by both teachers and fellow students. 
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Interestingly, Sam had already completed an AP course with Ms. Stein, and had been 
successful in it (by both of their accounts). Due to his strategy, Sam was able to move 
between various social circles and cliques with astonishing ease. For example, Ms Stein 
often relied on an instructional strategy which she referred to as "snaky snaky" in which 
after successfully answering an exercise (often on grammar), the student would choose 
the next person to go. I discovered very quickly that these "snaky snaky" moments were 
perfect moments in which I could start to understand the social boundaries of various 
groups within the classroom, as students would always call on someone for whom they 
felt "safe" (i.e., was inside their own social circle). Sam was one of two students that any 
student could call on, and consequently served as a "transfer point" between various 
social groups during these exercises. This social liquidity did come at a cost, though. Sam 
was often utilized by members of the high-popularity (and athletic) social group to "peer-
review" their papers. By peer-review, it meant that they would give Sam their papers and 
he would meticulously copy-edit them, pointing out every grammatical and mechanical 
error with astonishing accuracy, as well as suggest the appropriate corrections. When I 
asked Sam if he felt that he was being used, he shrugged off the notion and told me that it 
was all part of building his brand. 
 While Sam's presence indicates that the class was not completely "white," Kendra 
was the only black student in the class. Kendra appeared very early in my notes, as she 
was one of the few students who not only spoke up often in class, but was also willing to 
challenge other students when they (often unknowingly) would say classist or racist 
things in class. Despite this--and perhaps because Kendra's willingness to challenge other 
students was met only by her quickness to smile and laugh--she was universally well 
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liked in class, including Ms. Stein. Often, Kendra would "shhh!" other students while Ms. 
Stein was attempting to speak or admonish her classmates to "come on, let's do this" 
when they were being sluggish. However, Kendra would often instigate such things when 
substitute teachers were present. Kendra played basketball and was a manager for the 
varsity football squad. This meant that she was one of the main members of the social 
group that was comprised of other athletes in the class.  While she was well liked by the 
entire class, she rarely if ever participated in peer interaction with students outside of this 
group. 
 Jack represented the biggest conundrum for me, and for Ms. Stein. While he did 
not fit the outlines of my study (he was a junior, not a senior), I found it impossible to not 
be drawn to his personality. Jack was the quintessential insider-outsider. Early on, in 
discussing the rest of the class with me, he noted that he "knew" everyone in the class as 
he had been in school with them since kindergarten, and taken many of the same classes, 
but did not hang out with them. Accordingly, other students--some who have had other 
classes with him throughout their schooling--would have to ask for his name (even deep 
into the semester). Jack seemed to take this in stride, perhaps even revel in it. In the 
classroom, Jack was mercurial. While his intelligence was unmistakable, he would often 
"tune out" to the extent of simply reading other books (often beatnik literature: Ginsberg, 
Kerouac and the like) or pay so little attention that when he was called on by Ms. Stein, it 
would almost always cause a minor scandal. This outer turmoil was just as complicated 
on the inside. One day, after submitting an essay, Ms. Stein asked the students to write a 
self-reflection of their work. Jack simply sat in his desk and handed in an empty sheet of 
paper. Later that afternoon, as Ms. Stein and I were walking outside to attend a pep rally, 
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we encountered Jack at his locker who asked Ms. Stein to forgive him for his "bullshit" 
(as he put it). Ms. Stein told Jack that she believed she could teach him if he'd give her a 
chance. Jack would continually test this belief over the entire semester. Every day that I 
talked to Jack, I would learn something new that would turn everything upside down. For 
instance, halfway through the semester while I was talking with Jack about an assignment 
he did not complete, he mentioned that his mother was an instructor of writing at a local 
community college.  
 Christian, a composite character3 of two male students, would be readily 
identifiable within popular culture as the quintessential "jock." He was a captain of the 
football team, the homecoming king, and to Ms. Stein's eternal ire, a consummate class 
clown. Early in the semester, Christian sat next to me in the classroom at a table due to a 
recent knee surgery he had undergone. Despite not being able to play, Christian always 
wore his team jersey with the rest of his teammates. In this regard, Christian was 
dedicated and loyal to not only his team, but to his school. In the classroom, though, he 
was more often than not referred to as a "butt-head" by Ms. Stein (in an affectionate 
way—most times). Their relationship throughout the semester was complicated to say the 
least, mostly because Christian's intelligence was so keen that he was constantly able to 
stay one step ahead of Ms. Stein. He interrupted constantly, but as I began to realize very 
early on, his interruptions were almost always nuanced and sophisticated in the way in 
which they were responding to what the class was doing. For example, during class one 
day Ms. Stein was leading a discussion concerning a short story they had read in which 
                                                
3 I recognize that the construction of “composite characters” is contentious within 
Ethnography. I do so here not out of a need to further disguise the identity of a particular 
informant / consultant, but to simply maintain a coherence within the narrative I am 
constructing. 
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the main character had witnessed a violent crime but not called for help. As Ms. Stein 
was trying to push the class to consider the ethics of this and whether or not the concept 
of "community" actually meant anything, Christian continually countered every argument 
Ms. Stein made with seemingly ludicrous retorts. On a superficial level, it would seem 
clear that Christian was simply out to push Ms. Stein's buttons. However, on a closer look 
at this and other exchanges, it becomes evident that the reason Christian was so 
uncommonly good at pushing the limits of Ms. Stein was because he was quite clearly 
capable of seeing the foundational structure of Ms. Stein's arguments--often at a 
moment's notice--and taking extreme positions against them. 
 While many of these students attracted my attention as an observer because of 
their visibility, Jennifer was the opposite. Quiet and reserved in class, she was well liked 
among her circle of friends and rarely spoke up during class discussions. In her 
schoolwork, Jennifer was mostly dutiful and as such, Ms. Stein came to rely upon her 
even though it was clear that Jennifer was not interested in having Ms. Stein be a close 
"mentor" outside the realm of school. During group work, Jennifer almost always worked 
with the other "misfits" of the classroom: students who didn't quite fit into the more 
popular social groups in the classroom. This is not to say that Jennifer was a teacher's pet. 
In fact, often times she would procrastinate as much as the other students, although would 
always seem to come through at the last minute with something to hand in. I eventually 
discovered that outside of class, Jennifer was a voracious writer of poems and fictional 
stories, often participating in online writer's communities. Additionally, I often saw 
Jennifer engaging in a ritual that some female students engaged in: writing on each 
other's cloth backpacks. By the end of the semester, Jennifer (as well as many of her 
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friends) sported backpacks that were completely covered in handwritten text. This 
enthusiasm for writing never translated into enthusiasm for writing essays in College 
English, though. 
 I offer these brief biographical descriptions to offer a sort of "flavor" for the sorts 
of students in this classroom. However, I want to be careful to note that it would be 
impossible to reduce any single student to a "type" or an "every student." For example, 
while many students were athletes and the athletic culture was definitely marked by an 
upper-class influence, there were several student-athletes in College English that were 
very clearly from working class families and as such, never fully fit into any social group. 
Additionally, while students often times moved in particular groups with particular 
attributes, these groups were always fluid and contingent upon several factors, including 
the ebb and flow of personal, out of school relationships between students. For example, 
while there were definitely some social groupings that were built along class lines, these 
lines were often crossed when other group memberships (such as athletics) came into 
play. That said, the one thing that everyone seemed to have contact with was the 




For a few moments I was turned into a pillar of salt, standing at the head of my seated 
column of clerks. Recovering myself, I advanced towards the screen, and demanded the 
reason for such extraordinary conduct.  
 “Why do you refuse?" 
 “I would prefer not to." 
 With any other man I should have flown outright into a dreadful passion, scorned all 
further words, and thrust him ignominiously from my presence. But there was something 
about Bartleby that not only strangely disarmed me, but in a wonderful manner touched 
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and disconcerted me. I began to reason with him. 
 “These are your own copies we are about to examine. It is labor saving to you, because 
one examination will answer for your four papers. It is common usage. Every copyist is 
bound to help examine his copy. Is it not so? Will you not speak? Answer!” 
 “I prefer not to,” he replied in a flute-like tone. 
    -from “Bartleby the Scrivener,” Herman Melville 
 
 The students genuinely respected and liked Ms. Stein. I feel this is important to 
note at the start of this section, because it would be all too easy (and wrong) for readers to 
interpret what I am about to recount as a consequence of a bad teacher or a teacher who 
held no respect of their students. This happens far too often in the public conversation 
over the supposed failings of our educational system. There was one emblematic moment 
during the semester in which I realized just how much the students did like Ms. Stein. On 
this particular day, six weeks into the semester, I walked into the classroom to discover a 
substitute teacher. Ms. Stein had fallen ill that day and had left a note about me and my 
observation as well as instructions to let the students do the peer-review session Ms. Stein 
had set up. In briefly talking with the substitute before the students entered, I realized she 
was in a position that many other young, freshly licensed teachers were in: unable to find 
full time employment and as such working as a full time substitute, often going into 
different classrooms every day of the week. This turned out to be a disastrous recipe. 
While the substitute followed her directions, and the students followed theirs, a peer-
review session in a writing classroom often looks like total chaos when compared to the 
normally locked down style of interactions that go on elsewhere in schools. After about 
20 minutes, the substitute teacher, nervous at seeing 30 students having seemingly 
unstructured conversations, decided she had to reassert control over the classroom and 
started to go around to the small groups of students and demanded that they stay on task. 
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The students, confused because they were on task, continued on. At this point, I (as well 
as other students) began to feel a sense of anxiety creep in. The substitute dug in, telling 
students they had to return to their seats because "not enough work" was "getting done." 
Jack, sitting next to me and describing some ideas he had about the essay, became an 
easy target for the substitute, who ordered him to "find something, anything" to do. By 
this point, the students, realizing a young and inexperienced teacher was now on the 
defensive, reacted as though they were sharks and had just detected blood in the water. I 
don't care to describe what happened next, as neither the students nor the substitute 
teacher would be proud of the things that occurred. Ten minutes later, it was over. The 
substitute, now tears streaming down her face, kept asking the students "how do you 
think this makes me feel?" The students, quiet and somber, avoided eye contact with 
everyone else. I wrote the following in my field notes: "Silence. As the sounds of 
adjacent class rooms filter in, the victory of the sub is somewhat secured. We are 
reminded by the muffled noise that is now our noise of that moment of guilt and shame 
that always fills one's thoughts after a fight. Damn this. Damn it all."  
 The next day I met with Ms. Stein (who returned despite having lost her voice) 
before class for our bi-weekly interview. As the time for class to start approached, Ms. 
Stein had to rush off to the office at the other end of the building to grab some copies, 
leaving me alone in the classroom. One by one, students peeked into the window of the 
door and seeing only me, motioned me over. As I opened the door, several asked me if 
she was back yet. I indicated that she was but had to grab some copies. An immediate 
sigh of relief set in, as students then confidently filled into the classroom and took their 
seats. When Ms. Stein finally entered the classroom, she was met with a barrage of "we 
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missed you!" and "we're so glad you're back!," even from some of the male students who 
rarely if ever displayed any sort of emotion in class. This would not be the only moment 
like this over the course of the semester. However, even though the students were very 
quick to praise Ms. Stein during interviews and conversations, this often did not lead to 
students taking up the difficult standards Ms. Stein challenged them with.  The first 
instance I recorded of a student not taking up the challenge happened purely by accident 
in the 4th week of class. Until this point, my attention as an observer had been trained on 
other things. For the first few weeks, just as I had been trained to do in methods courses, I 
had been trying to outline and make sense of the social geography of the class. My notes 
were filled with observations of various interactions between students of different groups, 
relying on activities that forced interactions to help me decipher what was going on. I had 
even started to try to create provisional labels and names for different groups, such as the 
"Buffoonery Boys," a group of mostly athletes who continually disrupted class through 
joking and sarcastic remarks.  
 It was actually while recording one of these moments in which the "Buffoonery 
Boys" took momentary control of the classroom (moments I referred to as "delay by 
chumminess") that I noticed Jack, who sat next to me, nervously fidgeting with a pen 
while staring intently at the clock. It was during this day that students were to bring a 
rough draft of their personal narrative essay so that Ms. Stein could record it in her grade 
book. The discussion had moved from a question about a grammar exercise they were 
working on to something completely unrelated. Every time Ms. Stein attempted to pivot 
back to the class, another question would pop up that Ms. Stein would respond to. In my 
notes, I noted in awe how good the students were at throwing out questions just barely 
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serious and relevant enough to keep Ms. Stein biting, but to prevent her from getting back 
to her agenda. Finally, the bell rang and the class was suddenly over. Jack sprung up, 
looked at me and exclaimed "saved for another day!" and bounded out of the classroom. 
It wasn't until a couple days later during an in-class sharing session of drafts that I 
discovered Jack had no rough draft, nor had even really thought about what he might 
write. This suddenly explained why he was so nervously watching time run out and his 
sudden moment of salvation when class time was over. The time-delay strategy had not 
only thwarted Ms. Stein's lesson plans for the day, but had also prevented Jack's 
procrastination from being discovered. 
 At the time, I didn't see much importance in this moment. For anyone who 
teaches any subject (and writing is certainly no different), moments like this where 
students fail to submit an assignment are not rare. This was especially true given the fact 
that it was a "rough draft" of the essay, something students tend to be notorious at 
"forgetting" to do. However, the day after the final drafts of the personal narratives were 
to be submitted online, Ms. Stein met me at the door as I came into the classroom and 
informed me that twelve of the students, more than one third of the entire class, had not 
submitted anything. She was livid. Exasperated, she claimed that this was the first time in 
ten years of teaching that she was "missing papers" from students. This was a pattern that 
would continue in some way for the rest of the semester.  
 As mentioned before, I refer to this non-participation or students simply not 
engaging with the class as the "Bartleby Syndrome." I refer to it by this name because in 
general I think there are two defining features of this phenomenon. First, that this is a sort 
of peaceful or passive sort of non-participation. Students on the whole, while sometimes 
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would be frustrated or annoyed with Ms. Stein, were not in outright rebellion against her. 
They all respected her, liked her, and genuinely seemed to miss her when she was gone. 
When students had to be reprimanded or disciplined by Ms. Stein for in-class behavior 
issues (as was often the case with Christian), they genuinely seemed to be upset and 
disappointed with their actions. Second, students were absolutely capable of exerting 
tremendous amounts of effort on various things, but when it came to this class they 
seemed to just "prefer not to." I bring up this aspect because I want to outline one 
particularly pernicious aspect of this non-participation. Students not submitting 
assignments by deadlines was obviously one of the most visible ways of not engaging in 
the class. However, it was the not so visible attitude or "mood" of the classroom in which 
students chose not to work on writing through drafts and revisions over time that was the 
true "Bartleby" element. By this, I mean that many students preferred to not engage in the 
process of writing. Readings were not read for class, drafts were not brought for peer-
review sessions, discussions over readings were treated as alienated from drafts (often, 
likely, because no drafts existed). So students did complete their writing assignments, but 
more often than not it was writing done in as little time as possible, often right before the 
project was due or even days (and sometimes weeks) after the deadline.  
 Part of this can be explained by the way in which "work" was done by students in 
Copper Valley High. Early in my observations, I had taken to a little game during class in 
which I would keep track of students who were writing notes and students who were not. 
Some students appeared to be writing down everything that Ms. Stein was saying. Other 
students were either lost in their thoughts (daydreaming), asleep, or listening to Ms. Stein 
but writing nothing. However, it wasn't until much later in the semester during an 
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interview with Kendra and Sam that I realized I had not been seeing what I thought I 
might have been. In talking with students during the class, and especially in finding out 
how difficult it was to find time to talk to students, I had become aware that even though 
a lot of work was not being done for the class, for many students it was not because they 
were "lazy" (even though this is a label they often ascribed to themselves). I broached the 
question with Kendra, who I knew was active in several extracurricular activities. As I 
reconstructed her daily schedule, it became apparent that most of her days started at 5:30 
in the morning and then went until 10:30 at night. I asked her what I think is the obvious 
question:4 
Matthew: I mean the question I have to ask is...when do you have time to do 
school stuff? 
Kendra: school work? during school. for real. all my homework I do during 
school unless I have to type something up. 
like I will do it like if I have time between classes or during class and I'm doing 
nothing I'll just do my work [for another class] 
Matthew: mmhm 
Kendra: so like um, hypothetically you would be sitting in Stein's class and not 
having anything going on in Stein's class you would have something else for 
another class that you would then work on then 
Matthew: umm do you have like a study hall? or... 
Kendra: I wish, dude. that would be so great. that would be like the best thing 
ever. 
Matthew: so there are six periods of classes right [yeah ] and you have an actual 
class all six of those 
Kendra yes. I had seven classes this semester though. I had to take hybrid fitness 
                                                
4 I have deliberately chosen to retain a “verbatim” construction of interview transcriptions 
in this dissertation, including the fragmentary nature of spoken speech. However, because 
I am not relying on an in-depth analysis of the speech itself, I have not retained textual 
representations of pauses, tics, and so forth. 
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for life, which is a gym class. 
Matthew: I've heard about this. 
Matthew: so you don't have a study hall necessarily, you work on school stuff in 
school, but always during times when you can get away with it, right? [K: yeah]. 
how often does that happen? 
Kendra: like all the time. like we're...if I'm not like doing anything or the teacher 
is like "work day" they don't really care what you're doing if you're not being 
disruptive. like, well now especially that you're older, they're not going to be like 
oh are you doing anything. only the subs do that, which is super freakin' 
annoying [M: staying on task right?] yeah, like "shut up" I'm not burning 
anything, I'm not killing anybody. just leave me alone 
Matthew: so during the day, any given day in any class, how often would you 
say you have time to work on other stuff? 
Kendra: maybe like an hour. like all six classes put together 
Matthew: ah, but never at one shot right? 
Kendra: Nah.  
Matthew: so like five minutes here 10 minutes there, maybe 
 
Later in the interview, Sam dropped by and joined the discussion. I asked Sam the same 
question: 
Matthew: so, looking at your schedule, the question I had for Kendra, I'll ask you. 
when does doing school work fit in here.  
Sam: my senior year I mean I speak for myself I can almost guarantee Kendra 
does the same thing, you develop a system in which you do whatever is due 1st 
period at home, and then the first period you do whatever is due the second 
period, and so on and so forth, so your homework time comes a period before.  
[Kendra laughs and agrees] 
Matthew: not only do you have a strategy, you know... you have a system 
Sam: the only thing you do at home are things you have to type up 
Matthew: so it is kind of like a first in first out system 
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Sam: and then the copying...yeah. 
 
After this interview, I began to pay closer attention to the students who were "working" 
in class. Whereas before I had assumed that students were writing things down from the 
class, it became more and more apparent that what they were writing down often had 
nothing to do with what was going on immediately in front of themselves. Sometimes the 
hints were obvious: math textbooks would be on their laps under the table, readings were 
out for other classes only partially obscured by grammar worksheets. Other times the 
hints were a little less obvious. Times in which students seemed to be completely caught 
off-guard by Ms. Stein's questions (such as a question on a worksheet they were working 
through) were now clearly visible to me as times in which students were absorbed in the 
content of a different class, not that they didn't necessarily know the answer or correct 
response to have. Paying closer attention, I even began to notice that students were 
continually writing things even when the class discussion didn't seem to necessitate any 
writing.  
 This is not to say that all students were doing this all of the time. Kendra herself, 
while admitting this is often what she did in other classes, claimed to be actually taking 
notes in Ms. Stein's class (something I can attest to, since I asked to see her notes one 
day). Her reason for this was not well formed, but rather predicated on a belief that this 
might be important to her. However, as she described it in her own words, "I just feel that 
this stuff might be important to know someday." That "someday" aspect of her response 
will be important to dwell on more in Chapter 4. For now, I will just suggest that this 
indicates that while Kendra did think there might be something important about the 
discussions and lessons in College English, she only understood the importance of such 
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things in terms of things she might need to know in the future. As to how they might be 
important to her in the present, Kendra was not sure.  
 This aspect of how "work" was viewed and undertaken by students in the class is 
important to understand, as it suggests one important, although not comprehensive, 
answer as to why many "writing process" activities tended to not work in the classroom. 
We can think of the structural limitations in time imposed through the rigidity of the 
school day as a sort of rationality that determines or fixes how students are capable of 
understanding "writing" and how it is done. Or to put that more simply, the method of 
doing school work by the students is a very practical solution to the problem or question 
created by the time-space context of the high school itself.  
 In this same interview with Kendra and Sam, I tried to figure out just what 
students understood as the "writing process." I was interested in trying to understand 
what actually happened when students talked about their papers with each other. Here is 
how they responded: 
Matthew: So describe to me what you do when you are discussing a classmate's 
paper with them. What do you talk about? 
Sam: like to me when you're like editing someone's paper, you don't edit 
someone's paper because you care what they are writing, you edit someone's 
paper so that they can get a better grade on the technicalities... so like someone 
could be writing something and it's stupid but that doesn't matter. 
Matthew: so when you do that, you're looking for mostly technical things, but do 
you ever say "what you're writing here is completely wrong"? 
Kendra: you just write so that you just tell them just so they can get their main 
points across... so if it doesn't make sense that's one thing but you don't say "oh 
this is dumb or this is wrong or this is right"... you just do the technicality stuff 
and yeah you should add more stuff here and yeah 
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Matthew: so when you talk with other people about their papers, and I'm guessing 
for other classes as well, it's never about what's being said and like the 
conclusions they come to but only how they are saying it? 
Sam: uh yeah...so... everyone knows that's the same thing you're doing... like 
when you give someone a paper you're not doing like "oh hey that's what I think 
about something tell me if you agree" it's more like "hey read this tell me if I 
forgot a comma." 
 
Earlier, Sam offered this "philosophy" on approaching school-work: 
Sam: also I think like why should we....my philosophy in life ... even in math is 
why does the hell does it matter how you got to the answer as long as it's right? 
why the hell does it matter how you got to the paper as long as it is right, as long 
as you can source your information right like, support it... it shouldn't matter how 
you got there. 
The "process movement" in composition has traditionally stressed the concepts of 
refinement and growth through drafts and revisions. However, as Kendra and Sam's 
comments above suggestion, students rarely if ever had a desire to do more than to just 
"get it done." As Sam's statement so bluntly points out, for him "why does it matter" as 
long as it is correct or right. So for instance, while Christian's literary analysis paper was 
done (on time even!) and almost met the length requirements, what did not occur is any 
sort of participation in or transfer from all the activities Ms. Stein did in class to help the 
essay evolve.  
 This mood would manifest itself in other, unexpected ways. For example, Ms. 
Stein was stunned to learn one day deep into the semester that only a small handful of 
students had actually looked at the feedback on their essays that she had spent days 
producing. While I suspect her pride was wounded, the bigger concern Ms. Stein had was 
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that students weren't utilizing feedback to improve future drafts and essays. This concern 
would be continually validated throughout the semester. One common thread in my 
interviews with Ms. Stein was a frustration with the ways in which students would very 
neatly compartmentalize the class discussions and their own writing. From Ms. Stein's 
view, students saw classroom discussions as "just shooting the shit" (as she described it) 
and did not seem to be able to transfer classroom discussions to their writing. For 
example, during the period in which the students were to be working on the literary 
analysis paper, quite a lot of class time was dedicated to discussions of the assigned 
stories in class. However, when Ms. Stein finally started reading through some of the 
drafts, she was disheartened to discover that many of the lively discussions had simply 
failed to appear in the work of the students. This was deeply problematic for Ms. Stein, as 
it directly thwarted her own understanding of what it means to teach writing. To 
understand how this works, here is Ms. Stein's response to my question of what her 
"subject" was as a teacher. Or, in other words, what exactly did she teach? She started out 
by attempting to explain her understanding of writing through a contrast. What she was 
trying to place her own theory of teaching writing in contrast is the idea that writing has 
no "topic" of its own, and as such writing classes must be given a topic or a "theme." This 
is how she understood the dominant orthodoxy of how first year composition was taught 
at the major local university. As she explained, though:  
but if they are spending all of their time worrying about this theme of 
transportation, when are they spending time worrying about their writing, and the 
thinking about what the process means to them, and what about what I'm teaching 
them will carry with them to the future? I don't care if they become experts on 
light rail. I don't care and I don't think they care if they choose to zero in on 
something like that. That's great but I think that even thematically connecting all 
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of their writing is a distraction from what we're trying to do. [I ask: which is?] 
Writing is thinking so I guess I really think I'm a thinking teacher: how do you 
organize your thoughts, how do you persuade, or cajole, or entertain. I don't know 
how to put in a word. My subject is...hmm I don't have a good answer for you. 
Writing is thinking and that's as close as I can get to it. " 
  The method through which this "writing as thinking" was carried out was 
often born out of discussion. Typically, these discussions worked as a sort of 
conversation between [STUDENTS] and Ms. Stein. That is, all points of discussion 
moved and were subsequently redirected through Ms. Stein. Students did not discuss the 
texts with each other (in small groups, for example), but rather they discussed it directly 
with Ms. Stein one at a time. In this way, individual students were put into one "super 
category" of [STUDENTS] and would jump in and out of the stream of conversation. 
What resulted from this arrangement is that it was more like a conversation between two 
people (with one interlocutor being comprised of many individuals) as opposed to several 
voices taking part at once. Ms. Stein would generally start with basic questions 
concerning "what" a text was saying, and would eventually move to broader, more 
abstract questions. This was facilitated by Ms. Stein's control of the flow and direction of 
the discussion. However, this control was not necessarily foolproof, as students proved to 
be very adept at moving Ms. Stein off of where she wanted to be (much to her 
consternation). 
 For example, as student were working on their comparison/contrast papers, Ms. 
Stein had them read a very short piece in which a situation was described in which a 
person was shot in front of many witnesses, none of whom did anything to help the 
victim. After some preliminary questions concerning the content of the text, Ms. Stein 
nudged the conversation towards a question of what ethical responsibilities members of a 
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community have. The students, though, seemed to have other plans. Quickly, the 
discussion (even though it was moving through multiple individuals), evolved in to a sort 
of one-upmanship contest in which the goal was to see who could come up with the most 
exotic argument/answer to the question of whether others should have helped or not. This 
invariably led to the argument being reconstructed by students into metaphors such as "a 
herd of antelope versus a pride of lions." The point being, with this particular example, 
that if a bunch of lions are around, the antelope will simply run off and not stay to help.  
 This was visibly causing no small amount of frustration with Ms. Stein. Further, 
and perhaps what made her even more frustrated, was that there was some sort of logic or 
rationality behind the increasingly abstract, bizarre, and silly yet dada-esque arguments. 
This semi-coherence functioned to keep students within "the game" of class discussion 
but also allowed them to exert control over the situation (which they very clearly 
accomplished). Eventually Ms. Stein was able to reclaim the direction of the conversation 
and steered it toward a question concerning what this means about "America" and 
"American culture." As students began to wrap their mind around this, and as Ms. Stein 
continued to draw different students in and out of the flow of the discussion, the students 
began to start considering how the idea of "individualism" defined "America" as a 
culture. While not all students were willing to give up the previous free for all 
(Christian's lone comment during this phase was "Go move to China if you don't like it!"-
-something I don't think he meant other than as a statement intended to rile up some 
controversy), the discussion was sincerely breaking some interesting ground. Jennifer, 
who rarely talked much in class, struggled to explain to Ms. Stein how "People think its 
so great, but they only see it from the outside, and it's not so great on the inside." This 
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came as a response to another student who claimed that the reason that everyone tries to 
immigrate to the United States is a sort of "proof" that American culture is "how it should 
be." Christian even stepped back into the discussion, attempting to construct an argument 
that, while it might not be great, American individualism is better than socialism which, 
as he claimed, "doesn't work." This was almost immediately explored and eventually 
dismantled by several students, one of who brought in a discussion from another class in 
which they talked about how capitalism "doesn't work, either." Christian, instead of being 
angry or ashamed, simply muttered to himself that "that's true I guess."  
 Perhaps buoyed by this success, Ms. Stein then attempted to bring the discussion 
back to the text by asking students to "find words that support that." Kendra, who was 
trying to suggest that "we just aren't as neighborly now as then" was the first to run into 
this trouble when Ms. Stein pointed out that the text they were reading was written some 
40 years ago (something virtually no one else seemed to realize). Kendra sat in silence as 
her eyes glazed over the text. Jack, who up to this point had stayed out of most of the 
discussion, jumped in to try to "save" Kendra by suggesting that the text does this 
"through the tone" of the text. Ms. Stein shifted her attention to Jack and asked him 
"where does it show you that?" Jack, frustrated perhaps because his answer did not work 
as he intended it to, resorted to saying simply "it just does." Ms. Stein initially did not 
accept this answer, causing a tense moment in which Jacks frustration started to boil over. 
It is in this moment that the bells ring and the students leap up out of their seats and leave 
the classroom. The topic was never revisited. 
 Later, Ms. Stein and I would very slightly disagree over this moment. Ms. Stein, 
while encouraged by where parts of the discussion went, was still focused on the 
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inappropriateness of the dada-esque arguments that erupted and for some time took 
control of the classroom. I saw it more as students actually "testing out" their abilities to 
construct arguments, even if they were silly. Of course, my "read" on the situation was 
only made possible because I did not shoulder any responsibility towards the decorum of 
the classroom, something Ms. Stein had to be able to account for. Regardless, this 
moment (and others like it) stands out as important, simply because it demonstrates an 
ability for students to actively engage in such discussions as well as their ability to 
construct claims about them. It is also important because moments like these, as 
mentioned before, almost never translated into students utilizing them as building blocks 
for their assigned essays. Why, then, did Ms. Stein not focus more on directly assisting 
students with moving such arguments, claims, and interpretations of the text into their 
own essays directly in class? Part of the answer is that Ms. Stein was facing time-space 
constraints just like students (the length of class, demands of the curriculum, etc). But 
perhaps more importantly, such a move would have been at odds with Ms. Stein's other 
objective, which was to "prepare" students for writing in college. While this will be 
explored in much greater detail in chapter 4, the reason this was at odds with helping 
students with this in class is that it did not fit the image Ms. Stein had of how "writing" 
happens in college, a world in which professors would largely not spend the time to do 
such things. Her effort, then, to mimic such an environment precluded what may have 
been a necessary step in translating such discussions in the classroom into the student's 
actual writing. However, had she tried to do this, it most likely would not have worked 
anyway since it also goes against what many students commonly understood to be the 
important part of writing. Sam's charge that "why does it matter" as long as the answer is 
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right suggests that such a move might have contradicted this understanding of the 
purpose of writing. In the next section, I will suggest a theoretical framework that helps 
to work through such understandings of writing to see how this "Bartleby Syndrome" is 
constructed. 
 
The Construction of Bartleby 
 In subsequent chapters, I will be dealing more thoroughly with pulling apart what 
occurred in this classroom. In particular, in the next chapter I will be developing a 
theoretical framework that understands "activity" and "action" in order to illuminate why 
certain things happened the way that they did. Further, in chapter four, I will be exploring 
the ways in which such features of the classroom were co-constructed by broader social 
dynamics. Most notably, I will be exploring the function of "college preparation" as well 
as the longer history of "literacy crises" in literacy instruction. As I will be arguing, 
"college preparation" is essentially a contemporary iteration of a long history of various 
"literacy crises" that have come and gone. To finish out this chapter, though, I want to 
focus squarely on building an understanding of this "Bartleby Syndrome" as I have been 
describing it.  To do so, I first want to argue that it would be wrong to understand the 
"Bartleby Syndrome" as an absence of literacy, or as a form of illiteracy. Both of these 
charges (absence of literacy or illiteracy) are deeply infused with ideological baggage 
including spurious claims on the moral fitness of students as well as fears and anxieties 
over an oft-suggested general decline of western civilization. Instead, a more productive 
way of understanding this "Bartleby Syndrome" is as a particular type of literacy 
practice.  
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 The concept of "literacy practices" as I am using it here draws from an arc of 
literacy studies that has sought to understand literacy as "ideological" as opposed to 
"autonomous." An "autonomous" model of literacy asserts that there is one "master" form 
of literacy and that it is its own force, capable of producing cognitive benefits purely 
from contact with it.5 An ideological understanding, in contrast, asserts that there are 
multiple literacies and that the value and function of these literacies cannot be determined 
outside of the social forces and conditions that produced them. Or, in other words, that 
literacy itself does not exist outside of history. Ethnographic researchers such as Shirley 
Brice Heath used the concept of "literacy events" in order to isolate and and focus on 
situations in which literacy has some role (Protean 445). As an extension of this, the 
concept of "literacy practices" evolved to be able to link such literacy events to broader 
social and cultural dynamics.6 As Barton and Hamilton describe it, "However practices 
are not observable units of behaviour since they also involve values, attitudes, feelings 
and social relationships. This includes people's awareness of literacy, constructions of 
literacy and discourses of literacy, how people talk about and make sense of literacy" (7). 
It is in this way that all the various "values, attitudes, feelings and social relationships" 
that are rendered invisible in the written text are recovered, often through ethnographic 
research methods. 
 Many theorists in this arc have grounded their understandings of literacy in the 
work of the social psychologist Lev Vygotsky (and in particular, his discussion of how 
"mind" is constituted by society and the implications that follow from it) as well as the 
                                                
5 Goody and Watt’s classic essay “The Consequences of Literacy,” which I will discuss 
later in the next chapter, is a good example of this. 
6 See also Street, 1984, 1995, 2003 
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literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin and his concepts of heteroglossia, dialogism, and 
chronotope. While it is unfortunately beyond the scope of this current project to draw out 
a full comparison of Vygotsky and Bakhtin's work to that of American Pragmatists, there 
have been a few writers that have noted the striking similarities and resonances between 
the two, especially in regard to the work of John Dewey in the area of social psychology. 
It will suffice to note here that, like many in the Pragmatist tradition, literacy theorists in 
this arc understand knowledge as a result of social forces and not something that is 
simply discovered.  
 As such, the concept of "literacy practices" is much more useful in understanding 
the "Bartleby Syndrome" than something like Genre Theory, simply because the 
distinguishing feature of this phenomena is precisely the historically and socially situated 
values, attitudes, feelings, and understandings that help students understand and carry out 
the methods of producing a text. While Genre Theory (and in particular, its evolving 
relationship with rhetorical studies) has been slowing moving from simply describing 
"text types" to the social conditions that inform such text types (Bawarshi 335; Devitt 
698), it still remains focused on texts. While the essays many students submitted were no 
doubt affected by the methods through which they were produced, the texts themselves 
conceal and render invisible the methods of production. 
 In the 2000 collection edited by Barton, Hamilton, and Ivanic quoted above, 
Barton and Hamilton introduce the concept of literacy practices by suggesting six 
"propositions" about the nature of literacy. Of these six, the following three are of 
particular interest in thinking about the Bartleby Syndrome: 
• There are different literacies associated with different domains of life. 
• Literacy practices are patterned by social institutions and power relationships, and 
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some literacies are more dominant, visible and influential than others. 
• Literacy practices are purposeful and embedded in broader social goals and 
cultural practices. (8) 
 
I suggest that it is more productive to understand this "Bartleby Syndrome" as a particular 
type of literacy practice for a few reasons. Before I enumerate these reasons, I want to 
quickly summarize again what exactly I mean by this "Bartleby Syndrome." By invoking 
the Melville's eponymous character in the short story "Bartleby the Scrivner," I am 
drawing attention to the phenomena in which most students (and at times, all students) 
simply "preferred not to" engage in various "processes of writing." By this, I do not mean 
that students did not write anything, or did not turn any assignments in (although many 
students submitted assignments well past due dates and deadlines), but rather their 
passive refusal to participate in producing drafts, revisions, engaging in peer-review, 
utilizing teacher feedback, and in general treating the composition of a text as a one time 
event as opposed to a process over time. This is why I refer this as a syndrome. By 
syndrome I do not mean some sort of medical abnormality, but rather "a predictable, 
characteristic pattern of behavior, action, etc., that tends to occur under certain 
circumstances." Additionally, and like medical cases, my use of the term syndrome also 
is intended to draw attention to the fact that such a constellation of patterns of behavior 
do not in of themselves indicate a direct cause. In other words, the reasons for this 
passive non-participation are not immediately visible in the non-participation itself. 
Finally, the word "syndrome" is suggestive of the way in which this pattern of behavior 
seemed to be "catching" and thus seemed to actually "spread" and increase in intensity 
during the semester. 
 While it might seem logical to simply see this as students "not doing their work," 
  103 
such an explanation fails to adequately describe what was actually going on. Importantly, 
students were often able to produce some form of writing to be submitted at the 
deadlines. While these drafts were often written very quickly, often in the days 
immediately before the deadline, and often severely below expectations (not meeting 
length requirements, not fulfilling required components, sometimes not even aligning 
with the assigned project itself), writing did occur. Accordingly, it would be wrong to see 
this as a simple absence of writing. Also, by understanding the Bartleby Syndrome as its 
own peculiar (although not rare) type of literacy practice, we can at least have some sort 
of object to analyze. Without this, any framework of analysis would be required to rely 
upon some sort of contrast between "deficient" writing practices and "successful" ones. 
Finally, such an understanding inappropriately individualizes such non-participation, 
understanding it as a break down or lack of "personal motivation" which obscures the 
social basis to such non-participation. 
 With that in mind, I want to return to the Bartleby Syndrome as a literacy practice 
and to the three propositions about literacy from Barton and Hamilton. The first, that 
"there are different literacies associated with different domains of life" was routinely 
validated in my observations of the students. While the students may not have been doing 
much drafting and revising of their assigned essays, writing was in abundance in the 
classroom. For example, Jennifer and many of the other women in the classroom would 
often write messages to each other on their backpacks. By the end of the semester, their 
backpacks were completely covered with various phrases, messages, notes, anecdotes, 
and so forth written by other women in the class. Also, many students were active writers 
outside of the class. Jack, who had recently been introduced to the "Beat" writers of the 
  104 
1950s, would occasionally come in with long poems and stories, sometimes written 
during manic writing binges that would go all night. Other students, such as Sam and 
Christian could be seen constantly sending text messages through their mobile telephones 
in class despite a prohibition against this. Outside of school, one of Kendra's jobs was to 
work at the local community center/library. Because the school setting itself is permeable 
to multiple domains of life, these other literacy practices were visible. More interestingly, 
though, is that every student I talked to was able to recount an experience or an occasion 
in which they did fully engage in something like the "process of writing" envisioned by 
Ms. Stein. Sam, most notably, told me about the speeches he wrote for his extra-
curricular marketing club competitions. These speeches, often composed on his 
smartphone, were something that he would spend weeks agonizing over, sharing with 
others, revising, and re-writing. What this indicates is that the literacy practices the 
students engaged in in relation to the class was unique to the class (and to a lesser extent 
to school in general).  
 The second proposition, that "literacy practices are patterned by social institutions 
and power relationships, and some literacies are more dominant, visible and influential 
and others" fits the Bartleby Syndrome, particularly in the way that the rigid constraints 
of space-time in the school produced a way of working that undoubtedly contributed to 
the student's non-participation in process pedagogy activities. Further, various ideas 
about what counts as writing (held by both the students as well as the teacher) worked to 
obscure all the non-school forms of writing detailed above. When students were asked 
about what they like to write on the first day of class, many of them were quick to label 
themselves as "non-writers" and "bad writers," despite the fact that they participated in all 
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sorts of writing outside of the classroom. Finally, Ms. Stein's notions of college, her role 
as a teacher in a high school, and various demands and expectations from other teachers, 
administration, parents, as well as the discipline of English studies itself all patterned the 
various activities and assignments that were carried out in the classroom. While I will 
return to this in chapter four (specifically, the demands created by "college preparation" 
curricula), what I want to point out is that all these things created the background and 
expectations that students "preferred not to" engage in, thus creating the Bartleby 
Syndrome. In other words, the idealized "literacy practices" that Ms. Stein arranged her 
class with did not actually define the terms of what the actual literacy practices might be 
as the class progressed, rather it simply served as the yardstick through which the value 
of what did occur would be measured (typically as a "failure"), both for the students and 
Ms. Stein. This failure was felt in overt ways (grades, disciplining students, etc) as well 
as more subtle ways (emotional duress, confusion, etc). Again, the defining feature of the 
Bartleby Syndrome wasn't so much a pure and absolute absence of any literacy practice 
(although without a doubt, this did frequently occur), but rather was a feature of a deep 
conflict between two very different kinds of literacy practices. 
 The last proposition, that "literacy practices are purposeful and embedded in 
broader social goals and cultural practices" is perhaps the most important insight for the 
next two chapters. There is a danger in much of this that we might be tempted to think of 
"literacy" as a purely theoretical concept and that it has no direct connection to the 
material world we inhabit. However, as Scribner and Cole's work with the Vai suggest, 
literacy does in fact change the material conditions of someone's life. As they write, “this 
is certainly important evidence that literacy does ‘count’ in intellectual terms, and it is 
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especially important in suggesting how it counts. The consequences of literacy that we 
identified are all highly specific and closely tied to actual practices with particular 
scripts…” (85). This will be an important motif developed over the next few chapters. 
Just as it is wrong, I believe, to understand this "Bartleby Syndrome" as a sort of "lack" 
or deficiency, it is also wrong to understand it as counter-productive and non-generative. 
Recall Sam's "philosophy" of "why the hell does it matter how you got to the paper as 
long as it is right?" In this understanding, "right" or "correctness" might actually be 
complicated or made more difficult through the process of drafts, revisions, and so forth 
in which an idea might be thrown into doubt. On a much more basic level, such an 
emphasis might allow Sam to simply get a little more sleep. However, I also believe that 
there is a broader way of looking at this. One might ask, for example, why classes must 
be rigidly structured this way. After all, we could theoretically reconstruct education in a 
radically different way in which classes did not meet every day for 50 minutes. We could 
completely eliminate the emphasis of grammar in such a class (as Ms. Stein once 
admitted she longed of doing). The reasons these things don't happen, though, is because 
they resonate with larger social dynamics. As Brandt and Clinton note, "[w]here anyone 
is observed reading and writing something, it well worth asking who is getting something 
out of it; often that somebody will not be at the scene" (Limits 347). I do not think it is 
too far off to suggest that constructing the writing environment in such a way, in such a 
way in which the Bartleby Syndrome is almost guaranteed to happen, a writing practice is 
unleashed through which individuals simply cannot reap the potential critical benefits of 
engaging in a sustained process of writing. In very basic terms, it closes off any 
possibility of writing being a process of social critique, understanding, and 
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reconstruction. In a radically democratic world that depends on such literacies to sustain 
itself, the Bartleby Syndrome would be simply untenable. In a neo-liberalistic world that 
works only so long as such political reflection as a feature of social life is kept to a 
minimum, such literacy practices make a lot more sense. I will be returning to this in 
chapter four when I discuss "college preparation" as well as chapter five where I will 
explore the political implications of this more fully. 
 
Of Wizards and Spells 
 I want to close this chapter with a scene that occurred long after CE had ended as 
a prelude to the next chapter. Late in the spring semester, I went back to speak with Ms. 
Stein about what had happened in the fall. It was during this follow up interview that 
something completely unexpected, yet deeply illuminating happened. Since I would often 
meet with Ms. Stein in her classroom, it was a common occurrence to be interrupted 
during our interviews. Usually, in these moments, the interview would immediately pause 
as Ms. Stein would deal with whatever issues or concerns the students had. Once the 
student had been dealt with, the issue resolved, or whatever else was needed, we would 
resume our interviews. This time, however, something completely different happened. 
Like other times, a student came into the classroom to ask if Ms. Stein had gotten a copy 
of the draft she was working on. Right away I knew something was off because Ms. Stein 
very quickly noted to the student that she had and that she had already emailed comments 
back to her. Other times, Ms. Stein would have jumped at any opportunity to discuss a 
student's draft with them. Our interviews would sometimes go on long pauses while Ms. 
Stein would enthusiastically try to help students with whatever they needed help with. 
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This time, it was very clear that Ms. Stein wanted to avoid some sort of confrontation 
with the student, as every time the student would beg Ms. Stein to indicate just what her 
comments were in person, Ms. Stein would simply request that the student "go read [the] 
comments in the email." After several rounds of pleading and back and forth, the student 
finally gave up and left the classroom. 
 As the door shut, I remarked to Ms. Stein that that was the sort of attitude missing 
from the students I had been observing in CE. Ms. Stein then let out a sigh and began to 
explain to me what was going on. The student who had just been in, looking for extra 
help in writing her essay, was working on an argumentative essay that dealt with the 
school's Harry Potter book club. Specifically, the Harry Potter book club was hosting a 
"Harry Potter Olympics" at the school in which fans of the series would partake in 
various physical / intellectual activities (obstacle courses, races, etc) that all had a 
component related to the reading of the books. In particular, one activity had students 
reciting various magical spells drawn from the narrative. This student's argument was that 
such an event should not be allowed at the school. The reasons this student had for 
arguing against such an activity rested upon a fairly sophisticated argument. As Ms. Stein 
explained to me, the student was attempting to argue that such an event would make the 
school an "unsafe" atmosphere for students. Therefore, the "Harry Potter Olympics" 
violated the civil rights of various students in that it prevented their right to a public 
education. As I sat there with a confused look on my face, not fully understanding how 
such an argument would get from A to B, Ms. Stein noted that this particular student was 
a member of the "Soldiers of the Light," a group of Evangelical Christians at the school 
She explained it thusly: "she and the group of Christians who pray around the flag pole 
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say we 're opening up the school to demons and casting spells [which] blurs the line 
between this dimension and the next and the rest of the students still have to come here 
again on Monday by law and we have now made this place unclean." However, what 
should probably be noted at this point is that Ms. Stein was the faculty sponsor for the 
Harry Potter book club at the school. Ms. Stein was also Jewish. And yet, this student 
persisted in enlisting Ms. Stein to help her write the strongest argument she could, despite 
the fact that, as Ms. Stein later told me, "she has even told me that she believes Jews 
aren't going to heaven." 
Even though I am arguing that the Bartleby Syndrome is a literacy practice, this 
does not mean that all literacy practices are of equal value and that the Bartleby 
Syndrome style of literacy practice is just as good as any other. As I will argue in the 
final chapter of this study, there are important political implications embedded in the sort 
of literacy practices that students in College English eschewed. The question for now, 
though, is how did this student chose such a remarkably different literacy practice? By 
asking "how" instead of "why," my aim is to focus on the process of action that is 
fundamentally at the root of all literacy practices. Or, more simply, that literacy practices 
are things people do. If it is possible for a student to fully engage in a process of writing 
that deeply involves refinement and growth through social interactions as well as 
revisions of drafts, how then are we to understand the Bartleby Syndrome? Why did they 
choose non-participation over other possible forms of engaging with the class? To more 
fully explore this question, I will be taking up questions of both "agency" as well as 
"action." Specifically, I will be working to draw out a Pragmatist conception of action 
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and activity, relying heavily on Dewey's concept of habit and its role in human conduct 
as a means to understand the social nature of human deliberation.





Chapter 3 	  




 There is one majestic assumption that is foundational to practically every writing 
environment that is undertaken in an educational context: that students will write--or that 
there will be writing somehow and in someway. Because the teaching of writing is 
predicated upon some sort of medium or object (i.e., student writing) that pedagogic 
activity can be directed at, it is the one thing that must be in place before any "writing 
instruction" can occur. This, then, is the starting point for understanding the instruction of 
writing. Without student writing happening, there seems to be very little that the "writing 
class" can do. This assumption might seem like the proper departure into asking why 
students write in the first place, particularly in educational institutions. After all, this 
question seems ripe with importance for the teaching of writing, simply because without 
writing (or with students choosing to not write), we have serious problems. Further, this 
question is something that is beyond the horizon of writing instruction itself, simply 
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because we are now dealing with things that occur before writing. How is our knowledge 
of "writing" able to help us understand the reasons why writing exists in the first place? 
What can we say about why a student might choose to engage in writing or not? 
 As I was conducting my fieldwork, this was precisely the question that was 
scrawled into practically every page of handwritten field notes: why were these students 
not writing? What was their decision making process like? How did they deliberate on 
whether or not they should work on their essays or do something else? At about the mid-
way point through my fieldwork, I had begun to think of writing itself as a sort of ethical 
or moral choice. As I had thought about it, it seemed as though these students were 
making decisions regarding the sort of action they would engage in. They would decide, 
for instance, that they did not need to work on drafts, that they did not need to read the 
teacher's comments in order to help them make the next draft different, that they didn't 
need to start early and take advantage of opportunities to engage in peer-reviewing 
activities.  
 In the time since my fieldwork came to an end and the more I considered this, the 
more reasons I found to reject this idea. For one, as I suggested in the previous chapter, it 
wasn't that the students simply didn't write anything, but rather that they engaged in a 
literacy practice that was not quite what the teacher wanted. In other words, it wasn't so 
simply a choice of "to write or not to write," but rather a far more nuanced shaping of an 
action that would be undertaken. Two, to frame this as a "choice" seemed to me to be 
inappropriately individualistic. What was quite clear in talking with many of the students 
is that they were as frustrated and confused over the appearance of the "Bartleby 
Syndrome" as the teacher was. If it were simply a "choice" to be made, it would seem as 
  113 
though more students would have simply made a different choice. Instead, it was quite 
clear that something beyond the individual was constraining and guiding "choice." 
As the title of this chapter suggests, there are two words or concepts that I will be 
revolving around to work through and understand the problems posed by the Bartleby 
Syndrome: agency and action. The first, agency, I will define as the capacity to engage in 
action. Discussions over the theorized existence of this capacity, much like theorized but 
as of yet unmeasured sub-atomic particles, has been fraught with anxiety and for good 
reason. While human activity has been at the core of practically all philosophical thinking 
since the dawn of civilization, throughout various points in time theories have popped up 
that have thrown the idea of agency into serious doubt. The second, activity, is crucial 
because it points to not just being able to do something, but actually doing it. In this 
chapter, my goal is to undertake a theoretical reworking of where the previous chapter 
left off. That is, to begin with the question of action in regard to writing, particularly in 
light of the "Bartleby Syndrome." By this, I mean two things. First, I mean a broader 
question of simply why do students write at all? Second, I mean a question regarding not 
just why students write, but why they write in certain ways. In answering these two 
questions, I will ultimately be constructing a Pragmatist understanding of writing as a 
trans-actional activity. However, to do so, I will briefly consider other ways these 
questions have popped up in literacy studies as well as why they have been important. I 
will start with a brief overview of the idea of agency and how this quest for "agency" is 
entangled with conversations concerning not just the consequences of literacy, but how 
illiteracy is not just a state of having no literacy, but a socially defined concept that does 
work. I will then move from this overview to tackle a problem of understanding action 
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and activity as situated within a context or environment. I will start by exploring Activity 
Theory as a means to start outlining an understanding of literacy events and practices that 
takes into account a whole picture of literacy. It is from here, though, that I will discuss 
the limitations of Activity Theory and, without invalidating AT, to construct a Pragmatist 
account of activity derived from John Dewey's work that not only extends Activity 
Theory, but places the "Bartleby Syndrome" within an framework of organic unity that is 
limitless in regard to the scope of what C. W. Mills referred to as a sociological 
imagination. It is from this Pragmatist account, I contend, that the political implications 
of specific literacy practices become most visible in regard to a reflexive relationship 
between society and writer. 
 
The Need for a Theory of Activity and Agency in Literacy Studies 
 Within and around the field of writing instruction, there is a nearly hopeless 
entanglement of terms that are all grappling to define and understand the same 
phenomena: human action and agency. What is at stake is an understanding of the 
contours of how our theoretical claims make possible a view of human beings as situated 
and creative beings, responsive to the world around them while also creative of their 
environment. While the idea that literacy is something that one does is hardly 
controversial, such an understanding does not, on its own, explain the deployment or 
engagement in such activity. It is no surprise, then, that achieving a correct understanding 
of "agency" within literacy has been a major theoretical concern, particularly against 
theoretical and philosophical stances that sometimes veer too close to an understanding of 
the world as deterministic. This quest for agency is not misguided for the very simple 
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reason that the existence of "agency" is something that, to borrow the phrasing of 
William James, we do not doubt in our hearts. That said, I do not think it is too 
controversial to point out that the concept of "agency" itself has and remains to this day a 
nebulous concept that is elusive in the realm of theory.  
 What is clear are a couple things. First, our contemporary notions of "agency" 
cannot be divorced from the philosophical, political, and economic trajectories of 
Western rationality. It was, after all, the great figure in Liberalism of John Locke who 
necessitated a view of the individual as the locus of all social action and analysis. As 
these conversations twisted and turned (sometimes violently) throughout the years, 
different shades of a concept of agency have appeared. Regardless, my point here is that 
the concept of agency itself is historical. Second, the concept of "agency" itself exists in 
some sort of balance with terms like will, motivation, intention, purposefulness, self-
hood, self-efficacy, choice, freedom, liberty, power/empowerment, and creativity.  
 Within the field of writing instruction itself, many of these terms have taken up a 
central place in many theories of writing and writing instruction. Further, we have 
augmented them with concepts of our own. Consider, for example, the concept of 
"voice." In the opening pages to Writing: Teachers and Children at Work, Donald Graves 
famously provides this stark assessment of "traditional" writing classes:  
Children want to write. They want to write the first day they attend school. This is 
no accident. Before they went to school they marked up walls, pavements, 
newspapers with crayons, pens or pencils . . . anything that makes a mark. The 
child’s marks say, `I am’.  
`No, you aren't,' say most school approaches to the teaching of writing. (3)  
 
In this telling of the scene, we see the child as endowed with some sort of indomitable 
will, a sheer brute force that cannot be contained. Writing, in this example, becomes the 
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vehicle or vessel for some expression of voice, some affirmation of self, some unbridled 
sense of power and purposefulness in making a mark on the world around the child. 
Without writing, there is no expression, no voice, no will, no self, no agency. It is this, 
above all, that must be protected against the forces that say "no, you aren't." It is here that 
two poles of theoretical concern are visible. The first is an understanding of what is at 
stake with literacy. In Graves's scene, what is at stake with writing is an ability for a child 
to make a mark on the world that says "I am." The second thing is a recognition of the 
limits of individual freedom and will. The "No, you aren't" represents the structural 
limitations of agency, a supposedly external force that provides the framework from 
within activity occurs. It is through these two poles--the consequences of literacy (or, 
why it matters) and the imbeddedness of literacy within structure--that much scholarship 
of literacy weaves itself around.  
 In regard to the "why literacy matters" aspect, the theorized bounds of what 
literacy means to humanity are nearly limitless. For example, in the summary and 
conclusion to Goody and Watt’s 1963 “The Consequences of Literacy,” the authors note 
that “recent anthropology has rightly rejected the categorical distinctions between the 
thinking of ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’ peoples,” but goes on to say that these rejections 
have gone too far and turned into “diffuse relativism and sentimental egalitarianism” 
(344). At stake is the reality (problematic as it may be) that some cultures have produced 
more technological advancements than others. For Goody and Watt, this is an 
anthropological question that demands some sort of understanding as to why we have 
such a difference between "civilized" and "primitive." If we are to avoid "diffuse 
relativism" in which we would simply refuse to compare cultures, how can we account 
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for the fact that western culture progressed in the way that it did while other cultures were 
stagnant and never “progressed?” Writing. At least, for Goody and Watt, the answer is to 
be found in the fact that “the urban revolution of the Ancient Near East produced one 
invention, the invention of writing” (344). It was because of writing that we were able to 
think differently, to operate differently, to do more, to rationalize more, to critically 
understand more than simple oral cultures could do. 
 It is worth quoting them at length here to understand how seductive and 
commonsensical this argument is to us: 
In oral societies, the cultural tradition is transmitted almost entirely by face-to-
face communication; and changes in its content are accompanied by the 
homeostatic process of forgetting or transforming those parts of the tradition that 
cease to be either necessary or relevant. Literate societies, on the other hand, 
cannot discard, absorb, or transmute the past in the same way. Instead, their 
members are faced with permanently recorded versions of the past and its 
beliefs; and because the past is thus set apart from the present, historical enquiry 
becomes possible. This in turn encourages skepticism; and skepticism, not only 
about the legendary past, but about received ideas about the universe as a whole. 
(344) 
 
We’re so used to this story that it is indeed one of those “master narratives” that we are 
highly prone to being lulled into taking for granted. This, however, sets up some 
troublesome assertions. As Goody and Watt conclude, “A consideration of the 
consequences of literacy in these terms, then, throws some light not only upon the nature 
of the Greek achievement but also upon the intellectual differences between simple and 
complex societies” (345). It is here that a full outline comes into focus of why literacy, 
and in particular writing, "matters." This understanding of writing is so pervasive that no 
small amount of theoretical attention is given to moments in which such a desire for 
agency through writing vanishes. In these moments, our understanding is that something 
is wrong or unnatural when students don't write, when "illiteracy" is present, or when the 
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words just don't simply come out fast enough. Depending on the theoretical traditions 
writers are working from, we have described these moments as writer's block, lack of 
individual motivation, resistance, or structural and cultural tensions (e.g., lack of time for 
students working). Regardless of the theoretical tradition these concepts come from, they 
are typically unified by an understanding that only if such barriers are removed, be they 
cognitive barriers, social or cultural barriers, or barriers of the will, then writing will once 
again flow and students will be proclaiming "I am."  
 It is worth noting that Goody and Watt's work underscores one of the primary 
levers of inquiry in literacy research: difference. That is, we encounter different forms of 
literacy (either in a qualitative or ontological sense) and are forced to consider the causes 
and effects of this. Through this, the consequences of literacy are highlighted. In setting 
up a comparison between "primitive" and "civilized" peoples as an effect of literacy, the 
stakes are immediately raised in that the continuity of civilization depends upon the 
successful transmission of literacy. Goody and Watt are, of course, setting this 
mechanism up between two different cultures. However, the same question is often 
transposed to the internal production of a culture in that poor literacy skills might feasibly 
lead to an overall decline in that particular culture. Thus, the anxiety over "illiteracy" 
becomes the focus of much work in literacy education. This has lead to an investigation 
of not only the causes of "illiteracy," but what to do about it.  
 Nowhere is this tension more evident than in Mina Shaughnessy's Errors and 
Expectation. In what has become a classic in the field, Shaughnessy provides a guide for 
helping to not only deal with "basic writers" in the university who are underprepared but 
also to critically examine the relationship between "errors" and our own "expectations" of 
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student ability in writing. What is more important to understand with Shaughnessy's work 
are the historical conditions surrounding her work. As she notes in the introduction, the 
City University in New York adopted an "open admissions" policy in 1970 following 
years of political upheaval and protests whereby thousands of students who normally 
would not have been able to enter the University were suddenly granted access. Prior to 
this point, admissions standards would have prevented these "underprepared" basic 
writers from entry, thus providing a rather homogenous student body in terms of writing 
abilities that would help solidify expectations as to what a "prepared" writer might be. In 
other words, social and political factors in regard to access to college determined how 
"literate" was to be understood. 
 Similarly, it was social and political factors that produced the "basic writer" in 
CUNY in 1970. When these "strangers in academia," as Shaughnessy called them 
showed up, tensions that remained invisible were suddenly placed in the spotlight. 
Shaughnessy's description is worth repeating: "Not surprisingly, the essays these students 
wrote during their first weeks of class stunned the teachers who read them. Nothing, it 
seemed, short of a miracle was going to turn such students into writers. Not uncommonly, 
teachers announced to their supervisors (or even their students) after only a week of class 
that everyone was going to fail" (3). As Shaughnessy very importantly points out, most of 
the teachers who were responsible for these writing classes were trained to "analyze the 
belletristic achievements of the centuries" and not to handle "remedial" duties (3). The 
point I want to highlight is that in this situation that we see how both illiteracy and 
literacy are produced in multiple ways within a social and historical context. For instance, 
an instructor with a different understanding of language (William Labov’s work comes to 
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mind) might not see these students as illiterate in any sense of the word. Consequently 
disciplinary conventions and training form a backdrop of beliefs concerning what a good 
writer is and isn't. Further, cultural standards and dominant ideologies concerning who is 
and isn't a college student no doubt contributed to marking these new students as 
"strangers in academia." Lastly, social inequalities along class, gender, and race lines that 
deeply penetrate primary and secondary schooling options played a very strong role in 
the construction (not production) of these "underprepared" writers. 
 The point here is that this sort of inquiry into literacy suggests that social 
conditions, not internal biological differences, are responsible for the construction of 
what counts as "literate," and thus also produces "illiteracy" as its binary. The result of a 
rupture in these conceptions of literate/illiterate results in, similar to Goody and Watt, an 
examination into the nature of literacy itself. As Shaughnessy recommends, "rather the 
teacher must try to decipher the individual student's code, examining samples of his 
writing as a scientist might, searching for patterns or explanations, listening to what the 
student says about punctuation, and creating situations in the classroom that encourage 
students to talk openly about what they don't understand" (40). Shaughnessy's move here 
is a generous one. Refusing to see these students as "ineducable," she instead describes 
them as "beginners and must, like all beginners, learn by making mistakes" (5). For 
Shaughnessy, it is understanding the nature of student "errors" that is the first step in 
developing pedagogical strategies to helping students overcome them (73). 
 In her work, while Shaughnessy is generous in trying to attain a deeper 
understanding of where student errors originate from, her ultimate aim for doing so is to 
stamp out these errors and to create homogeneity where diversity exists in regard to 
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literacy practices. The picture this paints is that "illiteracy" is in fact the natural state and 
"literacy" is the refined, civilized state. Or, in other words, we start out illiterate and, 
through various civilizing procedures, attain literacy.  
 However, as Shirley Brice Heath's long term ethnography in the Piedmont clearly 
demonstrates, this is simply not the case. In Ways with Words, Heath provides an in-
depth account of two communities in the mill industry area in the Piedmont: 
predominantly black Trackton and predominately white Roadville. As Heath notes, "Both 
Trackton and Roadville are literate communities and each has its own traditions for 
structuring, using, and assessing reading and writing" (230). However, while much 
attention has been given to this assertion that both communities are "literate" (even 
though neither does particularly well in school), what is more interesting is the intensely 
deep connection literacy has to the environment of each community. As Heath writes, 
"The receipt of mail in Trackton is a big event, and since several houses are residences 
for transients the postman does not know, the children sometimes take the mail and give 
it to the appropriate person. Reading names and addresses and return addresses becomes 
a game-like challenge among all the children,as the school-age try to show the 
preschoolers how they know 'what dat says'" (190). While different, yet similar forms of 
literacy occurred in Roadville (such as adults constantly asking children questions geared 
toward awareness (127) It is observations like this that have lead many literacy 
researchers to understand that, much like breathing, how much "literacy" is simply a 
result of a person transacting with an environment that is deeply embedded with “the 
symbolic.” The concept of "transaction," a concept rooted in Dewey's inquiry into 
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inquiry, is a familiar one to many literacy researchers and theorists.1 Under this 
understanding, the practice of young children helping to sort and deliver mail (which 
requires not only the ability to decode text, but to also know what to do with mail) is not 
something that is necessarily "taught" directly in a decontextualized way, but rather is a 
function of living in a world where literacy exists. 
 This view, though, necessitates an understanding of the social context and 
structures that literacy practices occur in. As Heath notes, "Encapsulated in an almost 
totally human world, Trackton babies are in the midst of nearly constant human 
communication, verbal and non-verbal" (75). The problem then is not of either 
community being illiterate, but why both communities do not fare well in the urban 
schools. Heath builds a case by describing certain forms of "literacy practices" in each 
community that come in to conflict with various forms of schooled literacy. For instance, 
Heath observes that "Children do not expect adults to ask them questions, for, in 
Trackton, children are not seen as information-givers or question answerers" (103).  Of 
course, being an "information-giver" is something that is heavily identified with success 
in school. The assumption here is that children in Trackton and Roadville do have 
"literacy" but that these particular literacy practices are simply not wanted nor validated 
in the schools. The difference, then, between the students who do well in school and 
those who do not can be traced back to the community environment and, often, the 
families. As Brian Street claims, “parents in middle-class homes are indeed frequently 
concerned about structuring learning for their children in the ways legitimized by the 
school” (Social Literacies 117). The reasons for these parents to do so was to avoid the 
                                                
1 See especially Rosenblatt’s The Reader, The Text, The Poem and Rogoff, et al. 
“Development through participation in sociocultural activity” (1995). 
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perceived consequences of not having the correct form of literacy. As Street writes, 
“Children were learning to participate in the achievement culture that their parents saw as 
essential if they were to reproduce the parents’ life-style and avoid the horrors of poverty 
of which the nearby city provided such stark evidence” (119). One might take this as 
suggesting that the way to solve this problem is to change the early proto-literacy events 
in each child's life to better align them with what will be expected in schools. However, 
Heath seems to be suggesting something different than this. As she notes in the latter 
parts of her work, "Of what use might be the detailed ethnographies of communication in 
Roadville and Trackton be in enabling teachers and students to bridge their different 
ways? The answer to this question depends on finding ways to make accessible to 
teachers an understanding of the differences in language and culture their students bring 
to their classrooms" (265). Consequently, she arrives at a point not so different than 
Shaughnessy's call to "know thy students" in order to understand the social root of their 
errors. The danger in this, though, is that it does not necessarily entail a critique of the 
educative institution that is responsible for selectively validating certain literacy 
practices.  
 The consequences of this are noted by Deborah Brandt in her Literacy in 
American Lives, a survey of several generations of people and how they came to have 
various forms of literacy. In it, Brandt points out that the social value of various literacies 
flourish and diminish depending on prevailing social conditions. In one instance, Brandt 
paints a comparison of two women in the rural upper mid-west. One woman, due to the 
various realities of rural life including a rural agricultural magazine boom, was able to 
secure a position as an editor for one of the magazines in the first half of the 20th century. 
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By the time the second woman was born in the same area in the second half of the same 
century, these avenues of literacy had all but ceased to exist. As Brandt writes, "Although 
it is too soon to predict the full life and literacy trajectory of Hunt, it is clear that many of 
the local cultural assets that subsidized Day as she made her way into adult literacy either 
are not available to the younger woman or simply are no longer with as much in her 
society" (41). This suggests that what "counts," something different than literacy itself, is 
constantly shifting due to larger forces. One such force is race and racism. As Brandt 
points out, "Basic literacy rates among African Americans rose from 30% in 1910 to 
more than 80% by 1930 to over 95% by 1970" (106). However, these numbers are 
misleading if we don't take structural inequality into consideration. Brandt again: 
"African Americans who attained high level literacy and advanced education often found 
that their skills did not have the same status and tradable value as those of the white 
population" (106). In fact, in an earlier piece, Heath herself notes that for residents of 
Trackton, literacy could enable the opening doors but did not in any sense guarantee 
admission (Protean 464). Consequently, shaping the environment of young children with 
specific forms of literacy practices that might be helpful in school might not always work 
because what forms of literacy practices are valued are constantly shifting and contingent 
upon other unrelated social forces (race, gender, etc).  
 While many literacy theorists have made much of the fact that we are prone to 
focusing on schooled literacy without paying due attention to diverse forms of literacy 
that happen outside of schools, what the scholarship I have been discussing suggests is 
that the primary function of schools, as an element of structural limitation, is not to 
produce literacy skills but to rather engage in the production of illiteracy. This "illiteracy" 
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suggests a lack of agency on the part of students, ranging from an inability to work within 
mainstream institutions to acquire benefits from them to an inability to foster a critical 
perspective that would allow students to undo ossified hierarchies of power. Interestingly, 
schools function to also demarcate other forms of literacy, regardless of where they 
occur, as valid or invalid, literate or illiterate. This means that schools possess a function 
through which all forms of literacy are somehow related, sorted, and valued, even in 
areas where schooled literacy has no official place. As Harvey Graff writes, "Modern 
societies tend to stress the importance of literacy without defining or understanding it. 
Consequently, literacy by itself is overvalued and taken out of meaningful contexts, 
creating pressures that increase the difficulties of learning useful skills. Shame and 
awareness of inferiority are two products of a racially and class-biased educational and 
social system. In this way, the very high social emphasis on the importance of literacy 
becomes counterproductive for many individuals" (393). J. Elspeth Stuckey, in her 1991 
book The Violence of Literacy, takes this viewpoint to a tragic (yet honest) extreme. I 
might add that while this is counterproductive for many individuals, it is incredibly 
productive for maintaining and reproducing various forms of structural inequality. This 
insight has been shared by many other theorists of literacy, that these counter-productive 
and violent elements of literacy discussed in an attempt to understand activity and agency 
are not accidental, mistakes, or aberrations. To address this theoretical need to understand 
the relationship of activity and action to larger social structures in order to understand 
how something like "agency" occurs within these structures, many people in literacy 
studies have turned to or drawn heavily from Activity Theory. In the next section, I take 
up an account of Activity Theory to suggest some of the ways it might overcome these 
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barriers as well as provide a foundation for understanding the data presented in the 
previous chapter. Further, I will discuss what I see as the limits of Activity Theory to 
pave the way for a Pragmatist understanding of activity and agency. 
 
Origins of "Activity" in Theory: 
 My purpose is not to provide an exhaustive overview of activity theory, nor an 
exhaustive historical account of its development. However, I do want to briefly provide 
an account of what "activity theory" is and some features of its development simply to 
provide a background to a more pragmatist account of human activity as well as a 
justification for that account. On one hand, the origins of the concept of "activity" in both 
Activity Theory as well as Pragmatism share a common lineage. Both are continuations 
in philosophical discourse concerning change and motion in existence. Further, they both 
travel the Hegelian detour in this conversation. On the other hand, though, it is where 
they move "post-Hegel" that largely defines the differences between the two.  
 The question of not just what is existence, but what causes existence is perhaps 
one of the oldest questions in Philosophy. It is worth considering Aristotle's "four causes" 
as a precursor to the concept of activity. As one may recall from Aristotle's Metaphysics, 
the four causes are the material cause (the raw material out of which something is 
formed), the formal cause (the patterns or forms or "genres" through which things form 
into and that we can recognize by its universality), the efficient cause (the thing that, 
through the exertion of energy, molds or forms matter into something...like a painter, a 
sculptor, a writer), and the final cause. The "final cause," which Aristotle saw as the most 
important, referred to the telos--the purpose, goals, or ends--of an object. The final cause 
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held an important place because none of the other causes could be realized without it. It 
was, in a sense, the cause that gave meaning to the other three. This idea of the telos of an 
object being prior to other forms of causation will return in both Activity Theory as well 
as Dewey's pragmatist account of activity.  
 In Hegel's work, the concept of Geist or "spirit" unifies these four causes. "Geist 
for Hegel," as Bernstein helpfully explains, "is Reason or Nous as characterized by the 
Greeks, but Geist is not 'abstract' understanding, it is not Verstand; it is Reason 
(Vernunft) fully actualized in the world" (Praxis and Action 17). It is here that Hegel is 
able to move from the subjective mind to "reason" that is wholly characterized by some 
sort of connection to reality. In other words, we don't just "think," we think about things. 
However, it is Geist's location within the non-material realm of reason (and thus its 
"idealism") that would prove as the departure point for both Marxism and Pragmatism. In 
regard to Marxism, Marx would famously seek to turn Hegel's idealism right side up, and 
to locate the dialectical tensions that produced history within modes of production, hence 
Marx's foray into political economics as an attempt to "scientifically" understand history. 
In regard to Pragmatism, as noted in the first chapter, the move was to "naturalize" 
Hegel's idealism, drawing very heavily on the work of Darwin. In both traditions, though, 
the central problem was to understand the way in which change not only transformed 
nature, but the individual as well. For Marx, it was labor itself that accomplished this. For 
Pragmatism, it was "experience."  
 I will reserve further discussion of Dewey's conception of human activity for a 
later section in order to focus here on "Activity Theory" itself. One way to work in to the 
concept of AT is to start with some of the basic problems AT seeks to address in the post-
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Hegelian landscape in thought. For example, in Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language, Voloshinov sums up some of the major points he has been arguing. One of his 
points is that "The laws of the generative process of language are not at all the laws of 
individual psychology, but neither can they be divorced from the activity of speakers. The 
laws of language generation are sociological laws" (98, emphasis mine). It is here that we 
see the three most critical assertions about language that have formed the bedrock of 
much scholarly work that follows in this tradition, including Activity Theory. The first is 
a challenge to the "autonomous" way of thinking about where language comes from. 
Voloshinov is rejecting the notion that it is internal structures of individual thought 
(psychology) that are responsible for how we form language. That is that there are 
intrinsic or essential qualities about the "self" from which language flows. The second 
charge is that even if language does not emanate from the individual, autonomous mental 
structures, it still is somehow related to "the activity of speakers." This is crucial as 
Voloshinov is pointing to the fact that how we are living in the world says a lot about the 
sort of language we use. In other words, language use is situated in our everyday actions. 
Finally, Voloshinov asserts that "laws" of language generation, that is, the "rules" behind 
how language work are in fact sociological and not based in some sort of non-social, 
ahistorical realm. This is probably the most critical element as it directly challenges the 
notion that somewhere there exists a "perfect" language and all other forms of language 
can be measured by how close they come to this form. In short, for Voloshinov, language 
is social, situated, historical, and subject to conflict and struggle. We can compare that to 
a more structuralist view of language in which language governs its own "generative 
laws;" that is, there are "rules" of language that are not subject to social and historical 
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forces. 
 However it is in this oft-quoted passage that we see one of the enduring 
conundrums. This sociological aspect of language presents a problem, namely of 
understanding the nature of how exactly the "sociological" aspect itself fits into language 
generation. In other words, language is sociological, but is not divorced from the 
individual's "activity" either. In Vygotsky's famous formulation, individuals are always 
acting upon objects, but never do so directly. Instead, they do so through tools or signs 
(see fig 3.1). These objects, though, serve as a "mediating" substance. It is through this 
concept of mediation via tools or signs (including language) that the bridge between the 
individual and the social, the internal and the external is created. Engeström explains this 
further: "Mediation by tools and signs is not merely a psychological idea. It is an idea that 
breaks down the Cartesian walls that isolate the individual mind from the culture and the 
society [...] The traditional division between social sciences and psychology has created 
the still prevalent dichotomous 
notion according to which 
humans are controlled either 
from the outside by society or 
from the inside by themselves" 
(Activity Theory and 
Individual and 
SocialTransformation 29). This move allowed Vygotsky to theorize the ways in which 
something like "agency" occurs. As he noted in Mind and Society, "Because this auxiliary 
stimulus possesses the specific function of reverse action, it transfers the psychological 
Figure 3. 1 
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operation to higher and qualitatively new forms and permits the humans, by the aid of 
extrinsic stimuli, to control their behavior from the outside" (40). More simply, humans 
are able to direct and control their actions "from the outside" by precisely through using 
these tools and signs of mediation. This served as the impetus for analyzing "activity," or 
as A. N. Leont’ev described it, "[...] the main question is what these processes are that 
mediate the influences of the objective world reflected in the human brain. The basic 
answer to this question lies in acknowledging that these processes are those that realize a 
person's actual life in the objective world by which he is surrounded, his social being in 
all the richness and variety of its forms. In other words, these processes are his activity" 
(Activity and Consciousness). As Davydov noted in 1999, "Activity is a specific form of 
the societal existence of humans consisting of purposeful changing of natural and social 
reality. In contrast to the laws of nature, societal laws manifest themselves only through 
human activity that constructs new forms and features of reality, thus turning the initial 
into products. Any activity carried out by a subject includes goals, means, the process of 
molding the object, and the results. In fulfilling the activity, the subjects also change and 
develop themselves" (39). In short, Activity Theory has sought to understand and analyze 
the dimension of the "activity." 
 This project is the context through which more contemporary definitions of 
"Activity Theory" can be understood. For example, as Rogoff noted, "The use of 'activity' 
or 'event' as the unit of analysis - with active and dynamic contributions from individuals, 
their social partners, and historical traditions and materials and their transformations - 
allows a reformulation of the relation between the individual and the social and cultural 
environments in which each is inherently involved in the other's definition. None exists 
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separately" (Observing 140). It is out of this that we can start to come to a concrete 
understanding of Activity Theory (of as it is sometimes referred to as: "cultural historical 
activity theory" or simply CHAT). As Roth, et all describe it:  
Social analyses in terms of cultural historical activity theory focus on what people 
(participants) actually do, the objects that motivate their activity, the tools they 
use, the community of which they are part, the rules that pattern their actions, and 
the division of labor they take in activity [...] In an activity-theoretic approach the 
power to act (agency) is a fundamental characteristic of human beings; it allows 
individuals not merely to react to, but, of importance, to change their material and 
social worlds [...] Identity refers us to the question of who is the agent in an 
activity system. From an activity-theoretic perspective, identity is a product and 
byproduct of activity. That is, through their agency, the people in an activity not 
only produce material outcomes, but also, in the process, produce and reproduce 
themselves and others qua participants in the relevant community (Re/Making 50-
51).  
 
  In order to help understand the dimension of "activity," there is a reliance 
upon triangles that can be seen in many articles and books utilizing "activity theory." 
These triangles are rooted in Vygotsky's original formulation of the "mediated act" that 
sought to displace the linear stimulus-response process (see Fig. 3.1). Here we can see 
that the straight path between stimulus and response is complicated with the introduction 
of "x" or the mediated tool or sign. Also important to note is that in this model, the uni-
directional nature of the stimulus-response process is replaced with a bi-directional nature 
in which transformation of both the environment and the individual can occur.  
 From this model of the mediated act, theorists sought to clarify the relationship of 
"actions" to "activity." As Engeström, drawing from Leont’ev, noted, individual action 
was incoherent "without consideration of the overall collective activity [...] what 
distinguishes one activity from another is its object. According to Leont'ev, the object of 
an activity is its true motive. Thus, the concept of activity is necessarily connected with 
the concept of motive” (Learning by Expanding). Leont’ev himself stated that "actions 
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are not special 'units' that are included in the structure of activity. Human activity does 
not exist except in the form of action or a chain of actions" (Leont'ev 1978, 64. qtd in 
Engeström). We might see this as an instantiation of the old Aristotelian notion of the 





movement from the 
"animal form of 
activity" to the 
"structure of man" (a 
transitional 
representation) in figures 3.2 and 3.32.  As he notes regarding this evolution, "The 
breakthrough into human cultural 
evolution - into the specifically 
human form of activity - requires 
that what used to be separate 
ruptures or emerging mediators 
become unified determining 
factors. At the same time, what 
used to be ecological and natural 
                                                
2 Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are taken from Engeström’s Learning by Expanding. 
Figure 3.2 
Figure 3.3. 
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becomes economic and historical" (Learning by Expanding).  This brings us to the final, 
and very familiar triangle of figure 3.4.  
 What should be noted about the triangle is that it is an attempt to represent a 
dynamic function. All 6 points in the triangle are set in contradictory tension with other 











objective is "accomplished." However, such an end to tensions results in the creation of 
new tensions, so that such dynamism is perpetually changing in nature. As Roth notes, 
though, such contradictions exist not only between points, but also within points, and one 
entire system exists within a contradictory tension with other systems (Activity Theory 
and Education 5). Roth provides an example of what AT can ultimately offer in regard to 
education and schooling:  
If participation in activity changes the identity of the subject, what are the effects 
of the alienating structures of schooling (change of topics in 45-60-min intervals, 
confinement to chairs, mandatory silent activity, etc.)? If the two aspects of the 
object {Gegenstand and Objekt) cannot be separated, what can educational 
Figure 3.4 
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testing, which divorces the subject from normally accessible tools, division of 
labor, and social relations, tell us about the competence of an individual across 
activities characterized by very different objects? (4)  
 
 
Theorizing Bartleby and the Limits of Activity Theory 
 As I want to show in this section, Activity Theory provides a rather potent way to 
understand aspects of the "Bartleby Syndrome" described in the previous chapter. I also, 
however, want to push AT to where I feel its limits exist as a means to suggest where 
Pragmatism, and in particular, a more Deweyan system can be of use. I want to note 
before I start, however, that in large I do not feel AT fails as a theory, simply that a 
Deweyan system offers a different, and potentially better way of bridging the 
internal/external divide that AT seeks to bridge. I will return to this critique at the end of 
this section. 
 In order to dip into an analysis, I want to start by attempting to understand the 
"activity systems" in play in the classroom I was observing. As Leont'ev (1978) noted, 
"The main thing that distinguishes one activity from another [...] is the difference of their 
objects." Leont'ev makes this point, not so dissimilar than Peirce's point about the result 
of knowledge as being the primary location of difference, to call attention to the fact that 
there may be many differences within types of activity in regard to how they are carried 
out, the form they realized, and so forth. In any situation, there are numerous activities 
going on at any time, particularly so in any classroom. This is why it is helpful to start 
with the "object(ive)" (borrowing David R. Russell's term) in order to delineate precisely 
which activity system I am working with here. So what is the overall "objective" of the 
writing classroom? Well, on a very basic level it is "writing for evaluation." However, 
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within the activity system other forms of "objective" emerged.  
 I want to pause at this moment to consider "objective," simply because, according 
to AT, it is the critical component that separates one system of activity from another. 
There are two examples I want to use to highlight this. The first is an email exchange I 
had with Jennifer not long after the class had ended. I had wanted to know a little bit 
more about something she had said during the semester during a discussion concerning 
the motivations students had for doing "good work." Jennifer had noted that her 
motivations had changed as she got older. When I asked her about why this occurred, she 
told me that a particularly good report card earlier in her school career elicited such a 
good response from her father, that she started to covet good grades in order to continue 
eliciting such responses from her father. In this instance, then, the "objective" of the 
writing classroom was writing to be evaluated. For Jennifer, however, it was also to make 
her father proud of her.  
 The second example came during a "peer-review" session in class. I noted that 
Sam was working in a group with several of the athletes in the class, who were also quite 
clearly the students who had the most power in regard to their "popularity" in the school. 
One by one, he would give their papers a quick read through and very quickly identify 
sentence level errors for them. None of the other students did this for him, nor did any of 
them actually have any sort of discussion or conversation about their texts. Later, when 
talking to Sam, I asked about this moment. I was genuinely curious if Sam felt he was 
being exploited, especially given the one-sidedness of the interactions I had observed. 
Sam flatly rejected this idea, noting that he was simply helping "his friends" out. While 
Sam would no doubt disagree, I might suggest that Sam was leveraging his "people 
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skills" in this instance, performing a favor for those with social power in the likes that he 
might somehow obtain some of this power. Regardless, in this instance, while we can still 
see the objective of "writing for evaluation" present in the class, we also see how various 
actions within this serve a different objective for Sam: helping his friends out and perhaps 
increasing his own social standing.  
 Regardless, for the most part, objectives were somehow related to the submission 
of a written text for evaluation and it was through this nexus that all actions in the 
classroom focused on. The outcome in the class was by and large defined simply by 
"grades." I should take a second to point out that "college preparation" was understood 
through the obtainment of a passing grade in this class, not necessarily in the successful 
completion of college level work.  
 To start, we can now move into the other 5 points on the triangle and to start 
filling them in: subject, tools/means (or sometimes listed as mediating artifacts), rules, 
community, division of labor, and object. What will become evident as I do this is the 
presence of contradictions throughout the triangular representation. As Roth and Tobin 
note, "Contradictions may exist (a) within each of the nodes of an activity system (tools, 
object, etc.); (b) in the relation between two nodes; (c) in the relation between the object 
of one activity system and the object of another, technologically more advanced, system; 
or (d) between the nodes of different interconnected activity systems" (50). Keeping this 
in mind, I will start with what often appears to be the most basic level of writing 
instruction: the student writing in the classroom. In this regard, this triangle then is a 
representation of the "idea" of writing instruction in the classroom I was observing.  
• To start, I will identify the "subject" of this very first and rudimentary triangular 
representation as simply "a student." Obviously, this in itself is a contradictory 
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category itself, as any universalized conception of "student" is immediately 
problematic. As a contradictory point in this triangular representation, though, we 
can assume such internal contradictions. For example, multiple expressions of 
identity are present within any group of students, and such plural identities are 
present even within individual students themselves that overlap and are even 
sometimes in conflict with each other.  
• In regard to the mediating artifacts in the writing classroom, we might point to 
things such as basic "tools" like paper, writing utensils, the texts students were 
assigned to read, the computers some students used to compose on, and even 
things like forms of electronic communication (email, text message systems) that 
students used to send and receive questions from Ms. Stein. Further, we might 
point to the "signs" present as mediating artifacts; things such as ideas and 
instructions contained in the writing assignments and other various handouts, the 
meanings and concepts contained in the texts the students were to read, and even 
the posters hanging on the walls in the classroom.  
• In regard to the "rules," we have things like conventions of writing, grading 
standards (via the teacher's rubrics), the rules of the school in general. 
Additionally, though, we have to include implicit things such as the rules of how 
to perform "student" in the classroom, rules concerning behavior and interaction 
with others as well as the teacher, and in general rules pertaining to "playing the 
game" of school.  
• Within the community, there is obviously the immediate "community" of the 
classroom which includes the teacher. However, smaller communities would also 
appear within the classroom in a fluid matter. For instance, many of the male 
members of the classroom who also played sports comprised a sort of 
"community" on their own that served as a constant source of "class clowning" 
that was defined, in large part, through both behavior as well as activities outside 
of class.  
• Finally, for the division of labor, there is an obvious understanding that "students" 
do the writing for the "teacher" to be evaluated. However, divisions of labor were 
even found among students. For example, some students readily and actively 
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participated and kept discussions moving while other students, to use an extreme 
example, slept.  
 
I have placed these components in the familiar triangular representation of activity in 
figure 3.5. One question that needs to be dealt with at this point is a question of practice. 
Specifically, how does "practice" fit into AT? This is an important question, as I have 
previously defined the "Bartleby Syndrome" as a very particularly type of "literacy 
practice." By this, I simply mean the ideas, values, beliefs, and so forth that guide literacy 
acts such as reading and writing. The actual writing itself is, within the terminology of 
Activity Theory, an action, but not activity. But what can AT tell us about practice? 
Where do "practices" exist within "activity?" Can we speak of "literacy practices" as 
"activities?" Or, are "activities" somehow part of a "practice?" On one hand, it would 
seem that "activity" and "practice" are fairly synonymous and could be used 
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interchangeably. In fact, Engeström seems to use the term practice interchangeably with 
activity at times, whereas other times he tends to save the term "practice" for something 
broader than activity at a local level. As Cole (1995) warned,  
I have come away from this exercise worried about treating activity, practice, and 
context as if they were synonymous, especially in light of the fact that these terms 
often go undefined [...] In some cases, practices appear to be parts of activity 
systems; for example, distinct literate practices can be seen as elements in a 
variety of activity systems (as part of a bar mitzvah, the weekly shopping, or a 
courtship). Activity systems can also be seen as elements in a practice (the term 
“practice of law” implies involvement in courtrooms, boardrooms, libraries, and 
private conferences, all of which are analyzable in activity theory terms). (Supra-
individual 116) 
 
Part of this conundrum comes from the terms activity and practice coming from different 
traditions in different disciplines, both aimed at bridging the social/individual-
structure/agency divide. At the same time, though, both of these traditions (activity 
theory and social practice theory) owe a great deal of debt to Marx's usage of the two 
terms. 
 It is not my intent to make additions to AT here nor to open a conversation with 
social practice theory. However, because an integration between concepts of "practice" 
and "activity" in the respective traditions of social practice theory and activity theory 
remains elusive, I will work with a provisional link between the two terms. Practices, 
when conjoined with motivating forces toward a specific objective within a defined set of 
time, become activity systems. This explains why, at different levels of analysis in AT, we 
see elements of practice. Practices can be their own mediating artifact, are a quality of 
the subject, proscribe the division of labor, guide the actions taken, add shape and 
meaning to the "rules," and so on and so forth. Further, as activity systems and through 
activity, they are reconstructed and redefined. Accordingly, practices are both precursors 
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as well as results of activity. Also, practices as activity explains the way in which 
practice has been theorized as a major lever of social change as well as cultural 
reproduction. When an objective is satisfied and an activity ceases, it is practice that 
remains as the residual memory of the process of activity. Importantly, practice as such 
serves as the bridge between systems of activity separated by time as well activity 
systems at different levels.  
 Returning to the distinction between literacy events and literacy practices is useful 
in clarifying this muddy mess. As we can recall, Barton (1991) defines the distinction as 
thus: "Literacy events are the particular activities in which literacy has a role: they may 
be regular repeated activities. Literacy practices are the general cultural ways of utilizing 
literacy that people draw upon in a literacy event" (5). Literacy practices, then, without an 
occasion or an "event" through which they can be realized, are empty. They exist as 
potentiality in the absence of a realizing event. Such motivating elements of literacy 
practice have been theorized, such as Deborah Brandt's concept of "literacy sponsors."3 
Further, the plural usage of the term "practices" denotes that there are many kinds of 
literacy practices, and that often the context of the event itself, including all the aspects 
that AT seeks to address, have a major role in defining which practice people "draw 
upon."  
 Indeed, from figure 3.5 we can begin to see where Bartleby emerges as a form of 
literacy practice within College English. The first major tension that jumps out, and is 
probably the most important one, is quite simply the outcome itself: writing for 
evaluation. This point exists in a great deal of tension with the "rules" of the classroom 
                                                
3 See especially Brandt’s “Sponsors of Literacy,” 1998 
  141 
itself, which was designed by Ms. Stein to follow many principles from process 
pedagogy. These "rules" defined by process pedagogy are also, obviously, in tension with 
the division of labor in the classroom which designated the fixed roles of student as 
producer of text and the teacher as the evaluator of such text. While AT focuses a lot on 
contradictions within any activity system, resonances and harmonies seem to be 
important as well, particularly in this case. Because of this, while "process pedagogy" 
was the stated system of rules in place for the production of texts, it was not the actual 
system of rules that was realized in the class. This points to one danger of visually 
representing such complex systems. Within the triangle itself, it is hard to determine 
exactly how--and more suggestively, why--the mechanism for which particular rules are 
actually realized. I will return to this very shortly later in this section, but will simply 
suggest here that Activity Theory has sought to address this by introducing other systems 
of activity into the picture.  
 Additionally, one thing that is noticeably absent in this diagram are the actual 
"actions" themselves. As noted above, actions are a part of, but not a complete aspect of 
activity. We might consider all the various actions a baseball player might go through 
over the course of a game, including fielding balls, swinging the bat, sitting on the bench, 
and so forth. On their own, these individual actions do not equal the activity of baseball 
playing. However, put together within some unifying objective, activity starts to emerge. 
In responding to this issue, Engeström has suggested that action is located somewhere 
between the objective and the outcomes (see figure 3.6). In this diagram (from Enriching 
257), where "action" is finally located, we can start to see how Activity Theory not only 
points out the issue, but also illuminates its own limits in another way. It is between the 
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"objective" and the "outcomes" that we see where things break down in regard to 
Bartleby. In other words, what happens when the "outcomes" are so markedly different 
than the "objective?" A breakdown of action. Why and how does this occur? The arrows 
in this figure are misleading, as we can remember that the entire activity itself happens in 
time and co-evolves with the objectives and outcomes themselves. It is not, in this regard, 





Because of this, 
the "actions" 
themselves that are the supposed bridge between "objective" and "outcome" are not 
predetermined and thus in play as well. As a consequence of the entire system itself, they 
represent one of the most critical tensions in the whole system. 
 Other research utilizing AT to understand the writing that students do has picked 
up on this. As Wuori noted in his 2009 dissertation that explored writing in an elementary 
level classroom: "In this study, it was interesting to find that when students were engaged 
in activities motivated by their own interests, they rarely extinguished the activity 
prematurely, but when goals did not seem to be perceived by the students as worthwhile 
or when they did not understand the purpose or where not interested, the activity was 
almost always extinguished rapidly" (166). This led him to conclude that "Activity is 
extinguished upon goal attainment. This can happen quickly and to the detriment of the 
Figure 3.6 
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teacher’s instructional objectives, particularly when students feel no purpose, investment 
or interest in the activity" (168). This suggests that a sort of action or practice related to 
the overall activity comes into view and exists until it is not needed anymore. In other 
words a "practice" or a constellation of actions serves as a sort of guide in resolving the 
contradictions throughout the triangular representation toward the objective, and is 
extinguished when the "object of this need" is satisfied. I am thinking of nothing less than 
Bartleby here. As Leont'ev notes, "Up to this point we were talking about activity in the 
general collective meaning of that concept. Actually, however, we always must deal with 
specific activities, each of which answers a definite need of the subject, is directed toward 
an object of this need, is extinguished as a result of its satisfaction, and is produced again, 
perhaps in other, altogether changed conditions" (Activity and Consciousness). However, 
while this suggests some sort of explanation for Bartleby, it also suggests other 
unresolved issues. What I mean here is that, as I argued in the previous chapter, the 
Bartleby Syndrome as a particular type of literacy practice is not a lack or deficiency. 
The extinguishment of a process in writing in this activity system, therefore, is actually a 
component of other activity systems. In other words, it might represent the end of 
something for the student, but for others in other activity systems, it is a fully functional 
component of activity on a collective scale. It is useful to note here that this sort of 
literacy practice of the students in which the main objective was to simply get it done was 
seen by her as a failure. The Bartleby Syndrome was a marker of something gone wrong. 
Further, students were allowed a great deal of latitude (although not complete freedom) in 
working out topics for their writing. The concept of letting students choose their own 
topics has long been understood to be an important component in realizing agency in 
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writing classrooms. Still, though, this minor freedom did not necessarily equate to 
something that would have ignited a different sort of literacy practice.  
One way to think of the danger here is to see such extinguishing of actions as 
tragic and not comedic. In other words, this might be the extinguishment of literate 
activity on a personal level, but may also be, on a different level, precisely what some 
"activity" is meant to do. Engeström noted that "People face not only the challenge of 
acquiring established culture; they also face situations in which they must formulate 
desirable culture. In order to understand such transformations going on in human activity 
systems, we need a methodology for studying expansive cycles." (Activity Theory and 
individual and social transformation 35). This has lead to a sort of "third-generation" 
understanding of Activity 
theory that tries to 
understand the ways that 
"all activity systems are 
part of a network of 
activity systems that in its 
totality constitutes human 
society" (Roth and Lee, 
100). This has constituted a 
new horizon of theorizing 
in Activity Theory. As Davydov noted,  
For a long time, social scientists refused to discuss the existence of the activity 
collective subjects. Only recently has this term begun to be used. Lektorsky 
(1984) stresses that, in a certain sense, the collective subject exists outside 
Figure 3.7 
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particular individual subjects and reveals itself through external, objective-
practical, collective activity rather than through individual consciousness. (44) 
This has lead to a more complex visual model, in which not just one triangle is 
presented, but numerous and multiple triangles, which are all connected through various 
points or nodes (see figure 3.7). While this has lead to a more expansive understanding of 
"activity," it also leads to what I think of as the limits of Activity Theory. I take this up in 
the next section. 
 
Activity Theory or Pragmatism? 
 As we can see with the third generation of AT, the complexity of collective 
activity systems within a larger network increases exponentially at each level of analysis. 
As we keep adding triangle upon triangle upon triangle, things stand a fairly good chance 
of getting out of hand. While I think this third generation of AT makes a great deal of 
sense, and points to a necessary extension of earlier iterations of AT, I am also concerned 
about the ability to maintain some sort of sociological imagination concerning actual 
human beings lost in this sea of complex triangular representations. Quite simply, there is 
a good chance of losing sight of what matters: people and their lived experiences. As AT 
increases the sophistication and complexity of what it seeks to theoretically analyze in 
regard to activity, strains and tensions within AT itself become increasingly visible.  
 Davydov, in 1999, lists eight questions or concerns he has about AT. I want to 
focus on three of these concerns as a departure point for returning to Deweyan 
Pragmatism. The first concern has to do with understanding "transformation." As 
Davydov notes, "Many changes of natural and social reality carried out by people affect 
the object externally without changing it internally." (42) What is unclear is how, exactly, 
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we are to understand the nature of such changes if and when they actually occur within 
AT. Davydov's second concern deals precisely with collective activity. "If the collective 
subject is external to particular individuals," Davydov asks, "can it be imagined in the 
form of some totality or group of persons, and in what exact sense does it exist outside 
the particular individuals who form this group? Further, what must be the essential 
features of a group of persons who carry out the joint activity so that this group may be 
defined as a collective subject? What characteristics can help to distinguish collective and 
individual subjects?" (44). Third, Davydov questions the ability for all aspects of 
"activity" to be theorized. According to Davydov, "[...] the main question is how to relate 
this general activity structure to such psychic processes as perception, imagination, 
memory, thinking, feelings, and will. Can these be considered as components of the 
general structure of activity, along with motives, problems, and actions? Or should they 
be considered as independent kinds of activity"(45)? In other words, how do we textually 
represent something that is so complex without leaving something out? And, if things 
must be left out, how do we trust the results?  
 Extending these concerns, James Garrison takes activity theory to task for what he 
sees as a return (or manifestation) of many binaries that remain unresolved, thus resulting 
in all sorts of needless complexities and confusions in trying to account for things such as 
"inner/outer," "social/individual," etc.  For Garrison, the concept of "mediation" itself is 
suspect, as it appears to be a conceptual crutch to help rectify a notion of "outer" with 
something "internal." Ultimately, Garrison argues for an account of activity built 
primarily from Dewey's concept of trans-action, contained in Knowing and the Known as 
a means to suggest how Dewey overcomes such binaries when Activity Theory cannot 
  147 
(Introduction 278). Not all activity theorists have agreed with Garrison's critique (many 
of whom are scholars with an utterly amazing depth of knowledge in regard to Dewey's 
work). For example, in a paper titled "Is Dewey’s philosophy a philosophy of cultural 
retooling?," Reijo Miettinen disagrees with Garrison and suggests that "In my 
understanding, the concept of mediation of activity implies the idea transaction or 
reciprocal causal interaction: subjects, means and object are interactively constituted or 
co-evolved in activity." Ultimately, what Miettinen concludes is that the major difference 
between pragmatism and activity theory is found in what "[...] what they draw from the 
Hegelian legacy. For Dewey’s pragmatism it is the idea of organic unity, and for activity 
theory it is objectification of the activity into cultural artifacts, signs and tools."  
 I tend to agree with Miettinen here, although Garrison's criticisms still hold 
weight for one very simple reason: the description of activity from the perspective of 
Hegel's "organic unity" that pragmatism works out --while not at all incommensurable 
with Activity Theory's focus on "objectification of the activity into cultural artifacts"--
simply provides a better way of understanding activity without getting lost in some of the 
minutiae that unfortunately can be found when Activity Theory considers anything 
beyond the level of local, individual action. This alone suggests that, particularly in 
regard to collective systems of activity, a Deweyan system of understanding activity 
holds greater explanatory power simply because complex systems of collective activity 
simply outstrip the ability for any methodological system to adequately name and 
describe every constituent factor. Quite simply, as more triangles are added to 
represented increasingly complex networks of activity systems, at some point we reach a 
vantage point in which the edges of the triangles start to fade and what we see is nothing 
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short of this organic unity. While I will leave it to others to decide if one is "better" than 
the other, I do not think any formulation of Activity Theory--at this level of complexity--
can better Dewey's system. 
 Beyond this, though, there is another reason for turning to Pragmatism in 
describing activity, and this deals with the political implications of how we understand 
activity. As James Wertsch has argued, "it is often impossible to understand or interpret 
Soviet studies without an appreciation of the theoretical foundations that underlie them" 
(Concept of Activity 3). These foundations are rooted in Marxism-Leninism (8). 
Wertsch's point is that translations of Soviet work in sociocultural psychology to Western 
ears often leads to problems, simply because not everyone has taken the time to fully 
understand the implications of these theoretical foundations. Zebroski has made similar 
points here, too. However, Wertsch's argument illuminates a second problem with 
Activity Theory (and Soviet Psychology in general), and this problem becomes more 
visible when we consider the political implications of such scholarly work. Put very 
simply, in order to distill any sort of normative political implications from scholarship in 
Activity Theory, one would need to work backwards not only through the theoretical 
foundations of Marxism-Leninism, but also backwards through Russian and Eastern 
European history itself in order to finally attempt to transpose any significant meanings 
on to contemporary Western contexts. While it may be a bold claim, Pragmatism, 
particularly in the way it has developed and evolved alongside North American history, 
does not face similar barriers.  
 I should be clear what I am and what I am not claiming here. I am not claiming, 
for example, that Activity Theory's association with Marxism-Leninism is a fatal flaw 
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simply because I have some sort of a moral qualm with Marxism-Leninism itself. 
Personally, I am of those neo-pragmatists who think Marxism and Pragmatism are far 
closer than what post-war Western Philosophy has tried to convince us of (See also James 
Livingston here). I also see both Marx and Dewey as fundamentally connected through 
the broader Hegelian tradition, as many has noted (see especially Bernstein here). That 
said, there are important differences between Marx, Dewey, and "Marxism-Leninism" 
that have important ramifications. These differences could be understood as differences 
among individual philosophers in only a minimal way. Rather, what should be 
understood is that each of these philosophers and philosophical systems were deeply 
embedded in different social, political, and historical environments. (I might note, 
though, that we could also understand similarities between the two traditions through 
noting that "capitalism" has a global reach, as does science).  
Fortunately, the theoretical traditions that AT rests upon--namely, Vygostky's 
work and the extensions of it by Leont'ev--share a common methodological criticism of 
non-Marxist mainstream western psychology with Dewey's pragmatism. Since we've 
already covered much of that ground in describing AT, I will move directly into Dewey's 
understanding of human conduct, action, activity, and this organic unity.  
 
Building Human Activity from the Ground Up: Dewey's Live Creature 
 Toward the latter half of the 19th century, there was a great amount of interest in 
studying and measuring the reflex-arc, or the "stimulus-response" pattern. The "reflex-
arc" referred to a supposed channel or "arc" through which sensory stimuli eventually 
made their way to the mind. Essentially, research subjects were asked to wait for a 
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stimulus (such as a light that would turn on) and then respond in some manner (such as 
pressing a button). The amount of time between the stimulus and the response would be 
measured. This was thought to be the proper way to understand the psychological concept 
of "attention." As William Mackenzie noted in the 1971 edition of Dewey's Collected 
Works, the cause for such interest in these experiments is that it was thought to be a "a 
scientific alternative to the traditional dualism" (EW.5.xvi). Basically, it was thought that 
the measurement of the "arc" was nothing less than measuring some sort of connection 
between body (represented by the stimulus) and the mind (represented by the response). 
In the process of conducting these experiments, however, an interesting quirk was 
discovered. Research subjects who were asked to focus on pressing the button were able 
to "respond" to the stimulus a fraction of a second faster than those who were instructed 
to focus on the stimulus itself. A veritable cottage industry of research labs popped up to 
study and measure these differences based on what the research subject was asked to 
concentrate on. 
 At the University of Chicago, where Dewey was on faculty at the time, the 
experiment was repeated. As Louis Menand explains of what the results confirmed, 
"individual times varied according to skill and experience, but after sufficient practice 
concentration on the physical response rather than the sensory stimulus generally yielded 
the faster times" (327). This lead two of Dewey's colleague to suggest an explanation for 
what was going on. Louis Menand, again: "For most of the subjects in the experiment, 
picking up a stimulus becomes habitual more readily than producing a physical response, 
which is the real explanation for the tendency of the people focusing on their hands to get 
faster times: they're directing attention where it's most needed. Attention is functional. It 
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is not a process measurable from the outside; it is something that falls 'inside' the 
complete act. And the complete act is not composed of discrete units; the act is the unit" 
(328). Building upon this insight, Dewey wrote a short and very technical piece titled 
"The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" --an essay that, according to Menand, is "the 
key to his [Dewey's] thought" (328). 
 In this text, Dewey painstakingly breaks down the reflex-arc concept, ultimately 
finding that it simply errs in understanding the relationship of the stimulus to the 
response. As Dewey complained, "The sensory stimulus is one thing, the central activity, 
standing for the idea, is another thing, and the motor discharge, standing for the act 
proper, is a third. As a result, the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a 
patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied processes" 
(EW.5.97)4 "What precedes the 'stimulus'" Dewey wrote, "is a whole act, a sensori-motor 
co-ordination. What is more to the point, the "stimulus" emerges out of this co-
ordination; it is born from it as its matrix; it represents as it were an escape from it 
"(EW.5.100). Essentially, the stimulus is a result of the whole act, not the other way 
around. In short, Dewey claims that the entire reflex-arc concept is a product of the 
historical or psychological fallacy. In Dewey's words, "A set of considerations which 
hold good only because of a completed process, is read into the content of the process 
which conditions this completed result" (EW.5.105). As Menand further explains, 
"Analytically speaking, the response actually precedes the stimulus--that is, we label the 
seeing a 'stimulus' because we have already labeled another part of the act, the reaching, a 
'response'" (328). This move to a prior wholeness that is only later broken into parts 
                                                
4 “The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology” was originally published in 1896. 
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analytically is something that is unique to Dewey. As Menand points out, Dewey had 
already been making arguments along similar lines to other areas long before he applied 
it to the reflex-arc. Further, this move is not found in William James nor Peirce's work. 
The source for this concept was very simply Hegel's concept of Geist, stripped of the 
absolute and instead biologized (329).  
 This insight would have far reaching implications for Dewey's work, and can be 
seen underneath practically everything Dewey did. In regard to the reflex arc, Dewey 
ultimately concluded that "We ought to be able to see that the ordinary conception of the 
reflex arc theory, instead of being a case of plain science, is a survival of the 
metaphysical dualism, first formulated by Plato, according to which the sensation is an 
ambiguous dweller on the border land of soul and body, the idea (or central process) is 
purely physical. Thus the reflex arc formulation is neither physical (or physiological) nor 
psychological; it is a mixed materialistic-spiritualistic assumption" (EW.5.105, emphasis 
mine). As Menand points out, this would become Dewey's go-to strategy in dealing with 
virtually every problem: "We think that a response follows a stimulus; Dewey taught that 
there is a stimulus only because there is already a response. We think that first there are 
individuals and then there is a society; Dewey taught that there is no such thing as an 
individual without society. We think we know in order to do; Dewey taught that doing is 
why there is knowing" (330). Some of Dewey's biggest moves were predicated very 
simply on this sort of thinking. For example, in the first chapter of his magnum opus on 
the subject of experience, Experience and Nature, he painstakingly outlines what he sees 
as the chief defect of most philosophical reasoning: "[a] conversion of eventual functions 
into antecedent existence: a conversion that may be said to be the philosophic fallacy" 
  153 
(34, emphasis mine). We can see how it is practically identical to the case Dewey made 
against the reflex-arc. 
 However, it is when Dewey applied this logic to life itself do we see the full 
realization of this organic unity. As he claimed in the first pages of Experience and 
Nature, "Life denotes a function, a comprehensive activity, in which organism and 
environment are included. Only upon reflective analysis does it break up into external 
conditions--air breathed, food taken, ground walked upon--and internal structures--lungs 
respiring, stomach digesting, legs walking" (LW 1:9). It is from within this emphasis on 
unity that we can now fully contextualize Dewey's concept of experience that was 
discussed in the first chapter. It is worth recounting Dewey's discussion of what it means 
to "have an experience" in his major work on aesthetics, Art as Experience. For Dewey, 
having an experience was very different than having experienced something. We 
continually experience things, but that in of itself does not constitute an experience. The 
difference between the two is quite simply that an experience has a quality that denotes 
that which was before and what was after. "There is that meal in a Paris restaurant," 
describes Dewey, "of which one says 'that was an experience.' It stands out as an 
enduring memorial of what food may be. Then there is that storm one went through in 
crossing the Atlantic—the storm that seemed in its fury, as it was experienced, to sum up 
in itself all that a storm can be, complete in itself, standing out because marked out from 
what went before and what came after. (LW 10:44) For Dewey, what makes these 
instances qualitatively different and important is both unity and transformation: "An 
experience has a unity that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of 
friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the 
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entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts" (LW 10:45). This 
conception of experience, on the surface, starts to approximate the concept of "activity" 
discussed earlier, particularly in the emphasis on transformation, as in the movement 
from "a storm" to "that storm."  
 This transformation, though, can easily be misunderstood as a feature of the 
individual mind. That is, an experience results in some sort of qualitative change in the 
understandings a person possesses, but does not necessarily have anything to do with the 
environment in which it occurred in. Dewey, at many points, belabors his explanation of 
the unity inherent not just to experience, but to the environment itself. As he notes in the 
first chapter of Art and Experience, "[...] life goes on in an environment; not merely in it 
but because of it, through interaction with it. No creature lives merely under its skin; its 
subcutaneous organs are means of connection with what lies beyond its bodily frame, and 
to which, in order to live, it must adjust itself, by accommodation and defense but also by 
conquest" (LW 10:19). Earlier in his career, he makes a similar point in Human Nature 
and Conduct, explaining that, in regard to habits, "Breathing is an affair of the air as truly 
as of the lungs; digesting an affair of food as truly as of tissues of stomach" (MW 14:15). 
Dewey's point in Art and Experience builds from a rather revolutionary insight: the 
existence of experiences themselves, something "art" depends upon, is a function of a 
particular type of environment that oscillates between the precarious and the stable. 
"There are two sorts of possible worlds," as Dewey explains," in which esthetic 
experience would not occur. In a world of mere flux, change would not be cumulative; it 
would not move toward a close. Stability and rest would have no being. Equally is it true, 
however, that a world that is finished, ended, would have no traits of suspense and crisis, 
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and would offer no opportunity for resolution. Where everything is already complete, 
there is no fulfillment" (LW 10:20). Again, we can see how Dewey has effectively 
naturalized the dialectical nature of Hegel's Geist. Some sort of idealistic, extra-material 
entity that was constantly splitting and reconstructing itself was not needed, the natural 
world itself was more than capable of that task. 
 Dewey runs the implications of this position to startling conclusions. In 
Experience and Nature, this naturalization of Geist allows Dewey to reconstruct 
understandings of not just natural things or animalistic tendencies, but of human ideas 
and meanings themselves. For example, Dewey describes the evolution of the concept of 
"God" itself as such:  
It is an old saying that the gods were born of fear. The saying is only too likely to 
strengthen a misconception bred by confirmed subjective habits. We first endow 
man in isolation with an instinct of fear and then we imagine him irrationally 
ejecting that fear into the environment, scattering broadcast as it were, the fruits 
of his own purely personal limitations, and thereby creating superstition. But fear, 
whether an instinct or an acquisition, is a function of the environment. Man fears 
because he exists in a fearful, an awful world. The world is precarious and 
perilous. [...] The voice is that of early man; but the hand is that of nature, the 
nature in which we still live. It was not fear of gods that created the gods. (LW 
1:44, 45) 
 
  Like Dewey, I am belaboring this point for a fairly important reason: the 
isolation of elements into separate objects in the course of theorization and analysis is an 
artificial step. It isn't that things are connected, related, or networked through some sort 
of ecological apparatus, as the concept of "connected" assumes some sort of separation to 
be bridged by other elements. Rather, what we often times understand as different or 
separate are, in actuality, continuous within this organic unity. As Dewey remarked 
toward the end of Experience and Nature, "The world is subject-matter for knowledge, 
because mind has developed in that world; a body-mind, whose structures have 
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developed according to the structures of the world in which it exists, will naturally find 
some of its structures to be concordant and congenial with nature, and some phases of 
nature with itself" (LW 1:212, emphasis mine). Like the anatomical substance of lung 
tissue making no sense without air from the environment, neither do the acts and actions 
of humans make any sense when divorced from the social, political, and economic 
environment--or context--in which they occur in. They are not connected; they are 
continuous. Even further, the realm of the "natural environment" is not somehow 
connected or related to the realm of human ideas, the two are continuous as well.  
 With this, we can now see a very rudimentary account of activity within this 
framework predicated upon organic unity. To start, this framework of organic unity 
indicates that activity is constant. If we mistakenly understand various parts and elements 
comprising the whole, we fall into a trap in which we must find some sort of actuator that 
has the capability of putting those elements into motion. Instead, as Dewey suggests, if 
the whole precedes the parts, and the whole is itself active and in motion, the parts 
themselves are also constantly in motion. Consequently, it is erroneous to think of things 
as static and simply waiting for something to nudge them into action. Rather, as Dewey 
describes in his textbook on ethics,  
[...] the organism is already active, and stimuli themselves arise and are 
experienced only in the course of action. The painful heat of an object stimulates 
the hand to withdraw but the heat was experienced in the course of reaching and 
exploring. The function of a stimulus is—as the case just cited illustrates—to 
change the direction of an action already going on. Similarly, a response to a 
stimulus is not the beginning of activity; it is a change, a shift, of activity in 
response to the change in conditions indicated by a stimulus. (LW 7:290)5  
 
However, while the live creature is already in a state of constant activity, the continual 
                                                
5 This revised version of Dewey’s earlier textbook on Ethics was published in 1932. 
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ebb and flow of everything give shape, meaning, an guidance to the transformations 
taking place. For Dewey, this is what is meant by impulsion.  
 We can see shades of Dewey's insight into the reflex-arc in his description of 
impulsion in Art as Experience: "Every experience, of slight or tremendous import, 
begins with an impulsion, rather as an impulsion. I say 'impulsion' rather than 'impulse.' 
An impulse is specialized and particular; it is, even when instinctive, simply a part of the 
mechanism involved in a more complete adaptation with the environment. Impulsion 
designates a movement outward and forward of the whole organism to which special 
impulses are auxiliary" (LW 10:60). Impulsion, though, is not a property of the live 
creature, but rather a characterization of some movement that is qualitatively distinct in 
regard to some sort of consummatory coherence. Impulsion is a rather critical concept in 
understanding activity. However, over the course of Dewey's long career, there is some 
fuzziness over terminology he uses. On the surface, it would seem as though Dewey saw 
"stimulus" and "impulsion" as the same thing. This, I think, is somewhat accurate. 
However, as Dewey noted in Experience and Nature, "The consciousness of stimuli 
marks the conclusion of an investigation, not an original datum; and what is discovered is 
not the stimuli to that act, the inquiry, but to some other act, past or prospective, and it 
marks the conversion of de facto stimulus into potential means" (LW 1:254). In other 
words, an impulsion is not something that exists within the awareness of the live creature. 
However, in a move that is probably reconciling his own terminology with his own 
philosophical precedents, Dewey moved to define "stimulus" as something that can only 
really be known as a result of some inquiry. This is not unimportant, though, as in 
Democracy and Education, Dewey provides this highly suggestive definition of stimulus: 
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"In general, every stimulus directs activity. It does not simply excite it or stir it up, but 
directs it toward an object. Put the other way around, a response is not just a re-action, a 
protest, as it were, against being disturbed; it is, as the word indicates, an answer. It meets 
the stimulus, and corresponds with it. There is an adaptation of the stimulus and response 
to each other. [...] To some extent, then, all direction or control is a guiding of activity to 
its own end; it is an assistance in doing fully what some organ is already tending to do" 
(MW 9.29). It is here that we begin to bring not just changes in the environment into the 
picture, but the attempt at controlling or directing activity.  
 So far in this account, the role of "ideas" and "knowledge" have been absent. As 
mentioned before, for Dewey concepts such as "ideas" and "knowledge" were just as 
much a part of this organic unity as anything else. Dewey, in his collection of essays 
titled Essays in Experimental Logic, added this expanded and incredibly suggestive 
definition of knowing in the after notes:  
[...] knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately 
physical and active; that meanings in their logical quality are standpoints, 
attitudes, and methods of behaving toward facts, and that active experimentation 
is essential to verification. Put in another way it holds that thinking does not mean 
any transcendent states or acts suddenly introduced into a previously natural 
scene, but that the operations of knowing are (or are artfully derived from) natural 
responses of the organism, which constitute knowing in virtue of the situation of 
doubt in which they arise and in virtue of the uses of inquiry, reconstruction, and 
control to which they are put. (MW 10:367)6  
 
Dewey would build on this to craft an important definition of "intelligence." For Dewey, 
change was constant. However, when thinking was applied in an attempt to modify 
conditions or direct the already occurring changes, this "added type of interaction is 
intelligence. The intelligent activity of man is not something brought to bear upon nature 
                                                
6 Essays in Experimental Logic was first published in 1916. 
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from without; it is nature realizing its own potentialities in behalf of a fuller and richer 
issue of events. Intelligence within nature means liberation and expansion, as reason 
outside of nature means fixation and restriction" (LW 4:172)7. In a more practical sense, 
Dewey defined intelligence as "operations actually performed in the modification of 
conditions, including all the guidance that is given by means of ideas, both direct and 
symbolic" (LW 4:161) and further, that intelligence "is associated with judgment; that is, 
with selection and arrangement of means to effect consequences and with choice of what 
we take as our ends [...] In the large sense of the term, intelligence is as practical as 
reason is theoretical" (LW 4:171). 
 It is here that Dewey is able extend this account of activity to humans, and in 
particular to things like culture and politics. Unlike other systems that see a sort of 
"evolution" of these so called distinctly "human" aspects that tacitly assume that the 
realm of culture has replaced the natural, Dewey never gives up the natural realm that 
might lead into some sort of idealism (or intellectualism as he sometimes called it). As he 
noted in The Public and its Problems. An Essay in Political Inquiry, "For ideas belong to 
human beings who have bodies, and there is no separation between the structures and 
processes of the part of the body that entertains the ideas and the part that performs acts" 
(LW 2:8). Dewey does not stop there, though, for the ideas that belong to human beings 
who have bodies also belong to a context or environment. In the same text, Dewey 
utilizes this insight as a means to root out what he sees as the chief defect of most 
political theory. Where political theory gets into hot water is to associate "wants, choices 
and purpose"--undoubtedly things that are located in "single beings"--with something that 
                                                
7 Originally published in The Quest for Certainty in 1929. 
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is "purely personal." Dewey rejects this view. As he pointed out, "Even if 'consciousness' 
were the wholly private matter that the individualistic tradition in philosophy and 
psychology supposes it to be, it would still be true that consciousness is of objects, not of 
itself. Association in the sense of connection and combination is a 'law' of everything 
known to exist. Singular things act, but they act together. Nothing has been discovered 
which acts in entire isolation" (LW 2:22). For Dewey, even the concept of an "individual" 
was only understandable through an understanding of the whole. As Dewey pointed out 
in many times in many ways, it is only through a particular social structure do we even 
come to have an idea of an "individual." In his revised textbook on ethics, Dewey wrote 
that "Society as something apart from individuals is a pure fiction. On the other hand, 
nothing in the universe, not even physical things, exists apart from some form of 
association; there is nothing from the atom to man which is not involved in conjoint 
action. [...] Human beings are generated only by union of individuals; the human infant is 
so feeble in his powers as to be dependent upon the care and protection of others [...] 
Apart from the ties which bind him to others, he is nothing" (LW 7:323). Dewey's 
manner of characterizing such a position evolved over the course of his life. By the 1930s 
when he wrote Experience and Education, he characterized it as such: "[...] control of 
individual actions are effected by the whole situation in which individuals are involved, 
in which they share and of which they are co-operative or interacting parts" (MW 9:53). 
Eventually, though, he moved beyond the term "interacting"for what he felt was a more 
appropriate concept: transaction. 
 In what would be his last major work, Knowing and the Known, Dewey and 
Arthur Bentley describe three stages of action (or more specific to the context of the 
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work, inquiry or ways of understanding the phenomena of action): self-action, inter-
action, and trans-action. The concept of self-action simply referred to an understanding of 
action as being guided by an indomitable will, when things are viewed as being the cause 
of their own action. Dewey, like Activity Theorists, had long rejected this view as 
omitting the environment, culture, context, history, and so forth. The concept of "inter-
action," then, refereed to an understanding in which two separate "things" that were fully 
formed and definable would somehow and in some way exert some affect or influence on 
each other. As Dewey and Bentley defined it, inter-action referred to an understanding of 
action "where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection" (LW 16:101)8. 
The problem here, though, is that this understanding was subject to the same flaw that 
Dewey saw in the reflex-arc. It had no way of understanding the ways in which each 
"thing" was not pre-formed prior to action, but was a consequence of activity. To describe 
this conception of action in which the parts were also actively forming through the 
process of activity is to understand action as trans-action. As Dewey and Bentley 
explain,  
If inter-action assumes the organism and its environmental objects to be present as 
substantially separate existences or forms of existence, prior to their entry into 
joint investigation, then— Transaction assumes no pre-knowledge of either 
organism or environment alone as adequate, not even as respects the basic nature 
of the current conventional distinctions between them, but requires their primary 
acceptance in common system, with full freedom reserved for their developing 
examination. (LW 16:114) 
 
  As noted in the first chapter, Dewey's exploration of habit in his work 
Human Nature and Conduct represents the fullest development of Dewey's thought on 
the function and role of this organic unity when it came to understanding the realms of 
                                                
8 Knowing and the Known was originally published in 1949. 
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human activity, culture, morality, and will. To briefly recap, the concept of "habit" for 
Dewey represented some sort of consummatory synthesis of individual and environment 
that served as a guide or basis for action. Habits are born out of experience, but extend 
beyond the immediate experience. Because of this, and unlike involuntary physiological 
functions, Dewey saw habits as being acquired. "Habits are like functions in many 
respects," Dewey pointed out, "and especially in requiring the cooperation of organism 
and environment. Breathing is an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs; digesting an 
affair of food as truly as of tissues of stomach" (MW 14:15). Because to have an 
experience, in Dewey's terminology, denoted some sense of transformation, habits 
carried with them the resonances of some sort of complete transformation. For Dewey, 
this temporality is achieved through imagination. As he pointed out, "A hungry man 
could not conceive food as a good unless he had actually experienced, with the support of 
environing conditions, food as good. The objective satisfaction comes first. But he finds 
himself in a situation where the good is denied in fact. It then lives in imagination. The 
habit denied overt expression asserts itself in idea. It sets up the thought, the ideal, of 
food" (MW 14:39). Dewey is very clear of two things in setting up this example. First, 
that thought is not a "pale bloodless abstraction," but has "its source in objective 
conditions." Second, in moving to other, new objective conditions, this ideal carried in 
imagination "works to secure a change of environment" so that what is imagined can be 
realized.  
 What is perhaps more important here, though, is that Dewey does not constrain 
this mechanism to pure biological needs and desires. As he notes, "The analogy with 
morals lies upon the surface. A habit impeded in overt operation continues nonetheless to 
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operate. It manifests itself in desireful thought, that is in an ideal or imagined object 
which embodies within itself the force of a frustrated habit. There is therefore demand for 
a changed environment, a demand which can be achieved only by some modification and 
rearrangement of old habits" (MW 14:39). It is precisely here that we can see how 
Dewey's life-long attention to "democracy" comes not out of a sentimental attraction to 
the idea, but rather as an extension of his philosophy. For Dewey, "democracy" simply 
entailed "a means of stimulating original thought, and of evoking action deliberately 
adjusted in advance to cope with new forces" (MW 14:48). However, in asserting this, 
Dewey was careful to note that "democracy" in his times was "still so immature that its 
main effect is to multiply occasions for imitation. If progress in spite of this fact is more 
rapid than in other social forms, it is by accident, since the diversity of models conflict 
with one another and thus give individuality a chance in the resulting chaos of opinions" 
(MW 14:48). " What I need to emphasize here is that such action guided by habit has its 
roots in something experienced, something real and objective. "Thought which does not 
exist within ordinary habits of action" Dewey noted, "lacks means of execution. In 
lacking application, it also lacks test, criterion. Hence it is condemned to a separate 
realm. If we try to act upon it, our actions are clumsy, forced" (MW 14:49). This was one 
of the enduring problems Dewey wrestled with, particularly in his works more focused on 
education. As he seemed to be clearly aware, the separation of thought and action that 
produced "clumsy, forced" actions was no accident. "Those who wish a monopoly of 
social power," warned Dewey, "find desirable the separation of habit and thought, action 
and soul, so characteristic of history. For the dualism enables them to do the thinking and 
planning, while others remain the docile, even if awkward, instruments of execution. 
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Until this scheme is changed, democracy is bound to be perverted in realization. With our 
present system of education—by which something much more extensive than schooling 
is meant—democracy multiplies occasions for imitation not occasions for thought in 
action" (MW 14:52, emphasis mines). I will return to this point in the next section when I 
discuss a pragmatist critique of Bartleby.  
 The final aspect of Dewey's conception of activity I want to discuss in this section 
has to do with the separation of the immediate action to the ends of action. In considering 
the notion of "ends" and "means" in theories concerning moral and ethical deliberation, 
Dewy notes that  
[i]t has been pointed out that the ends, objectives, of conduct are those foreseen 
consequences which influence present deliberation and which finally bring it to 
rest by furnishing an adequate stimulus to overt action. Consequently ends arise 
and function within action. They are not, as current theories too often imply, 
things lying beyond activity at which the latter is directed. They are not strictly 
speaking ends or termini of action at all. They are terminals of deliberation, and 
so turning points in activity. (MW 14:154)  
 
Dewey makes this point to contrast himself with other theories of morality which place 
these ends beyond action. Under this understanding that Dewey finds to be flawed, these 
ends that are placed beyond action serve "as something necessary to induce action and in 
which it terminates" (MW 14:154). For Dewey, this is an unfortunate hold over of earlier 
philosophies that held that "fixed ends existed for all normal changes in nature." Darwin's 
revolution removed this view from the naturalistic sciences, yet it remained in theories 
concerning human action. The result of this was an inability to utilize ethical and moral 
deliberation in an artful manner that was able to bring inquiry to bear on problems (See 
especially Fesmire's discussion here). Importantly, for Dewey, "Ends are foreseen 
consequences which arise in the course of activity and which are employed to give 
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activity added meaning and to direct its further course" (MW 14:156, emphasis mine). 
Again, we can see shades of Dewey's insight into and critique of the reflex-arc concept 
earlier in his career. This leads Dewey to conclude that "[h]aving an end or aim is thus a 
characteristic of present activity [...] In a strict sense an end-in-view is a means in present 
action; present action is not a means to a remote end" (157). From this point, I will now 
turn back to the writing students were doing (and not doing) in College English. 
 
Bartleby from a Pragmatist perspective 
 Many conceptions of writing have stubbornly maintained some sort of concept of 
"mind" that, while connected or related to the context/environment somehow, is still 
somehow apart or different from it. This understanding, mistaken as it is, exists simply to 
help maintain another mistaken idea: that despite an environment that is hostile in every 
way to the sort of writing we as composition theorists envision, the mind is able to 
transcend such limitations if it truly desires it. This may be a politically expedient hope, 
but does little to help us understand writing within educational institutions. 
Unfortunately, this is the operating assumption under all educational courses predicated 
upon some concept of preparation. In this framework, the idea is that "college," or more 
specifically, the ability to go to college, serves as an adequate force of activity for 
students to engage in productive activity. In other words, if students want to go to college 
badly enough, they will do whatever they must to be ready for it.  
 However, building from a Pragmatist account of activity discussed in the previous 
section, college preparation itself cannot be an "ends-in-view" for activity (like, writing) 
simply because it is purely speculative for the students. This can only be something that 
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is an end-in-view for the teacher or other non-student stake-holders, as they are the only 
one who has actually experienced college itself. For the students, then, being unable to 
utilize "college" as an ends-in-view, other things that are far more immediate stand in 
here. As Dewey points out, "The in-viewness of ends is as much conditioned by 
antecedent natural conditions as is perception of contemporary objects external to the 
organism, trees and stones, or whatever. That is, natural processes must have actually 
terminated in specifiable consequences, which give those processes definition and 
character, before ends can be mentally entertained and be the objects of striving desire" 
(LW 1:87). Recall that an end-in-view is a means in present action. Or, in other words, 
ends-in-view come out of present activity, which is the student's lives as they are living 
them at the moment, not some imaginary life they might be living sometime in a distant 
future. Of course, we may say the exact same thing about education as job training in the 
schools, something Dewey had a lot to say about as well. It is here that Activity Theory is 
incredibly helpful in showing us what exactly constitutes the "present activity:" it is not 
writing, but rather schooling, and in particular, the acquisition of a credential that marks 
the individual student as "prepared" for whatever the next level might be. 
 Indeed, as I noted in the previous chapter, one thing I was particularly struck by 
was how limited the students were in having an understanding of "college." In this light, 
then, much of what the students actually did in regard to actions and practices related to 
writing, made perfect sense considering the environment of schooling in which the 
objective is simply to "pass." In Pragmatist lingo, the consummatory meaning that is the 
result of an experience is relegated not to the activity of writing itself, but rather to the 
activity of school going. It is without question that writing of some sort was a part of this 
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"school going" activity, but in regard to the assigned writing, it was certainly not an 
experience itself. Instead, much of what I saw can better be understood as an extension of 
the student's lives as immediately experienced by them as opposed to a preparation for 
something yet to come. The hours the seniors spent decorating the hallways for 
homecoming, the incredible rigidity of the school day itself, the sometimes insanely 
complex daily schedules the students worked under, the jockeying for friends and 
relationships, the anxiety over having to become some sort of adult, and the endless 
waiting for and anxiety over whatever is next constituted the array of experiences the 
students worked under. In this regard, the "schooled writing" the students were asked to 
do was completely cordoned off from these centers of impulse. 
 In short, what has occurred is that "college" is assumed to be a fixed aim for all 
students. Aims, or "ends-in-view," though, cannot be fixed, as they are a result of a 
process of activity. If we really wanted "college preparation," then what we're doing is a 
particularly bad way of going about it. Why? The idea of "college preparation" itself 
seeks to simply ignore present conditions in regard to the writing that students do. Dewey 
is very clear on why this doesn't work: "An aim not framed on the basis of a survey of 
those present conditions which are to be employed as means of its realization simply 
throws us back upon past habits. We then do not do what we intended to do but what we 
have got used to doing, or else we thrash about in a blind ineffectual way. The result is 
failure" (MW 14:160). In the context of the College English course I observed, what 
results is not so much a "failure" of college preparation or a failure of writing, but does 
go a long way in understanding the ways in which many students did "fail" to live up to 
the idea of writing as a process that is so pervasive in composition theory.  
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 While it is dangerous to invite comparisons of one student's writing to another, 
the story I ended the second chapter with of the student attempting to prevent the Harry 
Potter event from happening serves as an excellent illustration of this. As I noted, this 
student was engaging in a "process" model of composition, seeking out opinions and 
working through drafts in a very serious attempt to produce the most effective writing she 
could. The most important feature of this student's activity can be seen in the immediacy 
of all aspects of her activity in regard to writing. Her "ends-in-view" were not focused on 
something far off in the future, but were inextricably bound to a present situation she 
found herself in that demanded some sort of movement. This situation or context was not 
of her own making, but was the result of a volatile mixture of the environment, traditions 
she was a member of, an impulsion to do something, and a situation in which writing 
emerged as the means toward an objective located in the present. In short, the writing that 
this student was undertaking was not something that was simply preparing for a reality 
that might be realized in the distant future. Writing, for this student, addressed a present 
situation in an immediate way.  
 This idea, that writing turns into something interesting when it is bound with the 
immediate context in a meaningful way, is nothing new for composition. The by now old 
call for an "authentic audience" in composition instruction has a tacit recognition of this. 
A diverse array of post-1968 composition theory, ranging from Peter Elbow's dictum that 
"college is short, life is long" to even the critical pedagogy of Ira Shor and his 
"problematizing" method of instruction has an understanding of this and seeks to tap into 
the possibilities of writing within the present. However, many theories of writing as a 
process are limited to focusing on the process of writing itself only once it has begun. 
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Take, for example, Janet Emig's classic text The Composing Process of 12th Graders. 
What is strikingly absent from Emig's discussion of writing is anything prior to the actual 
act of writing itself. Emig's brief consideration of stimuli is one of the few places in 
which she looks prior to the writing process. Here is her explanation of the role stimuli 
plays in the writing process:  
The first dimension of the composing process to note is the nature of the stimulus 
that activates the process or keeps it going. For students, as for any other writers, 
stimuli are either self encountered or other initiated. Either the student writes from 
stimuli with which he has privately interacted or from stimuli presented by others-
-the most common species of the second being, of course, the assignment given 
by the teacher. Both kinds of stimuli can be nonverbal or verbal, although it is an 
extremely rare and sophisticated teacher who can give a nonverbal writing 
assignment. (33)  
 
From Emig's description, what we can see here is a picture of the writer as potential but 
in a moment of stasis waiting for some sort of external push. Again, like the idea that 
"college preparation" is in itself a fixed aim prior to writing that all writing bends toward, 
what is problematic in this understanding is that a "stimulus" exists prior to the act and is 
responsible for initiating activity.  
 Dewey's point regarding the reflex arc again suggests the problem here. Aims, or 
stimuli, are not dead ends or points of termination, but rather are instrumental in regard to 
action. They are things used in the course of activity and, as such, are transformed over 
the course of activity. As Dewey fairly clearly warns, "[...] there is a difference between 
future improvement as a result and as a direct aim. To make it an aim is to throw away 
the surest means of attaining it, namely attention to the full use of present resources in the 
present situation. [...] Deliberately to subordinate the present to the future is to subject the 
comparatively secure to the precarious, exchange resources for liabilities, surrender what 
is under control to what is, relatively, incapable of control” (MW 14:183). However, 
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Dewey is also aware that an understanding of aims or stimuli as fixed and prior to action 
has an instrumental function itself. "The great trouble," Dewey noted, "with what passes 
for moral ends and ideals is that they do not get beyond the stage of fancy of something 
agreeable and desirable based upon an emotional wish; very often, at that, not even an 
original wish, but the wish of some leader which has been conventionalized and 
transmitted through channels of authority" (MW 14:162). The ease at which this idea can 
be applied to the typical writing environment within schools is chilling.  
 Why have theories of writing fallen into this trap? Dewey's discussion concerning 
morality is highly suggestive:  
We see only consequences which correspond to our habitual courses. As we have 
said, men did not begin to shoot because there were ready-made targets to aim at. 
They made things into targets by shooting at them, and then made special targets 
to make shooting more significantly interesting. But if generation after generation 
were shown targets they had had no part in constructing, if bows and arrows were 
thrust into their hands, and pressure were brought to bear upon them to keep them 
shooting in season and out, some wearied soul would soon propound to willing 
listeners the theory that shooting was unnatural, that man was naturally wholly at 
rest, and that targets existed in order that men might be forced to be active; that 
the duty of shooting and the virtue of hitting are externally imposed and fostered, 
and that otherwise there would be no such thing as a shooting-activity—that is, 
morality. (MW 14:159-160)  
 
So it goes with writing, in which the situation becomes inverted so to speak. We see 
students "writing" as something that only happens when they are directed to do so. 
Worse, though, it suggests that we have assumed a stable and fixed environment or 
context in which a literacy practice that sees writing as a process persists. What has been 
forgotten are the particular, historical contexts and situations in which these practices of 
literacy developed and then assumed them to be an aspect of all writing itself. This sets 
up an expectation that is often deeply at odds with the possibilities and limitations found 
in present situations.  
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 To say this more boldly, the sort of literacy practices envisioned in process 
pedagogy have universalized some sort of experience of a few in a specific historical time 
to all situations. A Pragmatist critique of activity shows how such practices are built upon 
present situations and means and are not directed at future goals or aims. However, 
drawing from the concept of organic unity, these present situations and means are 
themselves not accidental, for we could envision a sort of classroom in which 
"preparation" was defined by the full and complete utilization of the environment 
students find themselves presently in. In other words, the "Bartleby Syndrome" may 
represent a local failure rooted in a contradiction between the expectations of process 
pedagogy and the realities of the lived experiences of students, but it may also fit into a 
broader purpose. As Bowles and Gintis note in their 1971 work Schooling in Capitalist 
America,  
The free school movement and related efforts to make education more conducive 
to full human development have assumed that the present school system is the 
product of irrationality, mindlessness, and social backwardness on the part of the 
teachers, administrators, school boards, and parents. On the contrary, we believe 
the available evidence indicates that the pattern of social relationships fostered in 
schools is hardly irrational or accidental. Rather, the structure of the educational 
experience is admirably suited to nurturing attitudes and behavior consonant with 
participation in the labor force [...] As long as one does not question the structure 
of the economy itself, the current structure of schools seems eminently rational. 
(9) 
 
While it may seem contradictory on the surface, we can start to see how the result of 
"college preparation" in a writing classroom is at once a "failure" to prepare students for 
college as well as a success in producing habits or practices of writing that do participate 
to a particular type of society.  
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Conclusion 
 To return to the concept of agency, I want to point out a couple observations built 
from this Pragmatist account of activity. The first is that a pragmatist account of agency 
starts by noting that the divide between structure and agency is, in the first place, an 
artificial divide. In fact, we may reconsider the binary of structure and agency in a 
different way--that agency is structured and structures are a consequence of agency. In a 
related manner, Alan Luke has noted that in regard to literacy, "these models [of 
empowerment] have tended to rely on concepts of free will and individual difference, 
explaining difference in terms of 'aims', 'intents' and 'choice'; power in terms of concepts 
of 'status' and 'role'; cultural and sociopolitical constraints in terms of 'rule', 'norm' and 
'convention'. In so doing, they have theorized a social self in ways that view agency first 
as an individual property: neither collective or intersubjective, nor necessarily connected 
with political ideology or cultural hegemony" (Genres? 311). For Luke, what happens 
then is a diffusion into different political projects centered around different notions of 
agency. In the "genres of power" concept, agency is defined or limited by mainstream 
institutions through which the mastery of a particularly type of discourse is thought to 
provide the ability to operate within that institution, and thus to benefit from it somehow. 
This constitutes the second thing I want to point out, and that is that the ways in which 
"literacy matters,"--the consequences of literacy--are not inherent to literacy itself, but are 
instrumental in various ways within various contexts. 
The sort of literacy practice I have defined as the Bartleby Syndrome, as a result 
of college preparation itself, is not a deficiency or a lack on the part of students. Nor is it 
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an aberration within the broader social contexts that "college preparation" is a part of. An 
understanding of the nature of college preparation itself, why it matters, where it comes 
from, in short the qualitative dimension of this movement, are continuous with the 
literacy practices produced in writing environments within schools. It is to an exploration 
of this, then, that I move to in the next chapter. 
 




Chapter 4 	  
College, Crises, and Discontent 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will be exploring the function and role of college preparation and 
how it fit into the classroom I conducted my research in. Ultimately, my purpose in this 
chapter is to set up a claim that broader social dynamics--the prevalent social relations of 
our times--is deeply at odds with the ways that writing instruction has long theorized its 
own project. To do this, I will be reading these elements against a background of 
scholarship–some old and some new–that has sought to shape the meaning of "college" in 
lower schools through what I refer to as the scholarship of discontent. By this, I very 
simply mean scholarship that emulates from a position of discontent within people in 
post-secondary environments and beyond in regard to the work being done in lower 
schools as well as the resulting abilities of students coming out of them. As I will 
demonstrate, a reading of the literature concerning the jump from high school to college 
will reveal three main "genres" of discontent. The first locates the problem in poor or lax 
educational practices, most often placing the blame on teachers themselves for ineffective 
and poor teaching. This genre is most often found lurking beneath right-wing, corporate 
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reform calls for "accountability" and "standardization." It is not exclusively of this 
domain, though, as often times the "blame the teacher" genre subtly bleeds into other 
areas. The second locates the problem in a lack of communication between post-
secondary institutions and high schools. The operating understanding here is that if only 
those in colleges could more clearly communicate the expectations and demands of 
college writing, high school teachers would be better able to prepare students for such 
demands. The third genre locates discontent within the methods of schooling, often with 
a very particular attention paid to standardization.  
 It is against this backdrop that I will return to the College English classroom at 
Copper Valley High. Specifically, I will be looking at four moments that occurred during 
the semester that are rich with meaning and significance. It is through these vignettes that 
I will demonstrate one overarching deficiency with these genres of discontent: they do 
not envision a connection between classroom practice and broader social dynamics. 
Because of this, the scholarship of discontent sees particular classroom problems as an 
aberration, not as something purposeful and in line with the socio-cultural milieu we 
currently live within. Instead, through these vignettes, I will demonstrate that the work of 
"college preparation" actually does generate something, and should not be understood as 
a "lack" or a "deficiency." What the concept of college preparation produces is an 
educative environment through which the potential consummatory meaning in writing is 
forever deferred, and as such not only strips the potential significance of writing for the 
students at the moment, but fixes habits of the writing process that then are carried 
forward in time. It is here that I am referring specifically to the Bartleby Syndrome 
discussed in previous chapters. This fixing of the writing process is no mistake. As 
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discussed in the previous chapter, one of the cornerstones of human activity that Dewey 
suggests is the ability for current situations and contexts to be utilized in constructing 
"ends in view." These ends-in-view not only generate the impulse to act, but also serve as 
a guide through which the qualitative dimension of action is discerned. More importantly, 
though, these ends-in-view are themselves thoroughly cultural and arise through 
experiences within an environment. As I will be arguing, it is precisely this dimension 
that scholarship concerning the transition from high-school to college writing has been 
missing. 
 
Policing the Crisis of Writing 
 In the public discourse, and even within the professional discourse, the notion that 
we are in the midst of a (yet another) great literacy crisis concerning the abilities of 
college bound students has been accepted as factual by many. As Steve Graham and 
Dolores Perin note in the abstract of their 2007 article on writing instruction and 
adolescent students, "There is considerable concern that the majority of adolescents do 
not develop the competence in writing they need to be successful in school, the 
workplace, or their personal lives" (445). In the beginning of the essay itself, they expand 
further on this claim, writing that: “[...] too many youngsters do not learn to write well 
enough to meet the demands of school or the workplace" and that, according to a report 
produced by an education reform group lead primarily by Fortune 500 executives, "[...] 
college instructors estimated that 50% of high school graduates are not prepared for 
college-level writing demands." Further, they point out that a 2004 report commissioned 
by the CollegeBoard advocacy group that "American businesses spend $3.1 billion 
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annually for writing remediation" (445). After surveying the scope of such discontent 
with adolescent writers, Graham and Perin point to the obvious: "One possible reason 
why students' writing is not what it should be is because schools are not doing an 
adequate job of teaching it” (446, emphasis mine). The phrase "not what it should be" is 
telling, as it indicates what student writing should be is something that is pleasing (or 
appeasing) to those surveyed in the studies mentioned: college instructors and business 
leaders.  
 In a lengthy passage, Graham and Perin produce a litany of reasons as to why any 
of this might matter: 
Adolescents who do not learn to write well are at a disadvantage. In school, 
weaker writers are less likely than their more skilled classmates to use writing to 
support and extend learning in content classrooms. Their grades are likely to 
suffer, especially in classes where writing is the primary means for assessing 
progress (Graham, 2006b). Their chances of attending college are reduced, 
because universities increasingly use writing to evaluate applicants’ 
qualifications. At work, writing has become a gateway for employment and 
promotion, especially in salaried positions (see reports by the National 
Commission on Writing, 2004, 2005). Employees in business as well as 
government (local, state, and federal) are expected to produce written 
documentation, visual presentations, memoranda, technical reports, and electronic 
messages. In the community at large, as E-mail has progressively supplanted the 
telephone for the purpose of communication, adults who are not able to 
communicate in writing may be unable to participate fully in civic life. (445) 
 
The four dimensions of a literacy crisis that puts students at risk in this passage are 
interesting due to the causal connection and thus linear expansion of the consequences of 
bad writing. Bad writing leads to bad grades, which leads to decreased chances of getting 
into college, which leads to an inability to get hired or, if hired, an inability to get 
promoted. The odd dimension out here, though, is the final one: civic participation, which 
doesn't seem to have much of anything to do with schools and schooling. However, this 
sort of civic participation seems to mostly be focused on mere communication, not 
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necessarily participation in community life. Later in the essay, they return to this familiar 
refrain:  
To reap the benefits of literacy in an advanced technological society, adolescents 
need to develop strong writing skills. Unfortunately, a majority of adolescents in 
the United States do not achieve this critical goal. These youngsters’ future 
aspirations are at risk, because strong writing skills are needed to be successful at 
the postsecondary level, to obtain more than menial employment, and to 
participate fully as an adult member of the community (464).  
 
Again, what is worth noting here is the causal/linear progression of the crisis, not so 
unlike a snowball rolling down a hill.  
 The reason I am devoting so much space to this is two fold: first, the occasion for 
the crisis is primarily one of discontent. This discontent, though, is one that is externally 
imposed. By this I mean that the crisis is one that emanates from outside of the students, 
by those who need or want the student to be able to do various things and in specific 
ways. I am referring precisely here to two main groups that seem to be the wellspring of 
this discontent when it comes to the abilities of high school students: employers 
(primarily) and college instructors. This dynamic is somewhat bizarre, as most employers 
surveyed in these studies are not hiring students directly out of high school. Precisely 
who the college instructors are is left ambiguous as well (one might note that tenured 
faculty rarely teach freshman level courses). Conspicuously absent from these 
discussions are students themselves, although the absence of high school teachers is 
troubling as well.  
 The second reason is rather simple: crises are occasions for action. In the wake of 
a crisis, whether internal to one's individual or something much broader, a great deal of 
effort usually follows in which the problem brought in line with understanding and 
changes in behavior/action is sought. In other words, crises are the lever of reflection and 
  179 
change. However, and this is crucial, the qualitative dimension of the crisis itself says an 
awful lot about the sorts of changes that are sought in response to it. Unfortunately, there 
is much danger in the moment in which the qualitative constitution of a crisis is 
overshadowed by the effort poured into resolving it. In quite simple terms, once we have 
agreed that there is a problem, we often forget why it was ever a problem in the first place 
(and who it was a problem for) when we seek to resolve it. As Addison and McGee 
claim, research into writing instruction has kicked into overtime recently. They see this as 
promising on one hand, but troubling on the other hand because such research "point[s] to 
the persistence of major concerns as well as a shift away from a focus on writing 
instruction in K-12 classrooms [...] Now more than ever, there is an urgency to 
demonstrate the value of writing across the curriculum and local and national levels" 
(148). They then mention the "current fiscal crisis" and its affect on instruction (larger 
classes, bigger teaching loads, elimination of core requirements). This is used as a sort of 
urgency of efficiency to be able to maximize our knowledge with the "new normal" of 
reduced resources. This is not "why writing matters" but more, why knowing about 
writing matters. We need to be able to maximize the "bang for our buck" due to the 
erosion of funding and support for public education. 
 My purpose here at the start is to discuss three major categories that seek to 
address and resolve the discontent over writing instruction in high schools (of which 
there is a lot), but to do so it is important to understand where this discontent originates 
from (of which there is actually not much). In other words, there is more material out 
there seeking to solve a problem than there is material out there that demonstrates a 
problem exists. One major source of material suggesting there is a problem that is 
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referenced in solutions to this discontent (when anything is referred to at all) is the 
National Commission on Writing. Founded in 2002 as an extension of the College Board 
(the group that is responsible for the SAT), the NCW has released several widely 
discussed reports on the state of writing and writing instruction in the United States. In 
their own mission statement, they describe their purpose as such: "The decision to create 
the Commission was animated in part by the Board’s plans to offer a writing assessment 
in 2005 as part of the new SAT®, but the larger motivation lay in the growing concern 
within the education, business, and policy-making communities that the level of writing 
in the United States is not what it should be" (Neglected R, 7). Their 2003 report Writing, 
the Neglected R indulges in this concern and has been frequently mentioned as proof that 
something is deeply amiss in regard to writing and writing instruction.  
 In this report, the Commission opens by reciting many of the familiar tropes 
concerning the value of writing: writing contributes to democracy, writing facilitates 
learning in the subjects, writing "sustains American life and popular culture" (10) and--of 
course--it doesn't hurt to write well if you want a job. Once the value and importance of 
writing has been established (something that is interestingly buttressed by displaying 
letters penned by children in response to the bombing of the WTC towers in New York 
on 9/11), the report moves to comparing NAEP data (National Assessment of 
Educational Progress, or commonly referred to as the "nation's report card" of schools) 
against the value of writing outlined in the beginning. Unsurprisingly, they find a large 
gap between the two in many areas, ranging from time spent writing, to the types of 
writing assigned. The report then addresses several steps needed to bring the two into 
agreement with each other. 
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 However, what is striking about this report is not so much what it does say (and 
is, in many regards, is delightfully subversive and enlightened), but for what it does not 
say. In particular, the report on its own lacks any sort of evidence or proof that the means 
of measurement we have can adequately measure that which they see as important. 
Without this connection, we essentially have two hermetically sealed and circular sets of 
heuristics that do not overlap. For example, the report claims that writing "[...] has helped 
transform the world. Revolutions have been started by it. Oppression has been toppled by 
it. And it has enlightened the human condition" (10). The report, though, does not venture 
any suggestions as to which revolutions have failed to materialize due to poor writing, 
what oppressors have yet to be topped, and where precisely the human condition is 
suffering from a lack of un-enlightenment. This is not to say the report avoids specific 
and concrete connections between writing and the consequences of poor writing. "More 
than 90 percent of mid career professionals," the report notes, "recently cited the 'need to 
write effective' as a skill 'of great importance' in their day-to-day work" (11). They 
continue on:  
The world in general, and advanced societies in particular, now demonstrates a 
nearly voracious appetite for highly educated people. To respond to it, fully three-
quarters of American high school graduates enroll in an institution of higher 
education immediately after graduation from high school, probably because they 
understand that college-level skills are the key to employment security in a fast-
changing world. (11) 
 
Later, in discussing the importance of writing to education, the report boldly claims 
"American education will never realize its potential as an engine of opportunity and 
economic growth until a writing revolution puts the power of language and 
communication in their proper place in the classroom" (14, emphasis mine). It is in 
moments like these that a direct connection between poor writing and the 
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consequences—primarily economic consequences—become directly visible, through the 
very same causal line of consequences we saw before.  
 I point this out merely to indicate the ways in which such documents stating the 
existence of a crisis are often enthymematic. For example, in the section titled "What the 
Assessments Tells Us," they report offers this stark claim:  
Despite the neglect of writing instruction, it would be false to claim that most 
students cannot write. What most students cannot do is write well. At least, they 
cannot write well enough to meet the demands they face in higher education and 
the emerging work environment. Basic writing itself is not the issue; the problem 
is that most students cannot write with the skill expected of them today. (16, 
emphasis mine) 
 
They then proceed to support this claim with evidence from the NAEP report. However, 
what is left unstated here is the assumption that the goal of education is to prepare 
students for higher education and the "emerging work environment." This claim falls into 
a long and deeply contested terrain concerning what exactly education (and in particular, 
"high school") should do and in what ways it should do it. For example, other ways of 
describing and defining the function of high school might be focused on a "custodial" 
function that addresses "problems of youth," or even a "progressive" function that seeks 
to prepare students for life and not necessarily just the next step.1 These reports claiming 
a crisis, then, should never be understood as ideologically innocent or neutral. 
 To further illustrate this, the next year (2004) saw the publication of a report from 
the NCW titled "Writing: A Ticket to Work...Or a Ticket Out." In this report, the NCW 
surveyed some 120 major corporations through their human resources departments in an 
attempt to discern the importance of writing in the ability of students to be employed and 
                                                
1 For a fuller historical discussion, see Angus and Mirel’s The Failed Promise of the 
American High School, 1890-1995 and Kliebard’s The Struggle for the American 
Curriculum, 1893-1958 
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promoted. The ominous sounding title comes from a comment made by one respondent. 
While desperately trying to hedge their work by noting that "Opinions, even those of 
high-level corporate executives, should never be the sole basis of policy" (19) the report 
nonetheless seeks to utilize the opinions of hiring managers to support previous assertions 
made in the original Neglected R report. Notably, the unsurprising finding that writing 
has something to do with work in a corporate environment is used to justify the claim that 
"individual opportunity in the United States depends critically on the ability to present 
one’s thoughts coherently, cogently, and persuasively on paper" (5). In this, the report 
outlines three conclusions to be drawn from the survey. First, that "writing appears to be 
a “marker” attribute of high-skill, high-wage, professional work." Second, that writing is 
a gatekeeper for not just work, but salaried employment. Third, when surveyed, 
"corporate leaders’ comments equating clear writing with clear thinking were impressive" 
(19). Therefore, presumably, it must be the case that clear writing equals clear thinking 
and that clear thinking is the gateway to a salaried life of high-skill, high-wage 
professional work. If I am being somewhat caustic with this study in particular, it is 
because of how patently obvious it is that who writing matters to is of a select group: 
corporate leaders. Despite the disclaimer noted above, the NWC did not and has not 
conducted a study of anti-war protestors, anti-globalization protestors, or even "Occupy" 
protesters to understand the way in which written communication is important in 
interrupting various dimensions of the status quo. This omission is not meaningless, as 
the continued and repeated claim that writing has something to do with civic participation 
takes on a whole new light in regard to what wasn't asked. 
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Three Genres in the Scholarship of Discontent 
 Once the crisis of literacy has been established—and this is something that is 
perpetually being re-established—the question of what is to be done takes center stage. 
The particular "flavor" of the crisis currently is one that is curiously defined by a 
perceived disconnection between secondary writing instruction and college expectations 
and demands. This is seen as a crisis because, as the argument runs, students who are not 
adequately prepared for college work in high school either fail to gain entry to post-
secondary education, flunk out if they get there, or (worst) cause massive expenditures in 
so-called "remedial" education (of which first year writing should be considered a part 
of). This is undoubtedly being driven by perceived connections between technical and 
scientific knowledge and the so called "new-economy." The actual reasons for this 
connection are likely far more complex, and include such factors as unavailability of 
work/employment for young adults, psychological anxieties of middle-class children for 
attaining "professional status," and even simple yet persistent and powerful narratives 
concerning upward mobility and education.2 Regardless of the causes, this current 
iteration of the eternal literacy crisis has produced three interrelated yet distinct strategies 
for identifying the real problem and suggesting what is to be done. As noted in the 
introduction to this chapter, these three genres of "discontent" are as follows. The first 
locates the problem in the poor quality of instruction that high school students receive. 
The second locates the problem in a breakdown or failure to adequately communicate 
expectations of college. The third genre laments in the culture of schooling in the 
secondary schools, typically in building from a critique of standardized testing and the 
                                                
2 See especially Aronowitz’s The Knowledge Factory and Ehrenreich’s Fear of Falling. 
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rigidity of the curriculum.  
 In its most vulgar form, the "blame the teacher" genre is most often seen in right-
wing and corporate reform calls for standardization and accountability, both of which 
seek to take the teacher out of the equation all together by placing decision making, 
curricular choices, and assessment options within the hands of administrators, legislators, 
and the like.3 It is also frequently seen in thinly veiled attacks on teacher unions, the 
argument being that the power of teachers unions prevents bad teachers from being fired 
and lowers the bar for all teachers. As Dennis Baron very succinctly puts it, "The 
perennial complaints about the inadequacy of earlier stages of education all seek to assign 
blame: after all, the claim goes, the literacy crisis is real, so it must be somebody’s fault" 
(CCC Symposium Exploring 425). Teachers, because of their proximity to the moment of 
the learning, become that "somebody" whose fault it must be. However, this is not to say 
that the "blame the teacher" model is exclusively a feature of the right-wing and of 
corporations interested in reforming education. It also quite often makes an appearance in 
the writing of theorists and researchers who might define themselves as in opposition to 
the usual suspects of "blame the teacher." For example, in a 2009 article conducted by 
Kiuhara, Graham, and Hawken, researchers conducted a nationwide survey of teachers 
that asked about the type of writing assignments they did as well as the preparation they 
had to teach writing. They asked three "groups" of teachers for the study, language arts 
teachers, social studies, and science. Among the findings they came up with, they noted 
that "the most common writing activities used by teachers were short answer response to 
                                                
3 This should be seen as a recent manifestation of a much older move within education: 
the obsession over efficiency. For a sobering history of this movement, see Callahan’s 
1962 book Education and the Cult of Efficiency.  
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homework," then journal type assignments, and finally "writing step by step instructions 
and five paragraph essays" (140). Findings like these, then, support their hunch that the 
sorts of instruction students are receiving do not match up to the immense importance 
they see in writing in schools (primarily based on the idea that writing supports learning). 
Further, the authors of this study point out that much is actually known about what 
produces better writing, and that there are several "evidence-based writing practices" 
available--and often known--to teachers. However, "although teachers indicated that they 
applied evidence-based writing practices and made many adaptations for struggling 
writers, they did neither of these things frequently." They turn this around and argue that 
"high school teachers need to apply evidence-based practices as well as adaptations for 
struggling writers more often. It is equally important that these procedures are applied 
with integrity (as closely as possible to how they were implemented in studies where their 
use was validated)" (154, emphasis mine). The fairly explicit assumption here then is that 
experts in education have, through empirical research, discerned the appropriate (and 
effective) classroom techniques that will, if only actually carried out correctly by 
teachers, produce the desired results.  
 This is one of the more gentle versions of the blame the teacher genre. As the 
researchers in this study argue, a major problem stems from the ways in which teachers 
are prepared through their own education and through the support they receive as 
teachers. Of the teachers surveyed, "Seventy-one percent of them indicated that they 
received either no or minimal formal preparation to teach writing in their college teacher 
education program" (153). Even among language arts teachers, 61% of the respondents 
indicated they received "minimal to no preparation" (154). They end their article with a 
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series of four recommendations. Of these four, the first three are linked in a sort of causal 
chain. It is worth quoting the entire passage simply to underscore how much of their 
analysis utilizes the teacher-in-the-classroom as the nexus of action and possibility: 
One, the process of composing longer text should become a more common 
activity in high school classrooms in general, and students should spend more 
time in engaging in writing that involves analysis and interpretation. Two, 
teachers should apply evidence-based writing practices and make adaptations for 
struggling writers on a regular basis instead of periodically. In addition, these 
teaching practices should be applied with fidelity. Three, teacher education 
programs and school districts should do a better job of preparing teachers to teach 
writing to high school students. Four, the first three recommendations should be 
tailored to meet the needs of each major discipline. (155) 
 
While obviously this approach is far more high-minded than the more vulgar criticisms of 
teachers as simply ineffectual, lazy, and worse, it still places the burden on teachers 
themselves for the writing of students. There should be no doubt that it is a major 
problem that teachers are so ill prepared to think about the teaching of writing. Still, there 
is a tacit assumption that if only teachers were better prepared, better educated, or better 
developed professionally, the ills of student writing would simply vanish. In other words, 
the focus of discontent is still the teacher. What it does not do, however, is inquire as to 
why teachers are prepared in such ways. Further, it also builds a connection, one that we 
will see is problematic in a moment, between quality instruction and quality writing.  
 The second major genre of discontent locates the problem in a lack, deficiency, or 
outright breakdown in the ability to communicate expectations across institutional 
boundaries. For example, in David T. Conley's "Rethinking College Readiness," he 
claims that "A key problem is that the current measures of college preparation are limited 
in their ability to communicate to students and educators the true range of what students 
must do to be fully ready to succeed in college" (3). Conley proceeds to enumerate 
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several cognitive strategies, academic and knowledge and skills, and academic behaviors 
that he claims are necessary for success in college. After all that, Conley's conclusion is 
this: "Clearly, far fewer students are truly ready for college when measured against this 
multidimensional model than when judged by the conventional standard of courses taken 
and grades received in high school" (11). He concludes that "By adopting the four-part 
conception of college readiness presented in this chapter, high schools and colleges can 
use the same language to communicate what it takes for students to be ready for 
postsecondary education" (12). So the solution here is an alignment of language or 
discourses that accurately describe what is expected.  
 While it doesn't critique the inabilities of current models of educational 
measurement (i.e., grades and grading) to adequately measure the perceived important 
attributes of a student prepared for college, the "Framework for Success in Postsecondary 
Writing" produced by the Council of Writing Program Administrators, the NCTE, and 
the National Writing Project takes a similar approach. In keeping within the genre of 
discontent, this document starts with the normal ritualistic incantations of writing: "The 
concept of 'college readiness' is increasingly important in discussions about students’ 
preparation for postsecondary education [...] The ability to write well is basic to student 
success in college and beyond [...] Students’ abilities to enroll in credit-bearing, college-
level courses are increasingly associated with the idea of 'college readiness'" (1-2, 
emphasis mine). What is critical to note here is the precise location of the bar in regard to 
defining "college-preparation:" being able to bypass remedial college courses, which 
often--although this is not stated--refers to basic or developmental writing courses.  
 This, then, is where the "Framework" comes into view. As the report defines 
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itself, "This document, written and reviewed by two- and four-year college and high 
school writing teachers nationwide, describes habits of mind and experiences with 
writing, reading, and critical analysis that serve as foundations for writing in college-
level, credit-bearing courses" (2). Their hope in assembling these "habits of mind" is very 
explicit. As they write, "[t]his Framework thus seeks to                              connect expectations across 
educational levels and institutions" (2). However, much of what is put forth in this 
document simply condenses the current state of composition studies into an easily 
digestible format. For example, one of the most central concepts behind the curriculum 
that they recommend is writing for authentic audiences, something composition as a field 
has long argued for as the basis for "good writing." 
 In this sense, the experience of reading through the Frameworks document is 
eerily familiar. Most working in the tradition of composition studies will recognize some 
aggregated vision of the field itself in the recommendations they make. Because of this, 
there really isn't much to be argued against in what they recommend. For example, in the 
section on "Experiences with Writing, Reading, and Critical Analysis," the report 
identifies the following "experiences" that are crucial to student writers developing the 
ability to not have to take remedial college writing courses: developing rhetorical 
knowledge; developing critical thinking through writing, reading, and research; 
developing flexible writing processes; developing knowledge of conventions; and 
composing in multiple environments. The implicit project here, though, is not so much as 
to propose or advance any radically new or revolutionary method of teaching writing, but 
rather to take the best of what we ("we" meaning experts in what it takes to write in 
college) know, condense it, and package it in such a way in which it can easy digested by 
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high school teachers of writing. Unlike the "blame the teacher" genre, though, this 
document does not presume to know what teachers are or are not capable of as teachers; 
rather, the assumption here is that they may simply may not know, or have a way of 
talking about, what is expected in a college-level writing environment. The project in 
response to the crisis of literacy is simply to codify expectations and make them widely 
available and known.  
 An obvious drawback of such a method is that the interpretation of such 
frameworks can never fully be fixed or regulated. One solution to this danger that much 
can be lost in translation is to simply transpose the "expectations" of college-writing 
within the high school itself through rigid curricular programs that must be taken as a 
whole. There are multiple ways that this is currently being accomplished. Among them 
are AP courses and so called "dual-enrollment" courses whereby students are able to 
directly earn college credit in a high school course. In the AP environment, while 
teachers may have some leeway in how day to day activities play out, the test at the end 
of the course to which everything is aligned is simply beyond the teacher's control. In so-
called "dual-enrollment" courses, a simulated college environment is created by adopting 
a version of the college level writing course and having high school teachers carry it out 
in the high school. In both of these approaches, the expectations of college are 
communicated through the actual structure of the courses themselves (for example, "dual-
credit" courses often utilize attendance requirements similar to college courses). 
However, what should perhaps be pointed out is that ultimately, the real mechanism 
through which these courses "count" is the way in which it allows students to avoid 
taking a writing course in college through "taking care of business" prior to college. This 
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is precisely in line with what many other "solutions" to the crisis have noted: the goal is 
not to be "remediated" in college. Or, more bluntly, what makes you "prepared for 
college" in regard to writing is not having to take freshman composition. It is also worth 
pointing out that this fixes what it means to be college educated: accumulating credits, 
hours, or other various tokens and or badges.  
 Another way in which "college expectations" can be communicated and brought 
into the high school classroom is through direct collaboration with college level 
evaluators. For example, one interesting approach is detailed in Acker and Halasek's 
2008 article "Preparing High School Students for College-Level Writing: Using 
ePortfolio to Support a Successful Transition." In this pilot program, an "ePortfolio" 
system was devised in which high school students would submit a portfolio of their 
writing, where it could then be assessed by both high school teachers and faculty from a 
local university. This was done through creating a common rubric and having "faculty 
[assess] the draft and final essays submitted by students on a five-point Likert scale using 
a rubric adapted from the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory" (6). In the actual 
implementation of this program, though, the authors discovered that the methods of 
response to student writing differed significantly between the different levels. The 
authors of the study understood this as a different "emphasis" of response. High School 
teachers, they claim, created responses that were informed by primarily "current 
traditional rhetoric" type concerns geared toward a universalized, generic, ahistorical 
conception of "good writing." College evaluators, however, looked more toward how the 
writing fit into or diverged from various genre conventions of different contexts, often 
built from disciplinary expectations (7). The method of evaluation, in other words, is 
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where they understand the split between college and high school. High school teachers 
evaluate according to an adherence to "global features" whereas college evaluators bring 
a more "rhetorical" focus to evaluating writing. Another thing they also discovered was a 
major split on the concept of "voice" between secondary/post-secondary instructors: "[...] 
high school teachers typically encouraged students to create a voice in personal essays 
(e.g., personal narratives or opinion pieces) but discouraged them from using that same 
"voice" in more academic pieces (e.g., research papers). The distinction was not one 
generally made by college teachers, who encouraged students to create voice in all of 
their academic writing" (9, emphasis mine). 
 Somewhat problematically, they end their work by claiming that "unless 
institutions actively support ePortoflios systematically and across educational boundaries, 
students will not enjoy the developmental benefits of ePortfolio" (10). Beyond 
tautological considerations, one major flaw of their conclusion is rooted in the voluntary 
nature of the program. For their study, they solicited students for participation, meaning 
"buy-in" was already accomplished. What is not known, nor really discussed, is what 
would happen in a universalized version of this program. Are the effects they see from 
the ePortfolio system wholly located within the program itself, or is it also something that 
can be contributed to the fact that the students who participated in the program have 
already bought into the idea of college, the necessity for their lives, and a commitment to 
some of its ideals. In a sense, it confines the discussion to students who feel they should 
already be in college, and by providing them with a "college type" experience in grade 
12.  
 This move (of which I am skeptical of the efficacy), points to a tension that the 
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third genre of discontent seeks to illuminate. This tension is located not within the 
teachers in high schools, not within a lack of communication over what matters in college 
writing, but within the function, purposes, and culture of schooling itself at the secondary 
level. This discontent with the culture of schooling opens the lens the widest. In Fanetti et 
al's 2010 article "Closing the Gap between High School Writing Instruction and College 
Writing Expectations" they note that two factors "strongly affect the transition of writers 
from high school to college." One of these factors concerns itself with the "avenues of 
communication" between the two levels. The second, though, is quite different: "the 
circumstances and contexts of high school and college writing classes are very different, 
and those circumstances and contexts strongly impact pedagogy" (140). What exactly are 
these "circumstances and contexts" that mark the two as different from each other? On a 
very surface level, Fanetti et al note the stereotypical, often romantic caricatures of the 
two: high school is about standardization and memorization, college is about abstractness 
and open mindedness, etc. However, they continue on this line, noting that  
We think of successful high schools in terms of statistics: comparatively high 
average test scores, consistent adequate yearly progress percentages, etc. Because 
success is measured against standards set locally and nationally and based on 
anonymous student averages, high school instruction is designed, first, to optimize 
performance on the assessments that provide the statistics. Less quantifiable 
aspects of the learning experience are subordinated. (78, emphasis mine)  
 
Conversely, "college students learn that there are no rules—or, better, that the rules 
change daily. Instead of the detailed rubrics, repeated drilling, and objective testing they 
knew in high school, college students find themselves largely autonomous and left to 
figure out what’s expected of them on their own" (78). Due to the drastically different 
contexts of each, students leave high school "decidedly unprepared for college [...] When 
students learn test writing well, their high schools show it in statistics, but the students 
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come to college and have to unlearn before they can learn. And teachers on both sides of 
the gap protest" (78). This observation is important, as the authors of the text note that 
this larger constraint that demands standardization and adherence to testing metrics 
subverts the attempts of teachers who might try to employ process orientated pedagogies. 
Thus, this genre of discontent illuminates how it is not so simple to just better train 
teachers (train them to do what, exactly?) or to simply communicate better what is 
expected (even if they didn't know what to do, it is not simply a case that teachers can 
simply do what those in expert positions dictate). Rather valiantly, the authors conclude 
with this suggestion: "We suggest that the gap we’ve fathomed here can be narrowed or 
even closed by rethinking the purpose of high school entirely [...] No longer can we think 
of high school as its own end. We must begin to think about it as preparation for the next 
educational step—college—and we must calibrate our instruction, and our assessment, 
with that in mind" (83). Of course, the entry point for such a project is to take the open-
endedness of college, and use that to replace the rigidity of standardized testing in high 
schools.  
 While this argument for increasing the alignment between the two institutions is 
intensely problematic for reasons I will discuss shortly, I want to use this third genre of 
discontent to pivot to the overarching inadequacies of all of these solutions to the "crisis" 
of literacy. All three of these genres of discontent and their accordant solutions posit 
some sort of pure, unmediated pedagogic activity in the classroom. By this I mean that 
they all seem to work with a concept of "activity" in the classroom that can be easily 
controlled, directed, fixed, and manipulated. However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, "activity" is never simply the domain of singular intents, positions of power and 
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influence, positions and structure of labor, and rules concerning structure. More 
importantly, though, the ends of activity, whether individual or collective activity, cannot 
simply be fixed and controlled from outside the process of activity itself. This theorized 
concept of what pedagogic activity constitutes presumes to be able to do just this: 
unilaterally fix or regulate the ends of such pedagogic activity. Consider the "blame the 
teacher" genre, even in its most high-minded format that takes aim at teacher experience, 
retention, professional development opportunities and the like. The implicit assumption 
here is that if only teachers were better, all of our problems would be solved. However, 
this also carries with it an implicit conception of the teacher as a heroic figure in the 
classroom, able to transcend the collective pressures focused on the classroom, able to 
rise above the "ongoing, historically conditioned" circumstances of education itself, and 
able to implement some pure version of what experts have determined "works." 
 Actual research, though, points to a far more problematic reality. As Addison and 
McGee discovered, what teachers do (and think they are doing) is not at all the same 
thing as what students experience. As they discovered,  
While 30% of high school faculty report “always” requiring multiple drafts, only 
16% of high school students report “always” writing multiple drafts. And while 
31% of high school faculty report “always” conferencing with students on papers 
in progress, only 12% of high school students report “always” discussing their 
writing with their teacher [...] These results and others suggest that even when 
faculty do engage in best practices for teaching writing, many students do not 
engage in best practices for learning how to write, calling attention to the need to 
find ways to encourage greater engagement among students for best practices in 
learning how to write. (159,160). 
 
This phenomena makes itself apparent in other ways. From the recent NCTE collection of 
essays titled What is College Level Writing, high school teacher Kittle describes the 
motivation behind teaching methods: "One of the most common of these myths involved 
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correctness: 'College professors' I would intone to my students, 'will give you an F if you 
make more than three errors in a paper.' This particular belief was widespread in my 
school; every English teacher used it as something of a cudgel to motivate students to 
proofread carefully" (137, emphasis mine). Perhaps even more chillingly, though, is how 
Kittle describes his reliance on teaching the "five-paragraph essay:"  
I taught the five-paragraph essay because it was easy to teach, not because I 
thought it was the best way to teach writing. I marked papers for grammatical 
errors because it was easy to see and circle those mistakes, not because they were 
the most important aspect of my students' writing. I admit this not with pride, but 
at least with honesty; expedience and efficiency matter tremendously when facing 
five classes a day, with over thirty students per class. (138, emphasis mine) 
 
What I think is quite clearly evident in this passage is that it is not so simply the case that 
teachers are simply uneducated as to the "better" way to teach writing, but rather are 
constrained by other forces. 
 The idea that expectations have simply not been communicated effectively 
enough runs into the exact same problems. As the data from Addison and McGee 
suggests, concepts such as pre-writing, conferencing, and the like are not unknown nor 
un-practiced in many high school writing classrooms. The problem, yet again, is that 
these expectations represent but one of many pressures and intentions present in any 
classroom activity. Even if such expectations were completely known, there is no reason 
to assume that they could be successfully implemented in some sort of pure, unmediated 
form. Further, even when such expectations are communicated through top-down 
curriculum demands as seen in dual-enrollment courses, these "expectations" often get 
lost in translation. As Farris points out,  
Rather than create actual opportunities themselves that socialize students in the 
university’s habits of mind, teachers of concurrent enrollment classes, perhaps 
more familiar with “college prep” courses, may resort instead to ‘brokering’ 
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(Sperry) for the university, having students write more for the purpose of 
admonishing them about the expectations of future college professors, who 
undoubtedly will grade harder and care less" (CCC Special Symposium 439).  
 
In a sense, then, what cannot be overcome is the environment of high school itself, and 
this environment through which activity occurs is where ends, purposes, aims, and 
motivations themselves are created.  
 Finally, while there is undoubtedly much to agree with when Fanetti et all claim 
that "Standardized testing, then, has 'caused' more writing in high school, but at the 
expense of actual writing instruction and experience. Students are learning longhand test-
taking, not real writing" and that "When students learn test writing well, their high 
schools show it in statistics, but the students come to college and have to unlearn before 
they can learn. And teachers on both sides of the gap protest" (78), these assertions rest 
on a dangerous pedestal. That is, if we simply got rid of standardized testing, things 
would return to normal. The problem, though, is it does not inquire into the reason 
standardized testing is so deeply entrenched in the first place. If you take away the tests, 
the social structure from which it came from and the broader socio-political dynamics 
that are at the root of standardized testing in the first place will still very much be in 
place. Removing such tests may make high school seem a little more like college, but this 
would be an illusion. As Doug Hesse proclaims, "I’m wary of those who would imagine 
high school as proto-college, who seek to reproduce 'college writing' instruction in a 
setting hugely unlike college, among students cognitively and circumstantially different 
from college students." (CCC Special Symposium 420). I agree, and I can show why, 
although for different reasons. What needs to be addressed is the larger nature of society, 
of which schools are an expression of. As the WPA/NCTE "Frameworks" document 
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claims, "This document takes as a central premise that teaching writing and learning to 
write are central to education and to the development of a literate citizenry" (2). The 
question, though, when we widen the lens beyond individual hopes and desires, is 
whether or not a "literate citizenry" is actually the desired product.  
 
A Very Brief History of Crises, Discontent and Writing Instruction 
 What I will be arguing in the remainder of this chapter is that when we understand 
"college preparation" as the result of transactional social activity (much like "writing" 
itself was discussed in the previous chapter), what results is a picture of a discursive 
space through which broader social relations manifest themselves as individual acts 
through guiding regulating the results of pedagogic activity. In other words, "college 
preparation" takes place within a social-political environment and that the two are 
continuous or within a "trans-active" relationship. However, to give a broader context 
through which these social relations operate in regard to literacy instruction, I first want 
to briefly note some important historical features of writing instruction at the post 
secondary level.  
 To say that these discourses of crisis and the discontent over student writing have 
never been far from writing instruction is a gross understatement. Writing instruction 
owes its existence to such crises. Adams Sherman Hill, the director of the first writing 
program at Harvard in the latter parts of the 19th century, explained the situation as he 
saw it in 1879: 
We can all remember a time when our schools and colleges gave even less 
instruction in the art of writing and speaking the English language correctly than 
is given at present, and that too without much complaint from any quarter. 
Children who learned their ABC's under the old system could call the letters in a 
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world by name, but were often unable to pronounce the same word, or to 
understand its meaning. Boys and girls who were well on in their teens could talk 
glibly about 'parts of speech,' 'analyze' sentences, and 'parse' difficult lines in 
Young's "Night Thoughts" or Pope's 'Essay on Man,' but could not explain the 
sentences they took to pieces, or write grammatical sentences of their own. 
(Brereton, 45-46) 
 
The solution to this crisis was a tightening of direct instruction in the English language, a 
project that was itself a fairly recent movement. However, one of the major drivers of this 
movement was an increasing alignment with high schools (themselves only recently 
coming into focus) and college. Part of this must be understood as a consequence of the 
industrial revolution in that required an increasingly skilled workforce. Another part of 
this should probably be understood in changing theories concerning the purpose of 
education as well as the emerging field of English studies. Regardless, the perceived 
needs as well as the perceived deficiencies of students was often a focal point over highly 
contentions debates concerning the function of schools in America. 
 In 1892, a committee was convened with the purpose of preparing a report on the 
alignment between high school and college. This "Committee of Ten" was one of the 
major touchstone moments in the formulation of both High Schools and their relationship 
to postsecondary institutions (as well as a major site of historiographical disagreements 
over the actual effect of this moment). The group itself was populated primarily by 
college presidents, with only one member being of the "high school" level. The group set 
up several sub-committees to investigate several subject areas, English being among 
them. While their recommendations were wide ranging in this regard, the committee was 
fairly unequivocal when it came to the relationship between the two levels of schooling:  
The secondary schools of the United States, taken as a whole, do not exist for the 
purpose of preparing boys and girls for the colleges. Only an insignificant 
percentage of the graduates of these schools go to colleges or scientific schools 
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[...] A secondary school programme intended for national use must therefore be 
made for those children whose education is not to be pursued beyond the 
secondary school. The preparation of a few pupils for college or scientific school 
should in the ordinary secondary schools be the incidental, not the principal 
object. (Committee of 10 Main report) 
 
Despite this recommendation, though, the actual curriculum in high schools--both private 
college preparatory academies as well as public high schools--was in a perpetual tension 
with the demands and expectations of colleges. In fact, those in the colleges were very 
much aware of this and sought to leverage this in a bid to rule the roost of who had 
control of what was taught in schools and for what reasons. In regard to writing, Adams 
Sherman Hill described the project in no uncertain terms in 1879 when he described an 
entrance exam for incoming freshmen: "Each candidate will be required to write a short 
English composition, correct in spelling, punctuation, grammar, and expression, the 
subject to be taken from such standard authors as shall be announced from time to time. 
The subject for 1874 will be taken from one of the following works: Shakespeare's 
Tempest, Julius Caesar, and Merchant of Venice; Goldsmith's Vicar of Wakefield, Scott's 
Ivanhoe and Lay of the Last Minstrel." More importantly, though, is Hill's understanding 
of what this examination was to do:  
It was hoped that this requirement would effect several desirable objects,--that the 
student, by becoming familiar with a few works holding a high place in English 
literature, would acquire a taste for good reading, and would insensibly adopt 
better methods of thought and better forms of expression that teachers would be 
led to seek subjects for composition in the books named, subjects far preferable to 
the vague generalities too often selected, and that they would pay closer attention 
to errors in elementary matters; that, in short, this recognition by the College of 
the importance of English would lead both teachers and pupils to give more time 
to the mother tongue, and to employ the time thus given to better advantage 
(Brereton 48, emphasis mine). 
 
Later, Hill is even more direct in who is at fault if students are not able to succeed at the 
collegiate level:  
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On the whole, the examinations makes a poor showing for the schools that furnish 
the material whereof the university which professes to set up the highest standard 
in America, has to make educated men. If she does not succeed in giving to all her 
graduates the one mental audition deemed by her president the essential part of 
education, the fault is not altogether or mainly hers. For her to teach bearded men 
the rudiments of their native tongue would be almost as absurd to teach them the 
alphabet or the multiplication table. Those who call for 'more English' in the 
colleges should cry aloud and spare not till more and better English is taught in 
the schools. (51, emphasis mine) 
 
Hill was certainly not without his critics, though. In 1911, Thomas Ranseford Lounsbury 
leveled this charge against the Harvard writing program that Adams Sherman Hill had 
instituted. Lounsebury's chief grievance is not so much with the project as a whole, but 
how it was carried out:  
There is a prevailing belief in the whole country that it is absolutely essential to 
the intellectual salvation of every growing youth that he should write themes. No 
sooner does the child enter primary school than this particular task looms before 
his eyes. It is, indeed, the one requirement from which he never escapes during 
the whole of his educational career. It follows him to the high school, it pursues 
him to the college. There are those who sorrow for him who has to learn Latin. 
But no voice is lifted up in behalf of the unfortunateness who are asked not to 
master a distasteful subject, but to perform the infinitely harder task of writing, 
not because they have something to say, but because they have to say something. 
For the great American community clings firmly to the faith that anybody and 
everybody can be taught to use the language with clearness and precision, to say 
nothing of effectiveness. Any failure to attain the result is imputed to wrong 
methods of instruction, any distrust of the feasibility to the stupidity or intellectual 
depravity of the doubter (Brereton, 280) 
 
We might see this as one of the earlier instances of the scholarship of discontent that is 
still very much endemic to composition scholarship today. However, there is a deeper 
level to these criticism, as Hill was more of what we might call a "rhetorician" and 
Lounsbury understood "writing" through an Arnoldian conception of literature as high 
culture. The divide, though, goes even deeper when Lounsbury attacks the compulsory 
nature of such instruction. Whereas Hill might have defended his themes as necessary for 
helping students learn to navigate "rhetorical situations" of writing, this would seem to 
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imply some sort of fidelity to a concept of civic participation in which the (increasingly) 
non-elite yet college educated citizen would be asked to be part of the decision making 
apparatus. However, this was not (and perhaps still is not) a full reality for most. Hence 
Lounsbury, not seeing the need for such civic participation through writing, saw the 
compulsory nature of theme writing as completely nonsensical. 
 Regardless, composition's long and tenuous association with various forms of 
literacy crises has understandably led to sporadic moments of resistance. In response to 
yet another round of literacy crises in the late 1980s, Andrew Sledd assessed the situation 
as such: "My first contention will be that there is no such crisis, that both the crisis and 
the means to resolve it have been manufactured in order to serve purposes of which 
teachers should not be servants." (Readin’ 495). This historical dimension of such 
literacy crises, whether it was the crisis of the mother tongue in the late 19th century, the 
mid 1950s crisis of Sputnik and Arthur Bestor's notion of "educational wastelands" as 
well as Rudolf Flesch's "Johnny Can't Read" diatribe, to the crisis of literacy precipitated 
by the open admissions movement in the 1970s, to the "Nation at Risk" panic of the 
1980s and the calls to a return to basics, suggests that the question is not really how bad 
are students but rather why we're complaining about them this time around. Or, for lack 
of a better terminology, what precisely is the occasion for anxiety over a perceived lack 
of literacy skills today? Sledd, perhaps capturing the lack of patience with such crises, 
quipped that "literacy has been declining since it was invented; one of the first ancient 
Sumerian tablets deciphered by modern scholars immortalized a teacher fretting over the 
recent drop in students' writing. There will always be a literacy crisis, if for no other 
reason than because the old never wholly like the young" (496). Of course, and as Sledd 
  203 
himself later explores in the essay, the reasons go far deeper than that. 
 However, and while I agree with Sledd that the crises of literacy are manufactured 
for nefarious ends, what I want to suggest is that there is in fact a deeper crisis that is 
often hidden or obscured by ones focused on literacy. The purpose of the manufactured 
literacy crisis is nothing short of the maintenance of the crisis, while the real crisis is 
allowed to carry on largely unknown. As Appleby and Langer noted, despite the nearly 
frenetic timbre of the current literacy crisis, the last time teachers were asked about their 
writing practices was 1998 (14). The first question that should perhaps come to mind is 
simply why aren't we asking these questions? That this is not really a part of "educational 
reform" is not surprising, because such educational reform does not really care much 
about writing and in particular, the "civic participation" part. It hasn't wanted to know 
because actual solutions to the problem are not the actual goal. That said, it is far too 
simplistic—and naïve—to simply say that since such crises are manufactured, all is well 
and nothing is wrong. Nothing, though, could be further from the truth. To illustrate what 
I mean, I will now return to the concept of college, except to return to it as an idea that 
had a generative force in the classroom, and through the idea of college, something rather 
troubling emerged. 
 
The Construction of a Function of College 
 Scholarship directed at understanding and solving the discontent of many in 
regard to the writing that high school students are capable of have been chasing the 
wrong rabbit. They have attempted to describe what college level instruction, 
expectations, and writing looks like. What they have not done, though, is asked what 
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"college" does. By framing it this way, I want to proceed by first considering college as a 
"belief," not an event. Beliefs, as discussed in chapter one and two, are the foundation of 
action. They are the ideas, values, and understandings that "[do] not make us act at once, 
but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the 
occasion arises" (CP 5.373). The formation of belief is a crucial component with the 
establishment of habits, especially as beliefs come in line with environmental (and thus, 
cultural) contexts. The formation of beliefs, though, is not an atomistic and 
individualistic moment; it is an activity that is socially, culturally, politically, and 
historically mediated. As Dewey argued, the customs of any society were its prevailing 
habits. Further, Dewey argued that individual "minds" were, in fact, the product of 
customs and not the other way around. As such, when we talk about college as a belief 
that serves as a priming agent for action, I am not referring to individual beliefs and 
ideas, but rather a manifestation of the prevailing customs of our times congealed around 
some form of discursive space. As mentioned before, this is what I am thinking when I 
use the concept of "pragmatist critique." 
 These beliefs are the cornerstone of all action in humans. As we can recall from 
the previous chapter, action itself is something that is already always present, it is a 
condition of the "live creature" that Dewey describes in Art as Experience. Activity, or 
movement, is not something started by an impulse, as many understandings of human 
activity have assumed. What such environmental impulses do, though, is continually 
shape, guide, and inform the qualitative nature of action. The results of such activity, 
such as writing an essay, cannot be fully understood apart from the environment from 
which it occurred in. As Dewey noted (in what is a common refrain), "We may shift from 
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the biological to the mathematical use of the word function, and say that natural 
operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are 
functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person" (LW 10:16). This unity is one 
foundational concept in Dewey's work. As he wrote in the early pages of Experience and 
Nature, "Life denotes a function, a comprehensive activity, in which organism and 
environment are included. Only upon reflective analysis does it break up into external 
conditions--air breathed, food taken, ground walked upon--and internal structures--lungs 
respiring, stomach digesting, legs walking" (LW 1:9). Composition theory's longstanding 
(and tenuous) relationship with literary studies as well as "rhetoric" as a discipline has 
made such insights difficult. The vast majority of work done in literary studies as well as 
rhetoric positions the text itself as the primary nexus of scholarly investigations and 
insight, resulting in the exact same condition that Dewey describes. Thus, it is of little 
surprise that many answers regarding what "college-level work" entails is often hyper-
focused on finding ways to have students produce writing that is textually similar to what 
one might see (or desire to see) in a collegiate situation. However, the reliance on the text 
as the primary focus of the scholarly gaze has unfortunately obscured the ways in which 
"college" itself, as an idea or belief, shapes the conditions through which students are 
required to produce texts. 
 To illustrate what I mean here, I want to briefly consider a rather amazing essay, 
written by Don Rickett, a high school teacher, in a 1982 issue of the Journal of Teaching 
Writing. In this article, he sets out to walk readers through his solution to two primary 
goals: one; "[to] allow each student to develop confidence in his or her writing ability" 
and two; "The establishment of a program in which fifty percent of my students would 
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attain the ability to be exempted in some fashion from at least one freshman college 
English course and the other fifty percent to receive a grade of no lower than a "C" for 
any freshman English course in college" There are two things of note here. First, note 
how "success" and "college preparation" is actually conflated quite simply as the ability 
to test out of a college writing course. The second is that it is so focused on the FYW 
course, which is itself a peculiar thing. Regardless, in trying to figure out what standards 
he should aim for, Rickett discovered that "for the most part, the ultimate evaluation of a 
finished product was limited to the textual: form and syntax" (172). This, even though it 
is somewhat tragic, is an assertion that isn't very controversial. However, it is where 
Rickett goes next that is astonishing. Noting that it would be practically impossible as a 
single high school instructor trying to prepare students for "the varied pedagogy of all 
college composition instructors" (172), he decides that his understanding of preparing 
students for college is to "get my students to a point where they could easily adapt to any 
professor's philosophy of composition." He primarily defines this as a binary: content-
orientated vs. structure-orientated instructors. In doing so, he simplifies his project to a 
rather basic maxim: figure out which is "easier" and then focus on the more difficult one. 
Without much surprise, Rickett decides that the professor who focuses on "content" is 
easier to produce work for; therefore, his responsibility is to prepare students to handle 
the professor who "stressed above all else language conventions" (172). This meant the 
majority of attention would be spent preparing students to write for someone who cared 
about the correctness of language above the content. Also of note is that Rickett utilizes a 
course focused around writing various "themes." By this I do not mean a course with a 
single topical "theme," but rather "themes" in the sense of pre-formed prompts and 
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writing genres that students work through weekly. Why? Rickett's process here is also 
rather amazing: he contacts his former students to see what they've done, and from this 
distills a "14 theme course" designed to expose students to what they might be prepared 
to expect. 
 What might we say of the texts that Rickett's students produced? Rickett claims 
that "When I finish my theme program, my students know what their strengths and 
weaknesses are in writing. They have confidence in those strengths, and they know how 
to overcome any weaknesses that they may have. My students also know how to write the 
various types of themes, and they have an example of each type. Finally, my students 
know exactly under what type of college English evaluation they will best perform." 
(176). But is this "college writing?" At best, what Rickett has accomplished is something 
more like asking a person to look at a description of college they have heard from 
someone else, and then to draw it from memory a few days later. However, what Rickett 
has really accomplished is codifying current-traditional rhetoric into his curriculum. This 
occurs because, as he noted, he aimed for those who "stressed above all else language 
conventions" simply because he figured that was the more difficult course to do well in. 
Further, it is highly problematic how singularly focused his course is on preparing 
students to survive freshman composition, although this is right in line with a problematic 
understanding that the ability to pass freshman composition (or test out of it) means one 
is a "college writer"--an understanding that persists to this day. Also missing is a 
consideration of who is teaching these freshman composition courses, an omission that 
has severe consequences given the perpetually poor state of labor conditions within 
writing instruction. As such, Rickett, in trying to prepare students for a very narrow 
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understanding of a "college composition" class, actually prepares them for "current-
traditional rhetoric" type classes. So students, when they hit college classes, are 
consequently habituated into understanding writing as defined within such CTR, and the 
feedback loop intensifies. In this example, what the idea of "college" does is not prepare 
students for college, but prepares them to write in current-traditional rhetoric. 
 My purpose in pointing this out is that "college" is not merely something that has 
to be interpreted and repurposed for curricular ends. In the classroom, especially 
secondary classrooms, "college" does not exist as some objective, Platonic form that 
simply needs to be mirrored in lived reality. Nor, however, is "college" simply an idea or 
concept completely detached from material reality. Even Rickett had to contend with 
constraints placed upon his teaching by considering his course's position within the 
experience of others (and himself). Beyond the actual spaces and buildings of post-
secondary institutions themselves, "college" is, like all "beliefs," an interpretive--and 
thus transactional--activity. However, the implications of this need to be handled very 
carefully. As discussed in the previous chapter, the emergence of patterns in the 
outcomes of such transactional activity is very easily mistaken as the fruits of 
interactional activity in which the constituent parts are fixed and known. In other words, 
familiar outcomes are presumed to be caused by familiar inputs (what Dewey would term 
inter-action). This mistake occurs because of a persistent binary between internal 
thoughts and external reality. Because of this binary, methodological concepts must be 
brought in to explain the transposition of the external to the internal, mainly the idea of 
"mediation." Once this binary is abolished, we see that internal activity (including 
thought, motivation, intent, etc) is continuous with external environments, which 
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obviously includes the sum of social relations. The external is not "reflected" in the 
internal, nor is there some sort of meditational step through which one is filtered into the 
other. Rather, the external and the internal are one and the same.  
 Still, what are we to make of the emergence of current-traditional rhetoric as the 
result of Rickett's process of designing his curricula? More broadly, what are we to make 
of the emergence of patterns that seem to mirror larger social relations? After all, as 
Bourdieu noted, "[...] analysis of the transformations of the pedagogic relation confirms 
that every transformation of the educational system takes place in accordance with a logic 
in which the structure and function proper to the system continue to be expressed" (95). 
Such observations aren't to be taken lightly. In the situation at hand, it isn't that the 
"crisis" outlined above, especially when we consider the qualitative "crisis" of college 
preparation, is reflected in the outcome of pedagogic activity; it is that the entire social, 
cultural, historical, and political dimension of the crisis is also continuous and fully 
present in the activity of individuals comprising any pedagogic transactional activity. It is 
because of this that when we look at the actual results of pedagogic activity, what we see 
is precisely what we saw in the discussion of the crisis of college preparation above. 
Because the global and the local are present in any immediate environment, though, we 
also see shades of variance. In the next section, I examine four moments in the classroom 
in which the transactional nature of "college preparation" is fully evident.  
 
College in "College English" 
 In this section, I will be presenting four "vignettes" that are highly illustrative of 
"college" as a transactional activity. These moments that occurred during my fieldwork in 
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Copper Valley High are, I believe, important to pay attention to simply because they 
present a different perspective on what "college preparation" actually produced in the 
class I was observing.  
 
"And then you die." 
 Throughout the semester the students executed a maneuver in which they would 
turn the teacher's lesson on its head and talk about things that were important to them. As 
noted before, I referred to these sorts of moments as "chumminess" in my field notes. Ms. 
Stein, who valued these moments, often helped the students along once they started. This 
particular conversation in class centered on why students did or did not do well in school. 
They first started off by discussing grades, and how many students felt grades were 
simply a form of punishment. Then, the conversation moved towards what school was all 
about. Ms Stein, trying to actually help the students get somewhere with this 
conversation, asked them this question: "What will doing well in school do for you?" The 
first student who responded to this question said "Good grades are supposed to get you 
into a good college, which will get you a good job, and that will get you a happy life." 
The next 7 minutes or so consisted of other students either agreeing with this or 
amending this sentiment. The teacher then pointed out that nearly all of the responses the 
students were giving focused on attaining a good job. A student responded with: "yeah, 
but you will be so busy working that you can't have that happy life until you retire!" A 
third student jumped in and said "so basically we are just building our lives up for 
retirement?" To which Jack, in a cynical voice, put the final exclamation point on the 
conversation: "yeah! and then you die." 
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 It would be convenient to say Jack got the last word here, but as if on cue, the 
infernal "tones" that signaled the rigid beginning and end of each class rang out. Instead 
of letting the blood of this conversation flow unabated, the rigidity of the environment 
itself clamped down hard as students threw books in their bags and filtered out of the 
room. As happened many times over the course of the semester, the memory of the 
conversation was all but extinguished by the next class period.  
 
"I'm fucked" 
 This interview occurred well after the deadline for the research paper but before 
the students received a grade or feedback on it. Knowing that neither Sam nor Kendra did 
well on the research paper, I eventually broached the subject with them. 
Matthew: talk about this research paper  
Kendra: I'm fucked  
Salim (Sam): I didn't like it. I thought it was stupid  
Kendra: I thought it was dumb too. cause, okay. one, I think we already talked 
about this, but like how I mean some people have an idea what they want to do 
and maybe that's like that's what you think you're going to do now but who knows 
like a year or two from now like you don't know and I just think it's dumb to pick 
a career that you might want to do and tell people about it like I don't know it's 
not everyone's main goal to be financially great and like have like a nice career... 
that's not my goal in life....so I thought it was kinda dumb  
Sam: I thought it was stupid 
 
 The basic idea of the research paper assignment boiled down to two steps: step 
one, identify what career or vocation you envision yourself doing in life and; step two, 
identify a problem or controversy within that area. The research itself, then, was aimed at 
understanding that problem or controversy within each student's self-selected career 
direction. Ms. Stein had some reservations about the way the assignment was 
constructed, but nonetheless believed 
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students were allowed to self-select something that would be meaningful and important to 
their own lives. This interview moment held particular interest for me, as about 2 months 
earlier I had met with Kendra to discuss the class as well as her plans for after high 
school. Earlier that week in class, Ms. Stein had students discuss some of their ideas as to 
what their research projects might be about. Because of the nature of the research project, 
this meant that students also had to be prepared to announce what sort of career or 
vocation they were thinking about pursuing after high school. The actual prompt that Ms. 
Stein gave the students was to think of what they want to be doing in 5 or 10 years. When 
Kendra was called upon to talk about her ideas, she at first wavered. Eventually, though, 
she indicated that one thing she was interested in was dental hygiene. I discovered more 
about this moment during our interview, but not in a direct manner. I had been asking 
Kendra what it might mean to her to go to college, and what it might allow her to do. She 
responded that:  
Kendra: it sounds so lame...I sound like one of those people who are like...world 
peace, but I really want people to just be happy... but you don't need all the money 
in the world to be happy. So I want to be able to support myself but at the same 
time not be so wrapped up in financial stuff because once you die your 
accomplishments financially... and as a business person aren't going to matter. It's 
going to be the relationships you create with people that will be remembered. I 
want to be independent but not so where its like...whoa, she has a big house and a 
nice car and all that. 
 
It was here that I asked Kendra if she had thought more about the research paper and 
what she was going to do with it. She said that she had been thinking about it, because, 
“the schools I'm torn between have something to do with careers, because I can study one 
thing here but another thing there so its like kinda like where I get accepted and not.” 
This was a dilemma, because the choice between careers was going to be determined, in 
part, by where she was able to go to college. While I knew dental hygiene was obviously 
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something she was interested, it was at this point that I learned there was another choice. 
As she explained, what she was torn between was dental hygiene and teaching. When she 
said this, I exclaimed “those are really different!”  
Kendra: yeah! If I was a dental hygienist, I would just want my work to be my 
work, so I could do other things in my time. But if I was a teacher I could really 
make a connection with people, change people's minds for the better or just 
change their minds so they can think for themselves. If people can think for 
themselves, I swear they'd make the right decisions and other people wouldn't be 
influencing them in negative ways all the time. 
 
I then asked Kendra when she started thinking about these two directions. As she 
explained to me, she started thinking about it during middle school. At the time, she 
thought it would be a nice way to have summers off. However, she then described how 
this dream of being a teacher had changed and matured over the years. As Kendra 
developed a desire to do more than just earn a lot of money, “teaching” had evolved into 
a potential outlet for that sort of life.  
 
"You know what I don't get?" 
 Early in the research project unit, Ms. Stein had planned a class in which students 
would continue to work through the various grammar exercises geared to help them on 
the end of semester test over parts of speech. This consisted of a thick packet Ms. Stein 
had distributed some weeks earlier that contained various exercises in identifying parts of 
speech as well as correcting incorrect sentences. Every now and then (usually once a 
week or so) students would do what Ms. Stein called a "snakey-snakey" in which 
students, one by one and in order of where they sat, would be responsible for correctly 
answering one of the problems. However, this time (like most times), the students seemed 
to have other plans. As Ms. Stein asked the students to pull out the packet of grammar 
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exercises, a few students raised their hands to ask questions about the research project. 
The first student asked how they were supposed to find the "right" person to interview for 
their research project. Other students chimed in with "yeah!" and "I'm confused about 
that, too." This quickly turned into a minor roar in the classroom. Ms. Stein then asked 
how many people were confused about where to start with their primary research. 
Practically every hand went up. This caused Ms. Stein to temporarily shelve the grammar 
exercises and to start offering some ideas as to how to start. Part of the "primary 
research" of the research paper was for each student to identify someone in the field they 
are interested in and then interviewing this person. Many students were unsure whom 
they could contact, as well as how they should go about doing this. Ms. Stein patiently 
discussed with students various things that would be good to think about in regard to 
selecting a person to interview. For example, she suggested that if a student's research 
paper was about being an elementary teacher, then they shouldn't ask a college professor 
to do an interview. This eventually led to me directly, as Ms. Stein suddenly realized that 
I might be able to offer something to this discussion. She asked if I could speak about 
why I came to Copper Valley High in particular, and what considerations I took into 
account when selecting my site. As I was talking about the various factors I was 
interested in and what I was looking for, I mentioned that I had compared several school 
districts in regard to their "free and reduced lunch” rates as a rough indicator of the socio-
economic position each institution was in. When I mentioned this, a student asked, "What 
does free and reduced lunch mean?" Ms. Stein took over for me, explaining that some 
students, due to the financial situation of their parents, were eligible to receive assistance 
in helping to pay for lunch at school. It was at this moment that Christian sprung to life 
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(who, not 5 minutes earlier, I had noted in my field notes that he seemed to be fast asleep 
in his chair), and exclaimed, in a nearly excited voice, "you know what I don't get?" 
Since others were still talking at this moment, Christian had to repeat this a couple times 
before Ms. Stein eventually, (and in a good nature) yelled back "What?" Christian 
continued, "You were saying stuff about how some kids here get free lunches. You know 
what I don't get? They get a free lunch and then last week I forgot my wallet and they 
said the only thing I could have was a peanut butter sandwich. I was like, I'm just as 
hungry as those other kids!" 
 This seemed to resonate with the rest of the class. Murmurs and side discussions 
erupted. Some students laughed at Christian, telling him he was a "butt-head" (a term Ms. 
Stein often used on her students in an affectionate way). Christian, though, persisted: "I'm 
serious! Why do they get free lunches and I don't?" At this point, Ms. Stein stepped back 
into the conversation and promptly shut it down, "Seriously Christian? I mean, 
seriously?" She then went back to her original plan for the day and asked students to pull 
out their exercise sheets, telling them that "We have to get through this stuff" and that 
there wasn't enough time to pursue Christian's question. Not long after this, I noted 
Christian yet again motionless in his chair, likely asleep. 
 
Building a Better Brain? 
 Toward the end of the semester, the students had to take a timed essay test as part 
of the class. For this test, students were to read a short article discussing whether or not 
brains can be "built up" like a muscle. The article was written for a popular audience, and 
the class spent a few days going through the argument and learning a few different ways 
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they could respond to it (challenge, extend, etc). Time and time again, Ms. Stein 
reminded teachers that she didn't care what they argued in their response, but rather cared 
only about how they went about doing it (supporting points, evidence, and so forth). 
While the students were obviously familiar with the text, they were not given the prompt 
they had to address ahead of time. It is here that Ms. Stein, trying to do double duty with 
the test, threw the class a sort of curveball. The prompt the students had to respond to 
during the test was Do you agree with the following statement: College English helped 
me to build my brain.  
 There are two things to consider while reading through some of the responses 
below. The first is that, again, Ms. Stein spent no small amount of time telling students in 
preparing for the test that she didn't care about what they said, only how they said it. 
Second, many of the sentiments echoed here were echoed in "official" end of semester 
evaluations that Ms. Stein had the students do, which were anonymous. I follow each of 
these segments with a few thoughts:  
 
"The papers you have to write in College English have the biggest impact on your 
grade, & for good reason! They are multi-step hell-holes processes that challenge 
every inch of your reasoning & creativity. There are so many different kinds of 
academic writing styles & ways to fashion your creativity & reasoning around 
such. The class not only challenges you in a way that will build your brain, but 
also give you the tools to keep your brain at its highest potential." 
 
What is of note in this response is the phrase "They are multi-step hell-holes processes" 
that gives a much fuller sense of meaning for the rest of the paragraph. In this small 
phrase, the student utilized the "strike-through" font to signal a more "true" sentiment that 
they also know is not, perhaps, appropriate. There was nothing in the computer program 
  217 
stopping them from simply deleting the phrase "hell holes" and the student, in a rather sly 
way of creating a secondary meaning to the text, included it in such a way that it was still 
very much readable. The result is a complex essay that, due to this section, now reads as a 
blistering satire of a "timed essay response."  
 
"In conclusion the statement, "College English helped me to build my brain" is 
true. Every tenet of intelligence was talked about in class and I believe I am a 
stronger person both mentally and academically. I feel prepared to go to college 
and write a research paper or find faults in sentences. I can reason through topics 
and discussions and feel good about learning new things." 
 
In this snippet, we see a direct answer of what "college preparation" has produced in the 
mind of this student. Very simply, what it means to be "prepared" to write in college is to 
"write a research paper or find faults in sentences." A skeptical reader might approach 
this as a text written simply to satisfy what they think the teacher is fishing for. Such a 
reading is not only plausible, but given the context of this writing, likely. That said, even 
if this is simply an impression of the author's understanding of the context, it still says an 
awful lot about the how the context of college preparation is understood. Very simply, 
regardless of the authenticity of intent (a spurious concept to start with), the author seems 
to have a clear understanding of what "college preparation" is supposed to be about.  
 
"College English has taken my skills and numbed them. I have not been 
challenged in the class and therefore my brain has been doing the same processes 
with no changes, while my mentality has become more negative. In no way am I 
blaming the class itself, the class achieves everything that it is meant to achieve; 
it's just that the class is not meant for a student like me. Yes, I am aware that this 
is the time to work hard to hone my skills, but where's the motivation after 13 
years of directed instruction, especially when what is being taught is something 
that I have already taken, and learned? The structure of a class to me is an 
introductory course for English; it honestly does not seem like a college level 
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class." 
 
What makes this paragraph interesting is both the admission of what the student did not 
do--use it as "time to work hard to hone my skills," presumably to get ready for college--
but the suggestion that it was not "college level" but rather a continuation of "high-
school." In this, we see the student constructing a concept of "college" and "high-school," 
where high-school is defined as "13 years of directed instruction" and college as being 
something else (although what that "something else" might be is not discussed here). 
Also of note is the student's claim that this isn't the fault of the class, but that the class 
"achieves everything that it is meant to achieve." In one sense, this segment might be a 
way in which the student (who remember, is not anonymous to the teacher) is seeking to 
shield the teacher from responsibility for the student's take on the class. By saying "the 
class is not meant for a student like me," they are absolving the teacher of what the 
student feels has resulted. However, the student seems to be pretty direct in claiming that 
the inability of this class to match expectations of college is the root of their personal 
failure. 
"Learning was another big part of this class and it was worked on through 
grammar practice. Grammar was a big part of the class, we slowly worked into it 
and kept applying new grammar concepts to the ones we had already learned in 
order to learn how to speak and write using proper grammar once you got to the 
college level. Though out the year my grammar has improved greatly and I now 
understand all the basic concepts that I did not understand before. I believe that 
this class has made me a better learner due to the countless hours spent working 
on grammar." 
 
Again, it is hard to tell how satirical this should be read, or if this should be read as a 
statement that seeks to merely pander to what the author thinks the teacher wants to see. 
However, what IS clear is the centrality of "grammar" to this student's understanding of 
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the class as well as how it related to "college preparation." Further, it places "grammar" 
as the central mechanism of "learning" in a writing class. That is, what is learned in a 
"writing" class (and presumably, what it means to learn to write) is to learn grammar.  
 
"Creativity is not used so much in College English because I have always been 
given my prompt, or the structure of writing I must complete for a grade. Giving 
me the prompt is not expanding my creativity at all. I may have to be creative in 
the way I write, but I am not being creative in what I am writing about. College 
English has given me hoops to jump through by creating the prompts and types of 
papers I am assigned to write. Without creativity my brain is not expanding its 
horizons. My brain is not growing at all without creativity it is just jumping 
through hoops to get a grade." 
 
I save this one for last simply because it may be the most troublesome of all the 
responses. For one, it is troubling as this was precisely the situation Ms. Stein continually 
hoped to avoid in the way she taught her class, the assignments assigned (for what was 
within her power to assign, at least), and the activities conducted during class time. It is 
also troubling in the way that the student does see a certain amount of creativity in "the 
way [they] write," but that this is not what really matters, which is the ability to be 
creative in regard to what is written about. What is troubling about this is not the student's 
perception--I think they are right to lament here--but is troubling because we can see here 
a definition of what it means to prepare for college writing: "hoops to jump through by 
creating true prompts and types of papers" students are assigned to write.  
 
Unpacking the vignettes: 
 In these moments, we can see both how "college preparation" sets up an 
environment where the action of students is shaped by the concept of preparing for 
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college as well as the qualitative nature of this shaping that produces a result continuous 
with the broader social environment in which these scenes happen. For example, we can 
start with the ways in which the students utilized their understandings of "college." As 
noted earlier, one thing I was struck by in speaking with students in the class was the 
incredibly nebulous understandings they had of what "college" entailed. Before the 
semester, I had been working on an assumption that students had some notion of 
"college" and that this was somehow operative in the work they did in class. This 
hypothesis died a quick death during fieldwork. In talking with students, many simply 
could not visualize college, could not imagine what would go on there, what sorts of 
work they would do, and were unable to even fathom basic ways their lives might change 
beyond simple things like reading more and sleeping less. However, this is not to say that 
the students had no conception of college, because what they did have was an incredibly 
keen and sophisticated understanding of how college fit into society.  
 In the first vignette ("And then you die"), what erupted in class echoed what many 
students, both in formal interviews and informal conversations during class, seemed to 
understand: school was based on some sort of linear preparation for work, which itself 
was basically preparation for retirement and finally death. First grade existed for second 
grade, which existed for level after level that finally secured the ability to do work. But 
what should be pulled from this is that work itself was simply preparation for retirement, 
where the non-economic aspects of a good life might finally be investigated and realized. 
Of course, the tragedy here of this understanding is that this phase is finally reached right 
before death. To return to the discussion in the previous chapter, what is painfully 
obvious here is that the ends of writing, as students understood them, somehow fit 
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directly into this linear progression. Where, we must ask, is the democratic sphere in this 
vision that the students held? As mentioned in the second chapter, it wasn't that these 
students didn't know how to "work" or "apply effort" towards writing, it is that the 
environment they find themselves thrown into provides little to no meaningful outlet for 
such action in a public setting, both immediately as well as in any sort of imagined future. 
Moments where such effort is expended, then, are reserved primarily for private 
endeavors defined through economic security. The notion of writing we commonly 
imagine as writing instructors, the precise notion of writing that is thrown into contrast 
with the Bartleby Syndrome where students simply prefer to not "write" in that way, 
makes no small amount of sense given the way "writing" was aligned to "college," and 
what "college" was aligned with in the student's minds. 
 Further, the discussion I had with Kendra in the second vignette ("I'm fucked") 
further illuminates the way that "college," at least in the immediate environment of the 
class, is understood as something to do with advancing a career and little to do with 
imagining a future in which meaningful work is undertaken. In this regard, Kendra's 
assessment of the assignment itself is very telling in two important ways. First, she sees 
an emptiness and futility in attaching meaning and importance to something that is years 
in the future. As Kendra points out, the future is always nebulous at best and will 
undoubtedly change. We might recall Dewey's warning about what happens when present 
means are ignored for the sake of something far off in the future: activity loses purpose, 
meaning, and importantly, the means become muddled. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, basing meaning on the economic choices Kendra sees in the future are 
ultimately unfulfilling when compared to other ways of thinking about what the future 
  222 
might hold. Part of what Kendra is responding to when she says "it's not everyone's main 
goal to be financially great and like have like a nice career... that's not my goal in life" is 
the way her and her classmates often select a career direction. For nearly all students I 
talked to about their topic, their selection in a career area was guided by information they 
obtained on job growth (security) and income potential. This is why choices like 
pharmacy technician, actuarial science, dental hygiene, and nursing were some of the 
most common career areas students envisioned themselves entering. However, the insight 
Kendra sees in all this is that job security and income does not necessarily lead to things 
like fulfillment, purpose, and meaning from one's career, or what we might refer to as un-
alienated labor. This alone, though, does not necessarily explain why students were 
struggling to care about the other assignments in class, all of which had virtually nothing 
to do with jobs or the economy that students were about to enter. 
 So why didn’t Kendra say “teaching” in that moment during class in which 
students were asked to describe what they would be doing in 10 years? Unfortunately, I 
can only speculate here, as Kendra had no real answer to this question (and I did not have 
enough foresight to press her on this). Yet, I still think an answer starts to become visible 
if we look again at why Kendra was so frustrated with the research paper around the 
deadline: “[...] I just think it's dumb to pick a career that you might want to do and tell 
people about it like I don't know it's not everyone's main goal to be financially great and 
like have like a nice career... that's not my goal in life.” It is here that we can see how 
Kendra clearly understood the research project to be about describing a “career,” and that 
this, to her, was very clearly connected with being “financially great.” This also meant, 
though, that her other option--teaching--did not fit into this at all, especially in how 
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“teaching” was very much connected to a sort of “save the world” vision, a vision that 
Kendra often times seemed to be somewhat bashful of.  
 In the third vignette ("you know what I don't get?"), we can see the way in which 
"college preparation" itself serves as a barrier to the inclusion of immediate meaning and 
purposes in the act of writing. We could envision a different scenario, where Christian's 
quite real and sincere question, a question born out of a contradiction that caused doubt in 
his mind and had opened the door to the possibility of inquiry into the matter, was 
utilized itself as the starting point for the activity of writing. Instead, though, the function 
of preparing for college closed off this avenue. In other words, the qualitative dimension 
of the crisis discussed above in regard to college level writing ability is continuous with 
the results of "college preparation" in the classroom: in this instance, the availability for a 
space to be opened up in which a critical examination of these dimensions is effectively 
shut down in the name of preparing for college. Spaces in which the process of writing 
could matter in the immediate lives and experiences of students are removed. The act of 
writing, then, is prevented from being anything more than a mere hoop to jump through. 
These are troubling moments indeed, because these were moments in which students 
were entering a moment in which ends-means were about to be consummated, and 
instead that unity was violently disrupted by something so far removed in the future that 
"action" was simply rendered muddy and confused. 
 It is worth contrasting this moment with how Ms. Stein, in a pre-semester 
interview, described her vision of "college." This particular exchange came, interestingly, 
in a discussion we were having over the value of "testing" in writing courses. Ms. Stein 
explained her ambivalence toward the tests she was required to administer this way: 
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"sometimes what tests test is a student's ability to play school well, and that's fine, it's a 
valid skill but its not what I want of them in this classroom and I don't think it's what 
colleges want of them. But, as you said before, 'my mythical idea of what college is' 
[pause] but I don't know how accurate it is" I then asked her what she did want. She 
replied:  
Ms Stein: I want them to think. I want them to stop [pause] producing things just 
for the hoops they're jumping through, but to start caring about their word choice 
because it's freaking awesome when you have good word choice, and to start 
thinking about the length of your sentences and the patterns of your sentences [so] 
it doesn't feel like a Dick and Jane book anymore, because it's its more exciting to 
read and it's easy to get lost in if the author puts in more work than the audience 
has to do less to follow. And [pause] to make them realize--and this sounds awful-
-but you can BS a teacher if your writing is flashy enough, you can not know your 
subject as well if you know how to manipulate language. [long pause] I see 
writing as subverting the system and I see teaching as getting kids to think and 
getting kids to think about oh partly voting and partly civic responsibility and 
partly to just think that, there's so much going on in the world today. We're 'The 
best lack all conviction, while the worst. Are full of passionate intensity.' I don't 
care where they stand politically as long as--for a change--they can build an 
argument that has reasons and support, and that's what we do in this class." 
 
A little later in the interview, Ms. Stein described a situation in a previous class in which 
a student started to "fact-check" everything Ms. Stein said in class, often coming with 
facts and figures of their own. As Ms. Stein described it, "we would just duke it out and it 
was fantastic." However, one day this student found Ms. Stein to be in error, and Ms. 
Stein admitted to the class the next day that she had been wrong, and gave them whatever 
she had misquoted earlier. When the student told Ms. Stein that they wouldn't report to 
their parents what had happened, Ms. Stein told the student that she wasn't ashamed to be 
wrong, and that more importantly, that was what the classroom space was for. As she 
explained, "I thought that was empowering and I think helps for kids to realize the class 
is a safe space to be wrong, a public space to be wrong and it's okay." 
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 What Ms. Stein describes in this anecdote about a previous class (which was not a 
"college preparation" class like CE), is a classroom space in which provisional ideas are 
brought into the classroom space to be discussed and considered by the members of the 
class itself. Because the emphasis was on "finding out" and not simply "being right," the 
classroom as a "safe space" for "being wrong" is a critical component of this. Except, this 
vision wasn't what occurred with Christian's question. This helps to illustrate the way that 
"college preparation" functions as a transactional activity in which the sum or the whole 
of the environment is continuous in regard to the individual and particular aspects within 
it. It is because of this that we can see how action and activity, while not predetermined, 
are guided in various ways that are, to borrow again Bourdieu's language, in accordance 
with a logic that extends beyond the immediate scene. Equally important, though, was 
that the students themselves didn't question this either. There were no calls to pursue the 
question (despite many students silently indicating that it was something they wondered, 
too). If habits of being a student and various beliefs and values concerning the function, 
role, and purpose of writing are things that are born out of experience, the fact that the 
students (and the teacher herself) didn't think much of this moment suggests a lot not only 
about "schooling" but the cultural environment itself that schooling is a part of. As Ivanic 
notes in her 2004 essay "Discourses of Writing and Learning to Write,"  
Policy, practice and opinions about literacy education are usually underpinned, 
consciously or subconsciously, by particular ways of conceptualising writing, and 
by particular ways of conceptualising how writing can be learned. These different 
ways of conceptualising literacy lie at the heart of ‘discourses’ in the broadest 
sense: recognisable associations among values, beliefs and practices which lead to 
particular forms of situated action, to particular decisions, choices and omissions, 
as well as to particular wordings[...] The ways in which people talk about writing 
and learning to write, and the actions they take as learners, teachers and assessors, 
are instantiations of discourses of writing and learning to write. (220) 
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Using Ivanic's term of "discourses," we can see how "college preparation" is able to 
produce such discourses concerning writing instruction. In her piece, she lists 6 
discourses of writing instruction. They are: 
1. A Skills Discourse 
2. A Creativity Discourse 
3. A Process Discourse 
4. A Genre Discourse 
5. A Social Practices Discourse 
6. A Sociopolitical Discourse 
 
In CE, the function of "college preparation" was to shape the environment so that only #1 
was viable, even though writing in CE was often theorized as 3, or 5, or even 6. 
 The final point I want to make about the series of responses students gave to the 
timed essay prompt is that they clearly indicate the results of "college preparation" are 
actually manifestations of the environment students were currently in, which had very 
little to do with "college" itself. As discussed in the previous chapter, this makes a lot of 
sense from within a Pragmatist understanding of activity. Means, within this 
understanding, are always found within the present situation. Further, ends-in-view, or 
aims, purposes, or goals, are themselves developed along with the means found in the 
present situation. Because of this, an incredibly distant relationship between "aims" 
(college preparation) and the present situation (the high school environment) produces a 
result that is only tangentially related (at best) to the "aim" of activity. Problematically, 
though, these understandings of what "college writing" is all about, understandings that 
are forged in a very different environment and for very different reasons, are embedded 
into habits or practices that are actually carried within students when they go to college. 
If we define "college writing" as simply the sort of writing a college student does, in this 
sense, "college writing" is being produced. In other words, we can see the way in which 
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"college writing" is in the process of being redefined by these forces. The problem, 
though, is that this version of "college writing" is deeply at odds with what composition 
theory has tried to understand as "writing."  
 As a very brief illustration of this, consider the following message sent out over 
the Writing Program Administration email list (WPA-L):  
"But I (and a number of my colleagues who 'believe in' revision as another word 
for the real work of "writing") find that the vast majority of our students resist the 
drafting process altogether. They regularly avoid workshop classes (despite a 
strict absence policy, which they see as about presence, not engagement). Or if 
they do attend those classes, most students will do so without drafts, even though 
part of each workshop class is a 'mini-lesson' on an aspect or element of writing to 
help them revise further or edit. (I typically focus workshops on content first--
including thesis development and overall structure, then integrating sources and 
overall coherence, then sentence control. And "process" drafts are required--just 
as, I tell them, calculations are required to support answers in math classes.) Most 
of my students just want that grade, and then (so it seems) they will decide what 
they need or want to do to raise it--not to improve their writing, but to improve 
their GPA. And they'll want to know what precisely they need to do--what 
specific changes they need to make--in order to get the grade they want. I have 
students every semester who repeatedly ignore assignment descriptions, goals, 
guidelines as if to say, 'This is all I'm going to do for this assignment; take it or 
leave it,' until, that is, they see the grade. (Miecznikowski email) 
 
This, of course, is a fairly good description of the Bartleby Syndrome, except that this is 
in reference to college students, not high school students. In this example, though, we can 
see how composition theory itself has also assumed certain aims, purposes, or goals as 
fixed and prior to writing itself. In short, it has assumed a world in which this sort of 
writing makes sense. As I have suggested before, it has detached the specific conditions 
and circumstances in which these ideas have been created within, and then assumed them 
to be present for all instances of writing. However, what is also telling is how this email 
focuses on the students as the center of the problem. This is not altogether off the mark, 
as it is the expectations and practices the students carry with them that ultimately define 
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the way they approach writing. However, such sentiments typically falter in asking why 
students have developed such habits in the first place. As I have been trying to show in 
this chapter, "college preparation" itself, and the continuity it has with the contemporary 
literacy crisis, provide a deeper understanding into how and why the beliefs and habits 
that students have are formed.  
 
Conclusion 
 The distance between the expectations of instructors in regard to the ways writing 
will be done in class, and the actual writing students do presents not only a problem, but 
illuminates a final level of analysis in understanding the complete "environment" in 
which writing takes place. The problem it presents is that this distance is often 
understood as the measure of success in a writing class. However, it also suggests a final 
level of analysis that asks why such practices of writing are continuous within what sort 
of environment. The argument I will be working through in the next chapter builds on a 
conversation around liberalism. As I will suggest, it is a particular type or flavor of 
liberalism that provides the broadest context for collective activity. It is an understanding 
of this type of liberalism--neoliberalism as many have referred to it as--that removes all 
contradictions surrounding things like college preparation, the crisis of literacy focused 
on college readiness, and the Bartleby Syndrome. In short, these things, while 
contradictory on their own, make sense within a neo-liberal society. 
 Pragmatism does several things here. The first is that it helps to understand the 
way in which different versions of liberalism become the axis upon which these things 
turn. While John Dewey has been described as a philosopher of many stripes (of 
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education, of experience, of democracy), one thing he is often not seen as is a philosopher 
of liberalism. However, as I will explore in the next chapter, Dewey's place within the 
tradition of liberalism not only helps to extend our contemporary understandings of neo-
liberalism, but Dewey also suggests an alternative liberalism that finds its justification in 
other various strands of pragmatist philosophy. This is important to work through, as one 
might take a more relativistic stance to suggest that all forms of literacy are equally 
worthy and thus, what should change is our expectations. Or, in other words, the solution 
here is to acquiesce to the environment, to welcome our neoliberal future, to accept this 
new normal as a normative goal. While many people have sought to condemn and smear 
Dewey as a philosopher who takes this position, I will be working against this 
interpretation of Pragmatism to offer a version of Pragmatism that, while often over 
looked, is still viable. It is in this form of pragmatism that such relativism is not seen as 
the solution, but as the problem to be over come through intelligence. Or, to return to the 
very first chapter, to look to inquiry itself as the foundation for a democratic vision.  
 What would the ideal preparation for college entail? The answer I am cultivating 
goes something like this: the best preparation for college is a purposeful and meaningful 
curriculum for the students that does not sell out to the future, but takes the students 
where they are at and cultivates them as inquirers into their present conditions. We can 
think back to Christian's question of "you know what I don't get" as a sort of yearning for 
this sort of work. Students have questions, have doubts, have all the impulsive ingredients 
needed to spur learning and growth. That is enough to work with, and college preparation 
enough to guide students through ever deepening abilities to deal with the world they 
have. Why must we learn rhetorical models for college when we can learn rhetorical 
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models that might help us understand social divisions such as race and class, particularly 
as it pertains to the lives students currently inhabit? Composition theory has long echoed 
such sentiments. However, the other sentiment composition has long echoed is that this is 
the road we continually do not take. How are we to understand this paradox? To this, I 
want to offer this lengthy quote from Bernstein that captures, I think, the essence of the 
project for Pragmatist philosophy in the 21st century and one that is highly suggestive of 
what the Pragmatist tradition offers composition studies:  
To believe, for example, that it is possible to bring about reconstruction of all 
social institutions through educational reform is to be completely unrealistic about 
the extent to which our schools are and will continue to be a reflection of a larger 
society in which they function. No capitalist society will tolerate a school system 
that is design to overthrow it. A Marxist critic would claim that all this might have 
been known if Dewey had a correct understanding of the dynamics of existing 
society. If one wants further confirmation, we need only look at the failure of 
Dewey's ideas to be effective and their impotence in light of the basic conflicts in 
society. The social conflicts that even Dewey perceived have not been 
ameliorated, they have been worsened. Where in American society can one find 
evidence of the growth of creative intelligence and the realization of the ideal of a 
democratic community of shared experience? Despite the influence of Dewey, our 
school system is even more chaotic and confused in its practices, aims, and 
objectives than it was during Dewey's lifetime. If Dewey was alarmed about what 
was happening to our social and natural environment during the first half of the 
20th century, look at the rapid deterioration since then. Even science has not 
become, as Dewey hoped, the beacon for intelligent activity, but a terrifying 
means for destruction. And the esthetic quality of our daily lives continues to be 
degraded and dehumanized. These are strong indictments. I believe they are 
essentially correct in the deficiencies they highlight and in the charge that Dewey 
was unrealistically optimistic about what could and would be achieved by social 
reform.  
 Even granted the thrust of these and other related criticisms, it would be 
disastrous if we discarded what stands at the center of the pragmatic tradition. 
This tradition, especially in the central position that it assigns to the theory of 
inquiry, has developed a critical understanding of the norms by which any idea or 
hypothesis is to be tested and evaluated. [...] Marx called for the radical criticism 
of all existing social institutions. But it is the pragmatists who have perspicuously 
and forcefully delineated the norms of critical inquiry (Praxis 228-9). 
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My task, then, for the rest of this project is to understand what "writing" and writing 
instruction has to do with this critical inquiry that Pragmatists assert as the crucial 
apparatus in working against such forms of literacy that are not sustainable, just, or 
worthy of our lives.  





Chapter 5 	  
Bartleby Redux: Composition, Liberalism, and 
Inquiry 
 
"For problems [in high schools] do not arise arbitrarily. They come from causes, and 
from causes which are imbedded in the very structure of the school system—yes, even 
beyond that, in the structure of society itself. It is for this reason that mere changes in the 
mechanics of the school system, whether in administration or in the externals of subject-
matter, turn out mere temporary devices [...] any adjustment which really and 
permanently succeeds within the school walls must reach out and be an adjustment of 
forces in the social environment. " (Dewey, MW.1.286) 
 
 
[...]a decent education ought to be creating free, independent, creative human beings 
[...]And it would be part of developing a free and democratic society of real 
participation. But of course that runs counter to elite interests. It's worth remembering 
that the United States was not founded to be a democratic society and elites do not want 
it to be a democratic society. It's supposed to be what political scientists sometimes call a 
"polyarchy," a system basically of elite decision and public ratification. And if you had 
the kind of educational system that Dewey spent his life committed to, you wouldn't be 
able to sustain that. People would become active, involved, engaged, and would try to 
create a truly functioning democratic society which would, as Dewey also pointed out, 
require an industrial democracy. That means democratizing production, commerce, and 
so on, which means eliminating the whole structure of capitalist hierarchy. [...] I was 
lucky as a kid to be sent to a Deweyite school. It was quite, quite an exciting experience." 





There are two unresolved problems this final chapter will address. The first 
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addresses an understanding of the "Bartleby Syndrome" that college preparation produces 
as something purposeful and harmonious within a broad sphere of social analysis. In 
other words, my goal here is to widen the lens to the point in which aberrations and 
contradictions at local levels are no longer aberrations or contradictions. As Dewey 
suggests in the first epigram to this chapter, it is the "structure of society itself" that is the 
ultimate root of many problems embedded in educational institutions. Crucially, and 
something that receives little attention, it is the term "structure of society itself" that 
points to an area of Dewey's philosophy that gets overlooked: liberalism. For Dewey, in 
addition to whatever else "liberalism" was, it was also a conversation centered on an 
investigation into the ultimate purposes of human lives and an experiment in ways to 
organize society to best realize those purposes. While it may seem odd that Dewey's 
major statement on political theory and liberalism wouldn't be published until 1935 as 
Liberalism and Social Action, many of the major concepts and ideas that coalesce in this 
later work can be seen evolving and, in no insignificant way, undergirding some of 
Dewey's earliest work. This includes his early work in psychology and education. In fact, 
as C. Wright Mills pointed out in his dissertation on Pragmatism1, one of the first courses 
Dewey ever taught at the collegiate level at the University of Michigan was in political 
theory and philosophy (295). Dewey is rightfully termed a philosopher of education, of 
experience, of growth, of democracy, of nature, and of organic unity. However, it may be 
as a philosopher of liberalism that the full implications of Dewey's oeuvre blossom.  
Of course, Dewey's take on liberalism only goes so far, as he died in 1952 and is, 
                                                
1 Later published as Sociology and Pragmatism: The higher learning in America. 
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as such, 60 years removed from our present situations. However, the framework that 
Dewey constructs to discuss liberalism provides a potent backdrop to a discussion of 
what contemporary theorists have termed neo-liberalism. Additionally, as one might 
expect, the liberalism Dewey worked up was not your garden-variety form of liberalism. 
It is in this reconstructed, this renascent liberalism (as Dewey described it) that the full 
importance of education, democracy, and inquiry--themes Dewey had elucidated at 
length in earlier works--start to hang together in some comprehensive philosophical 
project. This is where Dewey's work on liberalism is important: it not only provides a 
broad socio-political framework of understanding institutions like schools and schooling, 
but also points the discussion toward how things can be changed at such broad levels. 
This, then, is the second issue this chapter will address. It is at this second level, a 
Pragmatist critique of liberalism, that more contemporary "neo-pragmatist" conversations 
come back in to view. I will return to these discussions and the renaissance of 
Pragmatism's interest in "democracy" in the second half of this chapter.  
In order to set up this chapter, there are a few preliminary arguments and 
positions I need to stake out. One thing I have consciously avoided to this point is a 
discussion of so called "progressive education." I don't do this to slight the major tenants 
and practices of the progressive movement in education, things that Dewey had no small 
part in fermenting. At a very deep level, I, like Chomsky's quote in the epigram to this 
chapter, feel there's something fundamentally correct about the spirit in which the 
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progressive project was undertaken in education.2 The problem occurs when the methods 
of progressive education become unhinged from the social and political theory that it 
emanates from. I suspect this is the occasion for Dewey's ambivalence about his 
connection to progressive education. Regardless, my project here is not to suggest best 
practices, because I don't think that's the problem. I suggested in the previous chapters 
that the best preparation for college is a purposeful and meaningful education in high 
school. I should add to this now that it isn't that we don't know how to do this, but that 
rather we don't. This itself, though, is not a new or novel concept. Paul Goodman, writing 
in his 1962 book Compulsory Mis-Education, summarizes his understanding of where 
progressive education inevitably failed to live up to its promises:  
[…] this theory [of Dewey's] was entirely perverted when it began to be applied, 
either in private schools or in the public system. The conservatives and the 
businessmen cried out, and the program was toned down. The practical training 
and community democracy, whose purpose was to live scientifically and change 
society, was changed into 'socially useful' subjects and a psychology of 
'belonging.' In our schools, driver-training survives as the type of the 'useful'. (43)  
 
Of course, half of a century later and even driver-training has been privatized in most 
schools. Goodman suggests the direction I will be taking here when he noted that 
"Fundamentally, there is no right education except growing up into a worthwhile world" 
(59). The question is thus one of understanding how teaching, and in particular, the 
teaching of writing, has something to do with fostering a worthwhile world.  
                                                
2 My usage of the term “progressive education” is admittedly problematic here. As many 
have noted, the idea of “progressive education” was contentious the moment it came into 
existence, and was a term that Dewey himself eventually sought to disassociate from his 
work. My usage here is intended to refer to the ideas originating in Dewey’s work, not 
the eventual transformation the term would take when it was put into practice in the 
1930s through the early 1950s. See Kliebard (2004), and Sharp et al (1975) for fuller 
discussions of the evolution of “progressive education.” 
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This leads me to the second position I need to claim for this chapter. Like the 
perpetual "crisis" in literacy, any reading of the history of education at any level reveals a 
history of reform, struggle, and lament. As such, it might be tempting to read any claim 
concerning inadequacies of the status quo as the status quo itself. I fear we are weary of 
these conversations over what is wrong and how things should be. However, as I have 
been suggesting and hinting throughout, I do see the current situation, particularly in the 
way in which "college preparation" guides and regulates the writing environments within 
classrooms, as deeply problematic. My first objective in this chapter is obviously to 
construct a broad framework of understanding the sociopolitical situation we are 
currently in. However, while I will join the chorus of voices who declare problems to 
exist, my main objective is to give us a framework and justification for not being satisfied 
with the way things are. I believe Pragmatism offers a powerful conversation from which 
we can begin conversations over what's wrong and, more importantly, why. 
There is one last claim I need to assert before I start this project. As I noted in the 
introduction, my aim in this work is focused on post-secondary writing instruction. It is 
not my intention or goal to suggest better practices, theories of writing, or even strategies 
for reform in the secondary level. Such things are important and necessary. However, 
they are beyond the scope of my project here. Instead, I will be working to clear the 
theoretical decks, so to speak, in a way that would allow those of us in post-secondary 
writing instruction to play our part in this conversation. After all, we could declare that 
"good writing" at the college level is writing that actively seeks to create a better world, 
writing that does not contribute to discourses of exclusion or discrimination, and writing 
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that can effectively critique the world as we know it now. In short, we could utilize this 
alignment of all writing instruction to "college" for different purposes (and this would 
mean redefining “college” away from its current iterations). In doing so, we could join 
(and not direct) educators at all levels in resisting forms of education that move us further 
away from some vision of schooling for democracy. Doing so, though, requires dealing 
with theoretical impasses that are rooted in the western tradition of liberalism that make 
such work difficult to undertake.  
I will start this work through discussion of liberalism itself via Dewey's historical 
account of liberalism. In doing so, I will continue Dewey's work and connect up with 
contemporary discussions concerning neo-liberalism. Importantly, it will be here that I 
will locate the literacy practice I have been referring to as the Bartleby Syndrome as 
purposeful within this context. At this point, I will turn to the major commitments and 
one contradiction that lie at the heart of Western liberalism. One manifestation of 
liberalism I will explore is what I refer to as the imperative to "honor thy student" and the 
influence it exerts in thinking about writing instruction. As I will demonstrate through a 
re-reading of two major debates in composition theory, this "honor-maxim" has been one 
of the major axis upon which theorizing writing instruction at the post-secondary levels 
has turned as well as a serious impasse. In addressing the question of how to move 
beyond this impasse, I will be catching up to contemporary Pragmatists such as Robert 
Talisse and Cheryl Misak who have turned not only to Dewey, but to Peirce and his 
conception of inquiry as a major missing piece in how we think about getting out of the 
conundrums of liberalism that all of education, and especially writing instruction, finds 
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itself mired in. 
 
What is Liberalism? A Preliminary account of two commitments and one 
contradiction 
 
 Within colloquial speech, the term liberalism generally denotes center-left 
partisan politics, typically associated with the Democratic party after the New Deal 
legislation. This conception of liberalism is typically contrasted by the term conservatism 
and its accordant base within the Republican party. This colloquial usage of liberal and 
liberalism is not what I will be referring to throughout this chapter. Instead, as Dewey 
and other Pragmatists use it, liberalism is a set of traditions, values, beliefs, and 
guidelines that serve as the ground rules from which human beings can make sense of the 
world around them as well as determine how they must interact with that world. It 
provides particular meanings to words, supplies concepts to philosophies, and in general 
orders and arranges our existence. Liberalism, then, is a world-view, a conceptual 
framework, a discursive ideology. More importantly, liberalism has been the basis for 
nearly all political, social, ethical and religious theorizing in western cultures for the past 
400 years. As such, it is the dominant worldview of most western cultures. It is so 
dominant, in fact, that many assertions, claims, and commitments of liberalism are 
understood as "common sense" or "natural" for those within this framework. As Robert 
Talisse writes, "Liberalism [...] denotes a distinctive collection of philosophical claims 
about how a state must be ordered if it is to be legitimate" (16). I would extend this 
statement beyond legitimation of the state to a larger discussion that liberalism seeks to 
theorize: the ultimate purpose of human life and how to organize societies to realize this 
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purpose. In this, as Dewey points out, the larger project of liberalism is a continuation of 
a conversation within political philosophy that stretches all the way back to Plato in The 
Republic (and perhaps beyond) (LW 11:7). What makes liberalism distinctive and 
different from, say Aristotle's understanding that the polis is prior and generative of 
individual eudaimonia, is liberalism's unwavering claim that the individual is the primary 
unit of social analysis, action, and morality.  
 This assertion, the root of liberalism, was articulated by John Stuart Mill in the 
introduction to his classic work On Liberty when he wrote that "[t]he only freedom which 
deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way" (14).  While Mill 
was not the first person to come up with this idea, his simplistic maxim captured two of 
the most important aspects of liberalism. First, that each individual should be free to 
decide what is "good" for themselves. Second, that each individual should be able to 
decide what was the best way to go about obtaining this good. These two assertions went 
beyond simple freedom from restrictions to actually assert a "positive freedom." This 
asserted that each individual was free to discover their own conception of what was good 
as well as to seek out ways to realize this good in their lives. The primacy of the 
individual underscores liberalism's ability to upend and transform virtually all human 
understandings of reality.  
 To 21st century minds, this idea is so commonsensical that it might seem quaint. 
While I will discuss this at length in the next section, what should be remembered is that 
at the time liberalism was taking center stage, questions over what is "good" for an 
individual and how that good should be obtained were dominated by powerful, 
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centralized forces in society. Instead of individuals being allowed to "pursue their own 
good in their own way," centralized forms of power like the Catholic Church and 
monarchical governments decreed what these "goods" would be and how subjects should 
pursue them. Seen in this light, liberalism was a radical and potent revolutionary idea that 
sought to undermine the power of centralized state power. After all, what power would a 
king have over his subjects if the subjects had the freedom to decide for themselves how 
to live? While "democracy" and "liberalism" are not one and the same, the modern form 
of Democracy we are familiar with arose as a response to how to govern a society once 
such centralized state power was destroyed. 
 With this we can start to pull apart a more specific, more technical definition of 
"liberalism." Stemming from Mill's statement, the first thing we can say about liberalism 
is that it places the individual at the center of all social theorizing. By this, liberal thinkers 
assert that no group membership can ever fully capture the "essence" of who or what a 
person is. Or, in other words, we cannot understand someone by looking at what "group" 
they are a part of simply because every individual is at all times a member of multiple 
groups. Because of this, we cannot appeal to a person's membership in one group or 
another as a means to decide what is best for them and how they should live their lives. 
This brings us to the second thing we can say about liberalism: what is good for an 
individual is always prior and more important than what is good for a group. This second 
assertion has been hotly debated, but even in instances where a person "gives their life" to 
a group or an organization (such as joining the military, participating in a religion, etc), 
this is always done on a voluntary basis within liberalism. Or, in other words, no one is 
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ever "forced" to do these things; they do it as a "choice." 
 We have now two major commitments of liberalism: 1, the individual is the 
primary unit of social understanding; and 2, the good of and for the individual is always 
prior and more important than the good of any group. Hidden within these commitments 
is a rather major contradiction that has served as the problem that liberal theorists have 
sought to work around. Interestingly, John Stuart Mill articulated this contradiction with 
uncommon clarity in the very same sentence that he articulated the crux of liberalism. 
The full sentence alluded to above goes like this: "The only freedom which deserves the 
name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to 
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. " We can state this 
contradiction in a slightly different way: how are we to adjudicate between two 
conflicting conceptions of what is "good?" Liberalism, in emphasizing the individual, 
gives us no way to say that person A has the right idea and person B has the wrong idea, 
especially when those two ideas come into conflict with each other. For example, one 
person might decide that what is best for them is to be as wealthy as they possible can be. 
However, to obtain this wealth, this person must prevent other people from realizing the 
same goal. And here we have the conflict that Mill cautioned us against. As long as 
conflicts don't happen, there's no problem with individuals each deciding what is best for 
them. However, in complex modern societies, conflicts are an unavoidable fact of life. 
Attempts to resolve the contradiction of conflict in liberal societies has been at the heart 
of almost all political, ethical, moral, and religious theorizing in the past 300 years, 
including educational philosophy, pedagogy, and indeed, the major warrants under much 
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(if not all) thinking about writing instruction. To understand how Dewey and Peirce point 
toward a way out of this contradiction, we first must step back and read "liberalism" 
through the eyes of Dewey. 
 
Dewey's History of Liberalism 
 As a recent special issue in Radical History Review demonstrated, it is important 
to trace the origins of contemporary economic-political-philosophical movements in 
order to fully understand their nature.3 Without such narratives or histories of ideas, the 
social, political, and historical contexts from which they develop cannot be taken into 
account, effectively creating a situation where critique and resistance is hamstrung. At 
stake in this particular issue is "neo-liberalism," the name often given to describe the 
current state and nature of liberalism. As the authors in this special section note, how 
exactly we are to understand "neo-liberalism" is far from settled. This shifting terrain and 
subsequent search for solid explanatory ground has been echoed by many other writers 
from many different areas, from Wendy Brown to David Harvey to Henry Giroux. 
Dewey was no different, and had produced his own account of "liberalism" in a historical 
account in an attempt to distill just exactly what it was, what it meant, and what relevance 
it might have. As such, Dewey opened his 1935 Liberalism and Social Action by 
describing the fall from grace that "liberalism" had experienced. As he noted, while once 
a term that was one of praise, it had become one that was called "mealy-mouthed, a milk-
and-water doctrine" (LW 11:6). This, for Dewey, sets up the project:  
                                                
3 See in particular Bockman’s essay “The Long Road to 1989: Neoclassical Economics, 
Alternative Socialisms, and the Advent of Neoliberalism” for fuller discussion. 
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It is hardly possible to refrain from asking what liberalism really is; what 
elements, if any, of permanent value it contains, and how these values shall be 
maintained and developed in the conditions the world now faces. [...] I have 
wanted to find out whether it is possible for a person to continue, honestly and 
intelligently, to be a liberal, and if the answer be in the affirmative, what kind of 
liberal faith should be asserted today (LW 11:7).  
 
From here, Dewey sets up his method: to not necessarily account for the differences that 
various versions of liberalism have had over its history (of which, Dewey is quick to 
note, are sometimes contradictory with each other), but to discern the similarities such 
iterations of liberalism have had. 
 Dewey begins this project by tracing the roots of liberalism back to John Locke. 
Like Thomas Hobbes thirty-eight years before him, Locke understood the formation and 
legitimacy of a government as being a function of some sort of agreement, arrangement, 
or social contract. Additionally, Locke agreed with Hobbes that without a government, 
there was too much danger of conflict between people and further, any form of organized 
government was a sort of necessary evil. However, very much unlike Hobbes, Locke 
worked to refute the idea that there is such a thing as a single person that is ordained by 
God itself to rule as an absolute monarch. Further, Locke parted ways with Hobbes by 
describing the "natural" state of humans as being one defined by "perfect freedom" and 
the qualities or "rights" that existed prior to the formation of a government. Among these 
natural rights were, of course, "life, liberty, and estate."  
 This distinction is absolutely crucial. Since Hobbes had a very pessimistic view of 
human nature, he focused mostly on ways to repress it. Consequently, for Hobbes, the 
only reason for a government to exist was to protect individuals from harming each other. 
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Therefore, other than performing this function, there were no limits or restrictions on 
what monarchs could do to their subjects. Government, then, was a sort of necessary evil 
or an imposition brought on by the nastiness of human nature itself. Since Locke 
understood the state of individual human nature prior to government as being inherently 
perfect (yet logistically problematic), then the only legitimate role of a government was 
to protect the natural rights humans had prior to the formation of a civil society. 
Consequently, there were now limits to what a government could and could not do: 
namely, to protect the specific individual natural rights of life, liberty, and property. In 
this framework, the sole legitimate purpose of government was to safeguard this 
individualism. When governments failed engage in this safeguarding (or worse, worked 
against it), a government was to then be considered illegitimate. The implications of this 
were far reaching. Not only did these ideas fuel the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 which 
saw the transition of Britain from an absolutist monarchy to a parliamentarian monarchy 
as we know it today, but these ideas were later recycled by a group of artisans and 
merchants in the American colonies to form what we now know of as the American 
Revolution. 
 We can describe Locke's philosophy as a sort of fairy tale story: Mankind enters 
the world as an individual, and this individual is perfect, ideal, and endowed with "natural 
rights" from a higher power. However, these natural rights become threatened when 
individuals are forced to deal with other individuals. Therefore, mankind institutes a 
"government" to ensure that these natural rights are protected. When a government fails 
to adequately protect these natural rights, then it is the responsibility of the individuals to 
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reject that government and form a new government. Therefore, this form of liberalism 
stands for the freedom of the individual that is protected by a government that is 
answerable to that individual. Or, in other words, government "belongs" to and is 
responsible to the individual and not the other way around. Prior to this, governments did 
not have to answer to the individual and could (and often did) impose taxes without 
representation from those it was taking taxes from. If this sounds very familiar, it should. 
As noted before, it is this exact flavor of liberalism that went on to influence the fathers 
of the American Revolution that ultimately set up the United States of America. 
 It is here that Dewey starts to pull together an understanding of "liberalism" as 
defined by the historical and political conditions that Locke was responding to. As he 
notes:  
The whole temper of this philosophy is individualistic in the sense in which 
individualism is opposed to organized social action. It held to the primacy of the 
individual over the state not only in time but in moral authority. It defined the 
individual in terms of liberties of thought and action already possessed by him in 
some mysterious ready-made fashion, and which it was the sole business of the 
state to safeguard. Reason was also made an inherent endowment of the 
individual, expressed in men's moral relations to one another, but not sustained 
and developed because of these relations. It followed that the great enemy of 
individual liberty was thought to be government because of its tendency to 
encroach upon the innate liberties of individuals. (LW 11:8,9). 
 
What emerges from Dewey's interpretation of Locke's philosophy is a theme concerning 
the relationship of "individualism" to "organized social action." It is not too far off the 
mark to notice how similar this is in regard to the agon between "agency" and "social 
structure" that was explored in the third chapter. Not to foreshadow too much, but the 
moves Dewey will make here will be remarkably similar to what we saw in the third 
chapter. Regardless, Dewey suggests that tied up in this early form of liberalism are a few 
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things that are rife with implications for how "liberalism" would subsequently change and 
evolve.  
 In this form of liberalism, the function of government was to protect the freedom 
of the individuals. But what do we mean by "freedom" here? Locke had a fairly specific 
answer. First was "life." That is, humans had a right to not be killed by other humans. In 
other words, a monarch could not arbitrarily decide to cut off someone's head simply 
because they felt like it. Second was "liberty." By "liberty," Lock referred to the right of 
an individual to not be coerced by force into thinking or doing something against their 
will. Third was estates or "property." By property, Locke referred to the right to "own" 
anything that was the product of an individual's own labor. In other words, when an 
individual took raw material and made something out of it, it became their property. 
Interestingly, Locke also had in mind that the entire life of an individual could be 
considered "property" as well. Lastly, in Locke's view, since the individual is inherently 
ideal and perfect, it exist in an antagonistic relationship with any form of organized social 
life (which Locke thought threatened to encroach upon individual rights). Or, more 
simply, organized social action was, in Locke's definition, automatically less ideal than 
the individual unit. As Dewey is careful to point out, Locke's deep resentment and 
distrust toward government has to be understood within the historical context in which he 
was writing. At this time, power was located within one individual (the king or queen) 
who claimed authority of rule through God itself. Power was absolute, beyond question, 
and above all, answerable to no one but the monarch themselves. To openly question 
authority in such times was often punishable by death. In this environment, as Dewey 
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pointed out, Locke's immediate purpose was to uphold tolerance and reason in an era 
saturated with intolerance and blind faith in authority (LW 11:8).  
 It is in this last aspect of "freedom" that Locke mentions--estate--that sees the 
critical turning point upon which Liberalism evolved. As he noted in regard to "estate" 
and Locke's theory of value, "The importance attached to the right of property within the 
political area was without doubt an influence in the later definitely economic formulation 
of liberalism. But Locke was interested in property already possessed. A century later 
industry and commerce were sufficiently advanced in Great Britain so that interest 
centered in production of wealth, rather than in its possession" (LW 11:9). Dewey sees 
three important results of this. The first is the final dissolution of old feudal laws and 
systems that denied any sort of decentralized monetary system. In a sense, what was a 
static economic system morphed into a purely dynamic system. However, and this brings 
us to the second important result, to be dynamic meant that any sort of rigidity in laws, 
customs, and regulations had to be done away with. That is, for a market to function in a 
dynamic way, any sort of static rule was to be seen as the enemy and removed. This is the 
impetus behind theories of laissez faire economics. Essentially, in this view, a market 
best functions when it has total freedom to evolve as it needs to. As Dewey points out, 
the philosophy of Adam Smith--while not advocating laissez faire--suggested a very 
different notion of "freedom:" "the activity of individuals, freed as far as possible from 
political restriction, is the chief source of social welfare and the ultimate spring of social 
progress" (LW 11:10). This, then, is the third important result of this shift from 
possession of wealth to production: rights of freedom and liberty were extended from 
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human beings to decidedly non-human economic forces.  
 It is from this stage that Dewey moves into a lengthy discussion of how 
"liberalism" as an economic and political philosophy, also became a sort of cultural 
philosophy, moving into areas such as ethics, morality, public policy, and even religion. 
By the 19th century, as Dewey pointed out, "Natural law was still regarded as something 
more fundamental than man-made law, which by comparison is artificial. But natural 
laws lost their remote moral meaning. They were identified with the laws of free 
industrial production and free commercial exchange" (LW 11:11). In other words, the 
concept of individual liberation from outside control had become, for the most part, 
subjugated to the liberation of economic markets from regulation and control. In 
somewhat of a reversal, many (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Thomas 
Malthus, etc) believed that a free and uncontrolled economic market would, on its own, 
provide for the liberation of the individual. The way in which this would ideally occur is 
not readily visible and takes some theoretical magic to get from A to B. In its hyper-
idealistic form, the market is a space in which commodities are exchanged. Commodities 
come to have value based on what they can be exchanged for. Because there are many 
commodities in the marketplace, the value of each individual commodity is dependent on 
a complex network of factors which are all contingent upon each other including one 
central concept: competition. In other words, value cannot be declared prior to a 
commodity's entrance into the market and is dependent on what else is going on in the 
market at a specific point in time. This mechanism of determining value was deemed to 
be superior to all other methods of determining value simply because the effects of 
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"competition" drove values (i.e., prices) to their natural levels. This is where concepts 
such as "supply and demand" as well as "value, use-value, and exchange-value" all come 
into play. What is important for us is the way in which the market was believed to be 
decentralized, self-correcting, and free from human bias, much like the scientific method 
was heralded in a very similar way. As Dewey notes in discussing the French physiocrats, 
their "underlying philosophy was the idea that economic laws are the true natural laws 
while other laws are artificial and hence to be limited in scope as far as possible" (LW 
11:11). This relied upon the historical situation in which land was the primary focus of 
economic production. However, as Dewey notes, it wasn't all that difficult to transpose 
such concepts onto labor, something the burgeoning industrial revolution made 
necessary. The result was a search for the "natural laws" of labor, something requiring a 
conception of "laws of human nature." Dewey points out that for Adam Smith, two 
things were thought to be the foundations of all human nature: sympathy and self-interest. 
Crucially, as Dewey notes, "In individuals, the exercise of sympathy in accordance with 
reason (that is, in Smith's conception, from the standpoint of an impartial spectator) is the 
norm of virtuous action. But government cannot appeal to sympathy. The only measures 
it can employ affect the motive of self-interest. It makes this appeal most effectively 
when it acts so as to protect individuals in the exercise of their natural self-interest" (LW 
11:12). This leads Dewey to Bentham and, importantly, J.S. Mill, whose formulation of 
"liberty" was discussed in the previous section. 
 While Dewey is careful to note that Bentham, Mill, and others "were [not] moved 
by hope of material gain," he nonetheless points out that "the constant expansion of 
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manufacturing and trade put the force of a powerful class interest behind the new version 
of liberalism" and that those behind this version of liberalism "might have been as voices 
crying in the wilderness if what they taught had not coincided with the interests of a class 
that was constantly rising in prestige and power" (LW 11:13). Dewey, though, is not 
content to simply throw the baby out with the bathwater. His assessment of Bentham's 
utilitarian doctrine points to the position Dewey will ultimately appeal to in his own 
vision of liberalism. As he points out, most of what Bentham advocated for in regard to 
legislation were "negative," or to remove things that might stand in the pursuit of 
pleasure. Regardless, and importantly, Dewey notes that "there was nothing in 
[Bentham's] fundamental doctrine that stood in the way of using the power of government 
to create, constructively and positively, new institutions if and when it should appear that 
the latter would contribute more effectively to the well-being of individuals" (LW 11:14, 
emphasis mine). In short, what Dewey is pointing toward is a shift from individualistic 
liberalism to collectivistic liberalism. 
 If we go back to the original iteration of "liberalism" as a means to "liberate" 
individuals from kings and queens who ruled with absolute and unchecked authority, we 
can understand the common thread that ties these different forms of liberalism together. 
While the "liberation" of the economic market was the next step of this original idea, over 
time the market itself was seen by many to have taken the place of the kings and queens 
of earlier generations. Eventually, by the early parts of the 20th century, and what Dewey 
is pointing toward, the concept of "liberalism" evolved to mean the liberation of 
individuals from the tyranny of the free market. In a sense, Dewey, like many others who 
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had witnessed first hand the horrors of the other side of the industrial revolution, saw 
classical liberalism as replacing absolute monarchs with a similarly tyrannical force: the 
free market itself. It is worth recalling that a major formative moment in Dewey's 
intellectual development was his very direct encounter with the 1894 Pullman Strike in 
Chicago. However, as Dewey suggests, the answer to unchecked and absolute power was 
the same: to control it. To do this, though, this new form of liberalism in the twentieth 
century took a very different position towards organized social action and government. 
Unlike previous forms of liberalism that saw the individual as needing to be protected 
from government, this new form of liberalism might see government, labor unions, and 
other forms of collective social action as the ideal mechanisms through which the 
conditions for individual freedom could be created and protected from other forces, 
including the free market itself. 
 From this point on, more and more of Dewey's work starts to cohere within this 
tradition. As he writes, "Bentham himself urged a great extension of public education and 
of action in behalf of public health. When he disallowed the doctrine of inalienable 
individual natural rights, he removed, as far as theory is concerned, the obstacle to 
positive action by the state whenever it can be shown that the general well-being will be 
promoted by such action" (LW 11:18). It is worth considering Dewey's earlier work in 
education and democracy in light of his claim regarding the collectivistic liberalism he 
described as the most recent evolution of the tradition. For example in describing the 
faults of reading instruction in his essay “The Primary-Education Fetich,”4 Dewey 
                                                
4 First published in 1898. 
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pointed out that “It is futile to try to conceal from ourselves the fact that this great change 
in the intellectual atmosphere—this great change in the relation of the individual to 
accumulated knowledge—demands a corresponding educational readjustment” (EW 
5:258). “This great change” that Dewey refers to is mirrored in his understanding of how 
liberalism itself was changing, particularly in the locus of the “individual” at the center of 
social analysis. As he wrote some 37 years later, these thoughts were still present in his 
thinking on education: "Only by participating in the common intelligence and sharing in 
the common purpose as it works for the common good can individual human beings 
realize their true individualities and become truly free" (LW 11:21). The question for 
Dewey, then, was not so much whether the state could engage in positive action, but 
rather how it might best do so.  
 At the end of Dewey's assessment of liberalism's origins and the current state of it 
in 1938, he noted that a split had developed within the tradition. On one side were  
those who call themselves liberals who define liberalism in terms of the old 
opposition between the province of organized social action and the province of 
purely individual initiative and effort. In the name of liberalism they are jealous of 
every extension of governmental activity [...] they are the confirmed enemies of 
social legislation (even prohibition of child labor), as standing measures of 
political policy. Wittingly or unwittingly, they still provide the intellectual system 
of apologetics for the existing economic regime, which they strangely, it would 
seem ironically, uphold as a régime of individual liberty for all. (LW 11:22)  
 
Dewey, perhaps unrealistically optimistic, suggested this group had run out of steam and 
that "the majority who call themselves liberals today are committed to the principle that 
organized society must use its powers to establish the conditions under which the mass of 
individuals can possess actual as distinct from merely legal liberty" (LW 11:22). Of 
course, he was wrong about this, and the pendulum would swing decidedly far away from 
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where Dewey thought liberalism might go. Despite this, his understanding of this "older" 
liberalism is incredibly helpful in understanding the contemporary reiteration of it: neo-
liberalism. It is from this vantage point that the contradictions in literacy education--and 
in particular the Bartleby Syndrome as result of college preparation--resolve and can be 
fully explained. I move to a brief discussion of this in the next section. 
 
 
Bartleby the Writer: a neo-liberal story 
 We can see an incomplete vision of Dewey's form of liberalism that picked up 
steam in the late 1880s and 1890s and was in full bloom by the New Deal policies of the 
Roosevelt administration of the 1930s. Forms of organized social action (government, 
labor unions, etc) were seen as a space through which the conditions for liberation could 
be created and maintained. While this may seem like a complete departure from Locke, 
remember that part of what Locke saw as a fundamental right was the liberty to improve 
the quality of one’s own life. When modern capitalism failed to provide for this on its 
own, writers and thinkers began to suggest a different way of thinking about organized 
social action. Another part of this reversal from government as the enemy to government 
as the solution must be understood by the advancement of 20th century theories of 
democracy. The problems with absolutist monarchies as well as the "free market" were 
located in their manifestly undemocratic natures. That is, government wouldn't be 
necessarily evil if it was truly controlled by mass society (aka, “popular sovereignty”). 
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become a barrier to realizing individual liberation. Of course, this meant that 
governments had to be under the control of mass society and not a few individuals, thus 
necessitating modern inventions like mandatory mass education and a freedom of the 
press. Ideally, in this formulation, while government may prohibit certain freedoms of 
individuals (such as not allowing the freedom for business owners to employ children), 
this was acceptable because everyone was allowed to have a meaningful role in coming 
to this decision. In practice, though, this been a problematic idea to realize. 
 Regardless, and as I mentioned before, this is how Dewey's work in education and 
democracy (two things that should never be disassociated from each other) should be 
understood. For example, Dewey's laboratory school at the University of Chicago from 
1895 to 1905 was not just an experiment in education, it was an experiment in finding the 
best ways to produce the democratic mind via fixing habits of inquiry within individuals. 
The point? Creating the necessary institutional conditions for this new form of liberalism 
to work--and by work I mean to have validity, legitimation, and a self-correcting 
mechanism of inquiry-focused democracy at its core. Consider Dewey's book length 
response to Walter Lippman's broadside salvo against participatory democracy fired in 
Lippman's The Phantom Public. In The Public and its Problems, Dewey recognizes that 
Lippman is fundamentally correct in his assertion that the omnicompetent citizen does 
not exist and that the individual cannot possibly be able to respond intelligently to all 
problems in modern life: things are simply too complex. Dewey faith in democracy, 
though, remains unshaken. The problem with Lippman's reliance on experts, as Dewey 
points out, is that they cannot know what is best for those they represent. As Dewey, was 
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fond of pointing out, "The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where 
it pinches" (LW 2:365). Dewey's work was to create the conditions in which a reliance on 
expertise, at least in regard certain non-technical problems--namely, ethical and moral 
problems of contemporary life--was minimized or done away with.  
 I'll return to Dewey's method for doing this later in this chapter. However, as we 
know in 2012, history took a different route. As Christopher Newfield points out in his 
Unmaking the Public University, post-war politics and economics in the United States 
faced a rather stark choice. In the rear view mirror were two painful events that no one 
was keen on reliving: the Great Depression and World War II (27). In the first instance, 
the Great Depression was widely seen as the result of a completely un-regulated market 
economy. That is, there were no protections or safeguards built into a system to prevent it 
from completely failing. Once things started to go bad, there were few if any ways to stop 
it. While the Second World War was largely responsible for shocking stagnant economies 
into movement (mostly through controlling war economies through centralized 
institutions of power), the horrors of war and the crimes committed by totalitarian 
governments (e.g., Germany, Japan, Italy, etc) were seen as something else to be avoided 
at all costs. The question was how to avoid the extreme of a completely un-controlled 
market while at the same time avoiding a completely totalitarian / authoritarian 
government. This post-war arrangement, heavily influenced by the theories of British 
economist John Maynard Keynes, placed the economy as an element subject to larger 
social goals. These larger social goals were then the domain of government to be 
controlled through democratic action. In other words, the market would be shaped and 
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directed by government (via mass society) for certain ends.  
 The result of this arrangement, something known as embedded liberalism, upheld 
the workings of the market while making sure the market was used for socially desirable 
goods (Harvey 12). For a while, this arrangement appeared to deliver exactly what it 
promised. It produced affluence and wealth while at the same time avoiding many of the 
pitfalls that earlier unregulated markets experienced. Additionally, the mass affluence this 
arrangement produced made possible several social movements (Newfield 27). Among 
these movements was the civil rights movement as well as the open admissions 
experiment in higher-education. Eventually, though, the dramatic growth experienced in 
the post-war years began to drop off. While the actual reasons behind this decline of 
growth are hotly debated by historians and economists, what is important for us here is 
that this crisis lead to the movement that we now refer to as neo-liberalism. 
 Neo-liberalism refers to both a political and economic theory as well as a social 
theory. The prefix neo refers a form of liberalism that is a re-introduction of a previous 
form of liberalism. This liberalism that neo-liberalism returns to is classical liberalism. 
However, unlike the classical liberalism of the 19th century, neo-liberalism relies upon a 
strong government to promote and protect the interests of the markets. If we put this on a 
very crude historical timeline, it will look something like this: 
• Lockean liberalism (1689-1817): protect the natural rights of the individual from 
governments 
• Classical liberalism (1817-1928): protect the natural rights of the market (and thus 
the individual) from governments. 
• Progressive liberalism (1929-1968): protect the natural rights of the individual 
from the market through using government. 
• Neo-liberalism (1970s-present): The modern re-emergence of beliefs based on 
classical liberalism that protects markets via a strong (often undemocratic) 
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government. 
 
"Neo-liberalism" then, is a term used to describe a very particular social, cultural, 
political and economic philosophy in contemporary times based on classical liberalism. It 
is also a term used to describe the impact of that philosophy on modern life. As Marxist 
geographer David Harvey chronicles in his A Brief History of Neoliberalism, in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, major political players in several countries (Ronald Reagan in the 
US, Margaret Thatcher in the UK, Deng Xiaoping in China) unleashed a series of 
economic and political reforms that were claimed to help reverse the sagging global 
economy of the 1970s. These reforms centered on removing many of the restrictions on 
corporations and businesses introduced during the embedded liberalism arrangement of 
the post-war years. This was done in the belief that if business owners, corporations, and 
other forms of commerce were freed from restrictions and regulations, they would be 
"free" to be creative and find new ways to bring the economy back on track. This was 
seen as a necessary condition for a utopian society. In very simplistic terms, the idea was 
that if corporations could be free from restrictions, they would flourish and thus make 
money for the upper class. Eventually, because the economy would be expanding, this 
prosperity would eventually "trickle-down" to the rest of society, thus resulting in 
betterment for all. Underneath these reforms was a conviction that any form of collective 
social action was axiomatically inferior to market based solutions to problems. Therefore, 
any sort of "public" or "collective" force in society was to be dismantled. This includes 
labor unions, corporate regulations (e.g., regulations on the airline industry), and 
important to our concerns, public education. Replacing these public and collective 
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institutions were to be private institutions that were fully subject to market forces.  
 While much of this was a simple return to ideas developed by 19th century 
classical liberal theorists, there was one very important difference. Unlike classical 
liberalism, this brand of liberalism sought to exploit the power of the state to bring about 
these changes. This was made possible by co-opting the bureaucracy developed in the 
embedded liberalism era of the post-war years and using it for a different purpose. In this, 
a sort of government known as the "neo-liberal state" came into being. Harvey identifies 
several very specific roles of this neo-liberal government (79-81): 
• To prevent regulation and to actively disassemble any forms of public 
(democratic) control over the market 
• To maintain free markets and if no market exists, to create one 
• To create and maintain a structure of trade for consumers through monetary 
policy 
• To create and maintain a form of exchange, like money, that is guaranteed by the 
state to be used in the market.  
• To create and enforce legal structures that protects private property (that is, things 
that exist beyond the reach of democratic control). 
 
As mentioned above, these changes were instituted under the idea that they would revive 
the world economy and eventually bring prosperity to everyone. The actual result of these 
changes weighed against the belief that they would bring prosperity to the masses, 
though, has been nothing short of disastrous. They have been so disastrous, in fact, that 
many theorists now see neo-liberalism not as a way to help revive the economy, but 
rather as a way for the traditional elite ruling classes to reclaim much of the power they 
lost to the middle-classes in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, from the 1970s and on, 
the relative share of the top 1% of society has dramatically increased to about 20-25% of 
the total wealth in America. If we look at total assets instead of mere "income," the 
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numbers are even more skewed: the top 1% possesses a whopping 35% of all assets in the 
US. More shockingly, the percentage of wealth the top 0.1% possesses has risen from 2% 
in the 1970s to around 6% in the late 1990s. However, this increase in wealth for the top 
income earners in the US did not come from a massive increase of production. Instead, 
what has occurred is a phenomenon referred to by Harvey as accumulation by 
dispossession (160-164). In other words, for the top income earners to increase their 
wealth, assets were redistributed from other portions of society. Since the bottom 40% of 
America is in so much poverty that they can, frankly, go no further down into poverty, 
much of the wealth acquired during this time for the top 1% came at the expense of those 
who came in between 40-80%--that is, the "middle class." This "middle-class squeeze" is 
one of the defining features of neo-liberalism, and another reason why theorists see the 
rise of neo-liberalism to in actuality, be the restoration of elite class power at the expense 
of the burgeoning, increasingly highly educated middle-class. 
 Once a majority of voters accepted the basic premises of neoliberalism (often 
while not understanding the implications), the rise and dominance of neoliberalism was 
secured. For example, while Ronald Reagan, a socially conservative Republican, was the 
first truly "neoliberal" president, all presidents of the United States since then have 
adopted the basic premises of neoliberalism both in economic and political areas. This 
includes Democrats Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. In other words, outside of a few 
very rare exceptions, and to borrow a phrase from Nixon, we are all neoliberals now. It is 
also here that we can see another dimension of neo-liberalism. As Wendy Brown notes, 
neo-liberalism is not just a "a bundle of economic policies with inadvertent political and 
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social consequences" (38). Rather, "neo-liberalism carries a social analysis which, when 
deployed as a form of governmentality, reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to 
education policy to practices of empire" (39). I do not think it is too controversial at this 
point to argue that, to slightly modify Bowles and Gintis's insight that the structure of 
capitalism can be seen in schools, that as liberalism goes, so goes education.  
 In the realm of education and literacy instruction, neoliberalism has dramatically 
changed the landscape in two primary ways. First, the push to privatize all areas of 
society have lead to decreasing levels of public funding and support for education. The 
rise of private charter schools and an increasing dependency on tuition at public 
universities are two high profile examples of this move. In regard to the rise in student 
tuition, this is done under the belief that it is the responsibility of each student to pay for 
their education (tuition) as opposed to society as a whole to help foot the bill for 
education through taxes. Charter schools are claimed to be superior to public schools 
because they, unlike public school systems, respond directly to economic markets.  
 The second major shift currently taking place within education concerns the 
ultimate purpose of education itself. Each iteration of "liberalism" has entailed a specific 
role and function for education. The rise of public education in the United States in the 
19th century coincided with the period of classical liberalism. One of the main reasons 
for the establishment and rise of public education was to ensure that students who could 
not afford private academies (namely, immigrants) were taught to respect and obey the 
  261 
basic tenants of classical liberalism.5 In particular, teaching immigrants to respect 
"private property" was a major concern of early educational reformers in the United 
States, who were afraid that massive influxes of immigrants would upset the traditional 
ruling order of the United States. During the era of progressive liberalism, and where 
Dewey's work in education reaches its zenith, the belief that mass society would be 
responsible for directing and controlling the economy for the benefit of society required a 
highly educated base of citizens who were each capable of informed decisions through 
democratic means. The demands of this arrangement necessitated producing students 
who were capable of responding to a wide variety of challenges through public 
participation in politics. In very practical terms, this meant an emphasis on wide areas of 
knowledge (liberal arts education) that citizens would be able to draw upon when called 
to help formulate social policy. Or, more bluntly, students were educated to be part of the 
decision making process in society. Dewey's concept of the ideal school as associated 
living itself where students didn't just prepare for adulthood, but lived adult 
circumstances in a guided environment is a consequence of this need. 
 Under neoliberalism, however, the market is seen as the primary mechanism 
through which decisions should be made, since it is theoretically free of individual bias 
and thus how it seeks to attain legitimation by sidestepping individual antagonism 
(Harvey 65). This arrangement demands not citizens as well-informed decision makers 
but rather requires citizens to enter into the market as buyers and sellers. In other words, 
neoliberalism demands mass society to be consumers while reserving a few seats at the 
                                                
5 See in particular Reese’s The Origins of the American High School for further 
discussion 
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top for the "captains of the industry" to organize market forces. One highly visible shift in 
education has been an increased connection between education and instrumentalist aims 
on the part of students. Or, to put that another way, that students see education as a means 
to successfully enter the marketplace through learning job skills that can later be "cashed 
in" for gainful employment after college. This stands in stark contrast to the view of 
education as a "humanizing" endeavor, or even education as preparation for civic 
participation. Further, because of the near dominance of neoliberalism, students who wish 
to pursue education for other means are often forced into this instrumentalist mode 
simply because the structure of society necessitates it. 
 In the realm of curriculum, the rise of standardized testing within education (most 
visibly seen in the landmark No Child Left Behind legislation) has corresponded with a 
brand of education that emphases 
memorization and mastery of skills 
(measured by performance on tests) 
over creativity and critical thinking 
(things which cannot be fully 
measured on standardized tests). In 
particular, the NCLB legislation 
was touted as a way to increase 
personal responsibility and 
accountability for schools, conditions 
seen as necessary for increasing 
Figure 5.1 
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school efficiency and productivity, all of which fall under the aegis of neoliberal 
thinking.6 The drive to measure student performance according to standardized tests and 
objective measurements has lead to a renewed emphasis on grammatical / mechanical 
correctness, basic writing "skills," and knowledge of market friendly genres. This has all 
come at the expense of writing instruction concerned with the actual content of student 
writing. Since decisions over the purpose and direction of the economy are, in neoliberal 
thinking, best left to the market itself, writing instruction has increasingly focused on 
preparing students to "write well" within the confines of the workplace, as opposed to 
writing well for the purpose of civic participation (see figure 5.1).7 
 Enter Bartleby. As I outlined in the very first chapter, there is an undeniable 
democratic element in various forms of writing, particularly in various process and 
workshop models of writing instruction. The idea--while problematic in some ways--that 
the most important part of writing is the process through which ideas, meaning, value, 
and purpose might be born out of an environment of associated living simply cannot be 
sustained under a system of neoliberal social analysis and rationality. In fact, neoliberal 
rationality is antithetical to the idea that human intelligence should be nurtured, as 
opposed to the utilization of markets. In other words, one way we might sum up the non-
economic aspect of neoliberalism is that it defers rather than deploys human intelligence. 
Of course, this is a highly spurious claim, as what is really going on is that the utilization 
of intelligence is reserved for a very select few who control the markets that other people 
                                                
6 Of course, this appeal to “efficiency” itself has a very long history within education, as 
chronicled in Callahan’s Education and the Cult of Efficiency. 
7 I snapped this picture of a poster in a junior high English classroom in 2006. 
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then utilize instead of intelligence.  
 This is what is lost with the Bartleby Syndrome. In creating environments in 
which the process of writing is alien to the activity of writing in schools--where it simply 
makes no sense to do anything other than "get it done"--writing is still produced, but the 
byproduct of experiences through which meaning is produced through associated living is 
shed. This is no small matter. As discussed in the first and the third chapter, such 
experiences form the basis of habits. As Dewey used the term, though, habits did not 
mean mechanistic habits, but was rather a sort of guide or framework through which 
events and circumstances can be understood and responded to. As such, habits were not 
bad (as we often think of mechanistic habits), but rather necessary. The Bartleby 
Syndrome as a sort of literacy practice, not only fixes the ways that the production of text 
is understood (the "literacy practice" part), but also, in a broader sense, fixes a sort of 
habit in regard to inquiry itself. This particular habit, though, eschews the participatory 
and deliberative part of associated living simply because such elements are not 
necessarily needed or required when the objective is simply to “get it done” for grades. 
To put it bluntly, these are not democratic habits; these are market habits.  
 As such, when viewed from a very broad perspective on the "organic unity" that 
such writing environments are a part of, the Bartleby Syndrome as a literacy practice 
makes sense. While it may seem contradictory at a lower level that such writing 
instruction, such preparation for college produce things that many do not recognize as 
"college readiness," such contradictions resolve rather quickly when placed within a 
neoliberal society. Students are being prepared for college--"college" being whatever 
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students do with the spaces we call post-secondary education-- and this Bartleby 
Syndrome as a literacy practice is very much a meaningful part of that. In short, the 
Bartleby Syndrome is continuous with neoliberalism, especially in the way that the 
environment of neoliberalism itself produces practices and habits that maintain some sort 
of neoliberal stasis. What is excised from the act of writing--reflection, discussion, 
deliberation; or, in short, growth-- are precisely what would be needed for any sort of 
sustained critique of the status quo.  
 As mentioned before, it is not my project at hand to suggest fixes or solutions. My 
reason for doing so is that such fixes and solutions already exist and have existed for 
some time. Dewey's own educational model that was actually in existence for a short 
while at the University of Chicago Laboratory School is one such example. While far 
from imperfect, Dewey's lab school responded to a political, economic, and social 
condition that is, in some regard, remarkably similar to today. While assertions from 
theorists such as Wendy Brown that neo-liberalism is more than just a return of classical 
liberalism are important to pay attention to, there is, I believe, enough similar in that 
continuing the project of rediscovering Dewey's educational models makes as much sense 
now as it ever has. Of course, Dewey was in a right-time/right-place situation at 
Chicago.8 However, even though the alignment to post-secondary education produces all 
sorts of unintended consequences, it also creates interesting possibilities that could 
conceivably be leveraged against such moves. For example, such dual-credit/dual-
enrollment programs in effect produce an idealized "university space" within secondary 
                                                
8 See in particular Tanner’s 1997 history of Dewey’s Lab School in Dewey's Laboratory 
School: Lessons for Today. 
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institutions. These spaces could be occupied strategically ("occupy high-school?") and 
focused around something those in colleges and universities have long stood for: freedom 
of inquiry. These spaces may in fact be able to actually realize this ideal of freedom of 
inquiry, something that has been difficult to accomplish in post-secondary environments 
themselves. Further, these spaces could serve as unstable elements through which the 
continual feedback loop might be interrupted9. These spaces could be spaces in which 
Christian's sincere doubt and questions concerning why some kids received free/reduced 
lunches and he didn't were taken up as the work of writing itself. Composition in the 
post-secondary environment has long looked at its position in academia horizontally; it 
could look at it vertically, including not just what comes after college, but also what 
comes before. 
 This is my answer to the Bartleby Syndrome. However, there is one simple thing 
preventing this that must be dealt with. Quite simply: why? With what justification might 
we utilize to say the prevailing winds are wrong? This is a greater problem than it seems, 
for even if theorists within composition (and there are a great many) find no love for the 
neoliberal status quo, there remains a contradiction deep in the heart of liberalism itself 
that, as long as it remains unresolved, seals off all attempts at true revolutionary 
pedagogies. To explain what I mean here, I want to recount a remark made by an 
audience member of a panel presentation I was a member of some time ago. Our panel, in 
a broad sense, was collectively arguing for a conception of writing that was more 
                                                
9 Dewey himself, as early as 1896, noted that “As this intermediary, it [the high school] 
has operated to reflect back into the lower grades as much as possible of college ideal and 
method, thus solidifying and elevating the intellectual possessions of the public which 
never sees the college doors” (EW 5.272). 
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socially, political, and economically aware. After fielding the usual assortment of 
questions typical of academic conferences, an audience member contributed this to the 
discussion: "I don't think we're really honoring our students by defining writing the way 
you are defining it." I refer to this sentiment of "always honor thy student" as the honor-
maxim. What I believe this audience member was getting at is that our emancipatory, 
critical pedagogy informed discussion of how we might teach writing is often (and 
perhaps always) fundamentally at odds with what our students desire and or want from 
their education. The question implicit in the honor-maxim, then, is what role or, dare I 
say, what right do instructors have to challenge these students on what they think is good 
or best for their own lives? Those who throw this maxim out are (mostly) sincere in 
wanting to understand what the actual position or role of the instructor should be in the 
classroom. Their fear or anxiety of not honoring our students is one that is tinged with 
concepts such as indoctrination, coercion, symbolic violence, abuse of power, and so 
forth. In other words, it implies serious business. 
 This contradiction runs deep in the veins of composition theory. Consider, for 
example, Nancy Welch's recent College English essay, “We’re Here, and We’re Not 
Going Anywhere”: Why Working-Class Rhetorical Traditions Still Matter." In this essay, 
Welch aims to recover the possibilities working class rhetorics could hold for our 
students. I strongly believe that where Welch ends up, that is, the actual practices of 
teaching writing Welch offers here and in other places (see especially her book Living 
Room), are some of the most dignified, important, and, quite frankly beautiful 
descriptions of the possibilities of a writing classroom that composition as a discipline 
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has seen in a very long time. However, there is something missing here, something still 
lacking from this discussion. The awareness and inclusion of working class rhetoric in 
composition classes is the solution only if one accepts something within composition as a 
problem. We have the answer, but what exactly again is the problem?  
 What is lurking within this conversation, and what the honor-maxim frets over, is 
exactly this question of whether composition ought to participate in fermenting social 
change, even if it is against the wishes of our students. This is bigger than a problem of 
competing pedagogies or the appropriate role of the instructor in the classroom, as it is 
ultimately a question of justification for a particular social arrangement and the role and 
function education has within that framework. In other words, how do teachers know 
these radical conceptions of justice or democracy are in fact better than other systems of 
social organization? If we don't know, or can't move beyond a mere belief or 
sentimentality, the honor-maxim becomes an impasse for educators seeking to disrupt the 
neoliberal status quo. Accordingly, arguments such as Welch's (and indeed nearly all 
flavors of critical pedagogy) become ensnared in a pretty straightforward case of petitio 
principii and as such run afoul of the honor-maxim. By this, I mean that educational 
practices infused with the political often assume an a priori justification for ideological 
values that their practices aim to produce. Begging the question is not necessarily 
fallacious, however, especially depending on what your epistemological schema is 
(Rorty, for example, who has little place for "truth" in his philosophy, would never need 
to worry much about it). It does, though, create vulnerabilities, and those vulnerabilities 
have been the locus of criticisms over critical pedagogies. 
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 My project in the rest of this chapter, then, is to work through the problems 
implied by the honor-maxim, and to consider what grounds educators committed to 
emancipatory and critical pedagogies could stand upon. Critical to this discussion is a 
particular strand of American Pragmatism that adds something crucial to this debate, and 
that is a solid justification for a particular kind of deliberative democracy. Instead of 
simply saying "I just believe in my heart Democracy is better and that's that," Pragmatist 
philosophers and theorists following Peirce and Dewey have put in play a coherent 
constellation of concepts that don't just position deliberative democracy as a nice 
ornamentation to western civilizations, but place it as a mandatory arrangement for the 
continuation of social inquiry aimed at social amelioration. As noted in the first chapter, 
this is referred by Hilary Putnam as the epistemological justification for democracy. 
Consequently, Pragmatism provides us with a very rich tradition and history of thinkers, 
theorists, and educators that have sought resolve (or, more appropriately, dissolve) the 
problems implied within the honor-maxim. Additionally, the philosophical critiques 
Pragmatists have made against major tenants of Western thought provides an incredibly 
rich tapestry through which to re-read some of composition's most tenacious debates. A 
Pragmatist critique of these debates will show that there are old problems and then there 
are old problems. The imperative to "honor our students" is, as I will show, a 
manifestation of a very old problem in composition studies that has never reached a full 
resolution (and thus keeps coming back). It cannot reach any satisfying resolution 
because, while the two sides of this problem have exhaustively rehearsed, strengthened 
and tightened their positions, very little has been said on the actual similarities in these 
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debates. It is these similarities in this ongoing family feud that link up an old problem in 
composition to a very old problem indeed--old as in as old as human thought itself. 
Pragmatism at once illuminates the impasse as well as suggests a different route to be 
taken forward. 
 
Composition as an enterprise of liberalism 
 Nancy Welch's announced purpose in "We're Here, And We're Not Going 
Anywhere" is to "seek to repair that bridge by which we can link the history of working-
class rhetorical action to needs and possibilities today" (225). In order to repair this 
bridge, Welch employs two major arguments: 1), that composition is not an exclusively 
"middle class" enterprise and 2), we do not live in a so called "new economy" in which 
the "working class" has little to no meaningful role (and thus power) (224). This 
argument, while cogent and persuasively argued, doesn't on its own answer the second 
part of Welch's title for this piece: why working class rhetorics still matter. After all, a 
reclamation of working class rhetorics is only necessary if there is a justifiable reason for 
reclaiming them. Welch, though, is too smart to beg this question so blatantly. The most 
eloquent answer as to why working class rhetorics still matters comes at the very end 
(indeed the very last sentence) of the essay: "Whether today’s students go on to working- 
or middle-class jobs, the security of those jobs and the equality and justness of the society 
they live in may depend on their finding and exercising such a voice" (239). However, 
this assertion relies upon knowing that, for these students, their needs are in peril and 
working class rhetorics are their remedy. In a refrain that we will soon see is familiar, the 
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first question one might ask is "but how do you as the teacher know what is best for 
students?" In other words, we are caught within the throes of the honor-maxim. 
 The anxieties in Welch's argument are symptomatic of a larger theoretical 
conundrum that has plagued mature democracies: how to handle the internal 
contradictions of liberalism. Put simply, the internal contradiction of liberalism focuses 
around what to do with plural beliefs on what the good is for each individual. This 
pluralism of beliefs is at once a consequence of liberalism and a major stumbling block. It 
is a welcomed consequence of liberalism's strong defense of the individual to, as Mill 
wrote in an oft-quoted passage, "[pursue] our own good in our own way" (13). It is a 
major stumbling block because this position gives liberalism no means to adjudicate 
between different understandings of what good is to be pursued and in what ways, 
especially when these pluralistic beliefs come into conflict with each other. Accordingly, 
any attempts by a state or a community (or a teacher) to choose between competing and 
conflicting individual conceptions of the means and ends of individual goods violates 
liberalism's most cherished assertion. When competing conceptions of the good are 
adjudicated, depending on who wins, we come to decry these moments as injustice, 
oppression, and worse. This is exactly the root of the anxiety behind the maxim to honor 
our students.  
 It is now possible to trace the effects that liberal anxiety over the honor-maxim 
has on Welch's argument. A close examination shows Welch treads very carefully when 
defining exactly who and what her students are in order to reconfigure what "honoring" 
them might look like. In this, I count three distinct moves on Welch's part. The first move 
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is to deftly avoid the honor-maxim by subtly limiting and qualifying who exactly 
working class rhetoric is for in the classroom. In introducing her argument, Welch writes 
"Students of public writing and rhetoric, concerned with how ordinary people can claim 
and hold a platform from which to speak and be heard [...]" and later in the same 
paragraph writes "It also provides students of social justice movements with a model to 
contrast with those forms of civil disobedience that seek to advance an argument through 
momentary rather than sustained disruption" (223, emphasis mine). Welch makes similar 
moves in other places, too. For example, in discussing the teaching that could be inspired 
by a sit-down strike, Welch writes "But although a text such as the Republic sit-down has 
much to offer any class concerned with how individuals with meager economic means 
and slight political weight still have the persuasive resources to rival the Goliaths of our 
society" (224).  
 Welch's second move is to qualify what students are and does this in two steps. 
First, Welch provides labor data that breaks down who exactly has and who does not 
have some measure of control over their means of production. Welch finds that the 
"middle class," despite the conceptions of most students, is not actually the majority: 
"The assumption, then, of a middle-class majority in our composition classrooms, 
particularly in public colleges and universities, is some distance off the mark" (226). 
Second, Welch uses this point to pivot and assert that if our students aren't really 
members of the middle-class, then "middle-class rhetoric" is not "the rhetorical education 
that best supports students’ aspirations for economic security and social voice" (226). 
Consequently, Welch perceptively sees a counter-argument claiming that not many (or 
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not enough) students fit the description she provides after her first move of qualifications 
and responds by saying that students are misinformed or have been mislead as to who 
exactly they are in the economy and what strategies they really need for securing the 
things they want.  
 This leaves one final move left for Welch, and that is to turn from looking at who 
our students are to considering what "honoring" them might entail. As Welch writes, "But 
I do think there is a chance for composition as a field to consider much more fully the 
practices and stances that students will need in order to, as Brandt puts it, safeguard civil 
rights and ensure a just distribution of public resources" (236). In other words, Welch's 
move here is to reconfigure her project through some deft maneuvering as a project of 
honoring her students. Welch, at the end of the day, argues that it is actually working 
class rhetoric that honors her students more fully. Ultimately, what was wrong with 
composition as a middle-class enterprise is that it never actually honored the true needs 
and desires of students, something which Welch presumes to know or assumes she can 
create. We are now right back where we started.  
 Going back, we can see where the internal contradiction of pluralism in liberal 
societies fails to be resolved. For instance, while Welch qualifies who her students are, 
what about students that aren't concerned with how ordinary people can claim and hold 
these sorts of platforms or aren't concerned how they might obtain persuasive resources 
to rival the Goliaths of our society? What of the students who aren't students of social 
justice movements but are rather just students who find themselves in a required, first 
year writing course? Perhaps most controversially, what about our students who actually 
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are (or will be) the "Goliaths of our society" that Welch speaks of? Since demarcating 
who these students are is limited, Welch shores this up by working hard to (rightly, in my 
view) argue that students aren't as "middle class" as they actually think they are and much 
talk of this "new economy" stuff is, at the end of the day, smoke and mirrors. However, 
saying students occupy a position within the economy according to an economist's 
heuristic is quite different than suggesting a student's own conception of their identity is 
wrong. This strategy, then, encounters a fatal flaw when exposed to the post-modernist 
skeptic's question of "how do you know?" This is a problem I will investigate at length 
later in this essay. It will suffice to say right now that this move does not directly address 
or attend to the tension between a student's system of understanding and belief and the 
instructor's.  
 The deeper problem, though, is a couple of key assumptions that allows Welch to 
dance around the problem of pluralism. First, Welch's strategy of qualifying who students 
are suggests or assumes that students have already made the choice to be the students 
Welch envisions in the "We're Here" part of the title. Accordingly, the honor-maxim is 
effectively voided by simply removing any tensions over what students expect and what 
instructors do. If we wish to teach critically, then the way we can do this and still honor 
our students is to seek out students who want us to teach critically. This strategy works 
for the other corners of writing instruction that don't receive as much attention as they 
probably should: freshman seminars, upper-level rhetoric and writing studies courses, 
advanced composition courses, etc. The solution is often as simple as writing "Working 
class rhetorics" into the course title itself. Then we can assume students have made a 
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choice to be in that class, and whatever we do from that point on will, axiomatically, 
honor them. This is unsatisfactory for me because I am not terribly concerned with these 
boutique offerings of composition and rhetoric, as interesting as they are. Instead, I am 
concerned with the meat and potatoes of composition: the required first year writing 
course in which students often have little to no choice in either taking the class or which 
section they will sign up for. This assumption, which is silent on the question of whether 
composition ought to participate in fermenting social change, holds little value when 
these questions are applied to the required first year writing course.  
 It is exactly this question of whether composition ought to participate in 
fermenting social change, even if it is against the wishes of our students, that the second 
assumption seeks to resolve. When Welch moves to qualify what students are by arguing 
they are more working class than they realize, she is actually assuming that antagonisms 
or conflicts within communities (in this case, a community of students in a class) are not 
antagonisms or conflicts at all. This assumption works by asserting that something 
greater than or transcendent to the classroom community has been located and can be 
known, therefore apparent conflicts or tensions are simply mirages. Welch, like many 
other composition theorists in the past several years,10 have located this transcendent 
thread in appealing to the (assumed) commonality within students to have a particular 
instrumentalist aim. It is saying, in a sense, look, you may think we disagree but if you 
look a little deeper, you will see that we actually share the same concerns. Since there is 
potential here, I will take up this move in the third section of this essay. For right now 
                                                
10 See also Lu and Horner's "Working Composition and Rhetoric" 
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though, I want to point out one difficulty in this move. To put it bluntly, it's problematic 
to assume that all students want a just distribution of public resources. Some students, the 
future Goliaths of society perhaps, would actually lose the benefits accrued to them 
through the mechanisms of structural inequality. Consequently, the move to find a priori 
consensus through the creation of a social unity within the classroom is immediately 
problematic because it is precisely this social unity that is a result or effect of the 
classroom.  
 As I have just argued, the honor-maxim has its roots in the liberal anxiety over 
adjudicating between conflicting and competing claims on individual means and ends 
towards the good. To avoid coercion or oppression, the liberal state (and its agents) must 
assume a position of neutrality when it comes to conflicting pluralistic beliefs. This is all 
well and good if you are capable of accepting this neutrality. I have already indicated that 
I, like Welch and other educators committed to political informed teaching, am not. For 
one, this sort of neutrality within the classroom is mythical as there truly is no view from 
nowhere. More importantly, though, apolitical forms of teaching remove the possibility 
of teaching "good writing." By this, I mean that it is not possible to be neutral and expect 
to produce writing that is not just mechanically and organizationally "good," but writing 
that is truly good in all senses of the word, including ethically/morally good. Not 
accepting neutrality when it comes to conflicting claims on the means and ends of the 
good shifts the problem from a political problem to an epistemological problem of 
justification. The epistemological problem boils down to a very simple question: how do 
you know? What looks like a simple question, though, has plagued educators of the 
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critical ilk both from criticisms from the outside as well as from the inside. This very 
question of how do you know has served as the canvas upon which some of the most 
heated debates in composition's history have played out. In the next section, I go through 
two foundational debates in composition's history to trace the effect of liberalism in how 
the field has defined itself. 
 
Two Debates 
James Berlin: You know what? I don't think I'm preparing them for the really 
good life. I mean they're going to have breakdowns. They don't understand that 50 
percent of them are going to wind up divorced for instance, right? I mean, that's a 
statistic. The odds are that that's what's going to happen. In other words, we're not 
preparing them for this wonderful glorious future. I mean, it's not really that good 
of a future anyhow, if they're going to be unhappy, right? 
Stephen North: I don't think 'right' is so simple answer there, actually. 
Berlin: What? 
North: Is it right they're going to be unhappy? I don't think that's such a, I mean- 
Berlin: I want them to know what's in store for them! I mean, they have 
narratives-- 
North: You're like an image broker. Here's a picture of poor people, here's a 
picture of unhappy rich people. 
Berlin: Why? Because they're not going--alright, their notion is that they're going 
to find peace and fulfillment and happiness, alright-- 
North: are you sure? 
(Composition and Resistance 137, emphasis mine) 
 
 Debates in and around leftist pedagogies have probably, in some sort, been 
present since the beginning of writing instruction in America. However, I like to start the 
epoch as we know it with Louis Kampf's CCCC address in 1970. In a moment of candor 
now rare in polite academic discourse, Professor Kampf (that incorrigible radical from 
MIT) charged that "Composition courses should be eliminated, not improved: eliminated, 
because they help support an oppressive system" (248). Lest anyone think Kampf's 
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assertion was a sort of outlier, Harvey Irlen leveled this charge in the first issue of CCC 
in 1970:  
I should state my bias at the beginning: the traditional approach to freshman 
composition, no matter how we patch it up, does not work. It does not work in 
the opinion of the graders of English proficiency tests for graduating seniors. It 
does not work in the opinion of the assigners of papers beyond the freshman 
year. It does not work in the opinions of most who take it and many who teach it. 
And all the protests that it should work, that it used to work, do not alter the fact 
that it does not work now. (35)  
 
Something was definitely in the water that year and that something was the social and 
political upheavals of the late 1960s. Prior to this, it was often enough for those in 
academia to rely on a belief in the intrinsic goodness of the educational mission of the 
university. When Kampf, who had earlier been nearly arrested by the FBI for anti-war 
activities at the '69 C's, saw little if anything to salvage from composition as we knew it, 
he was signaling a new era in which unexamined assumptions of why composition (or 
school in general) even existed at all were simply no longer tenable. If composition was 
going to be offered and taught, we now had a responsibility for having reasons for doing 
so and if we could find none, our only choice was to abandon the endeavor entirely. This 
left those committed to the continuation of composition scrambling for justification and 
legitimacy for their work and would in large part define what thereafter composition as a 
discipline would take up as its raison d'être.   
 This scramble for justification opened up a few different strategies. One was to 
find shelter behind disciplinary and scientific knowledge. This strategy worked by 
essentially excising the student from the equation all together by relegating the biological 
student as a problem to be handled instructionally. Within this strategy, the student's 
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needs, experiences, and backgrounds didn't actually change the body of knowledge 
composition had, but only mattered in figuring out how best to deliver that knowledge to 
the student. As Sirc notes, this strategy was first outlined as a sort of counterpoint to 
Kampf at the 1970's C's by Robert Heilman and his call for an "objective body of 
material" and would come to engulf composition as a discipline in the second half of the 
70's and most of the 80's (Never Mind 12). Outside of a longstanding but eroding belief 
that grammar and mechanics could provide this objectivity, the increased obsession with 
acquiring an objective body of knowledge from which to teach made for rather strange 
bedfellows. Donald Murray's introspective and unapologetically expressivist goal to 
study the composing process of real writers had an awful lot in common with those who 
attempted to tap into traditions of academic discourse and what we "knew" from that, 
who in turn had a lot in common with the cognitivists such as Linda Flower and others 
who sought to understand the cognitive aspect of writing. All three projects of inquiry 
sought to shift composition's locus away from the pluralist conundrum of individual 
students by appealing to something transcendent to or outside of the classroom itself. 
Their arguments, then, were not so much against each other as much as they were battles 
to see which conception of the objective would come to rule the roost of composition. 
The success of these projects was to effectively render student pluralism a non-issue, as it 
really didn't matter much who students were or what they believed. We had knowledge to 
impart on students, and that knowledge was not contingent upon the students themselves. 
What is more interesting, and more pertinent to my discussion here, is what these 
different positions were and are attempting to avoid: justification for adjudicating 
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between plural beliefs in the classroom and the anxiety that comes from having no such 
justification. 
 To see this anxiety in full display, there are two "seminal" debates or arguments I 
want to give a quick reading of.  James Berlin's 1988 essay "Rhetoric and Ideology in the 
Classroom" is an appropriate place to start, as Berlin tended to be at the epicenter of some 
of composition's fiercest disagreements in the 80's and 90's. In this well known (and oft 
written on) essay, Berlin continues his project of hierarchizing a triad of "rhetorics" that 
he saw as attempting to supplant current-traditional rhetorics: cognitive, expressionistic, 
and his preferred category social-epistemic. What is of particular interest in this essay is 
Berlin's strategy for placing his social-epistemic rhetoric as the ideal rhetoric. It's worth 
looking at the construction of Berlin's encapsulated argument against cognitivist rhetoric 
in full: "the rhetoric of cognitive psychology refuses the ideological question altogether, 
claiming for itself the transcendent neutrality of science. This rhetoric is nonetheless 
easily preempted by a particular ideological position now in ascendancy because it 
encourages discursive practices that are compatible with dominant economic, social, and 
political formations" (478). Berlin, then, doesn't so much seek to challenge cognitivist 
psychology on its claim on transcendence but rather on a weaker challenge on cognitivist 
psychology's inability to share Berlin's own leftist commitments. More importantly, 
though, Berlin cannot challenge any other system on these terms because it is a move that 
he himself will turn to in order to erect his own definition of social-epistemic rhetoric as 
the heir-apparent of composition praxis. While he claims an anti-foundationalist stance, 
he does not shy away from making metaphysical claims on methods of knowing. For 
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instance, he offers this claim in support of his social-epistemic rhetoric: "For social-
epistemic rhetoric, the real is located in a relationship that involves the dialectical 
interaction of the observer, the discourse community (social group) in which the observer 
is functioning,and the material conditions of existence" (488). While this claim may not 
stake its validity on objectivity, it is still a claim. We might inquire, for example, just how 
far Berlin is willing to go down this rabbit hole? Would Berlin concede, perhaps, that 
even this claim is contingent and may no longer be "true" 25 years later?  
 Even more curiously, Berlin shifts from making metaphysical claims on 
knowledge to making claims concerning political outcomes of such rhetorics when he 
writes "In short, social-epistemic rhetoric views knowledge as an arena of ideological 
conflict: there are no arguments from transcendent truth since all arguments arise in 
ideology. It thus inevitably supports economic, social, political, and cultural democracy" 
(489). John Schlib, in response to this essay, noted that "I'm puzzled even more when 
Berlin goes on to claim that what he labels 'social-epistemic rhetoric' inevitably supports 
economic, social, political, and cultural democracy. Again, I wonder how Berlin can 
speak with such prophetic authority about the future incarnations and consequences of a 
theory--why he thinks the discipline of history should exist at all if theories are 
'inevitably' as well as 'inherently' such and such" (Reply 769). In essence, Schilb paints 
Berlin into a corner in which Berlin cannot move without losing. We can think of it this 
way: if Berlin's social-epistemic rhetoric does produce a particular social arrangement as 
an outcome, then how does he know with certainty that this is the best possible outcome, 
especially if it conflicts with other claims on what the outcome should be? If it doesn't, 
  282 
then with what justification does Berlin assert in teaching this way in the first place? He's 
damned if he does, damned if he doesn't. 
 Berlin, in his response to Schilb, misreads what Schilb's major challenge was, and 
that was an epistemological challenge, or, rather, a challenge on how Berlin knows with 
certainty that his social epistemic rhetoric produces his desired political arrangement. The 
epigram to this section, then, can be read with a heavy tinge of irony when Stephen North 
challenges Berlin the same way Berlin had sought to challenge Flower and Hayes. The 
challenge of how do you know? is most powerful when directed at one's enemies and least 
powerful when directed at your own theory. Challenges of this type are maddening 
precisely because there are very few things the skeptic's razor cannot undercut. This, 
coincidently, is exactly the same weakness that Maxine Hairston presses on.  
 Four years later in her article "Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing," 
Maxine Hairston identifies and defines her opposition. Her target, our familiar social-
epistemic rhetoric, "[Is] a model that puts dogma before diversity, politics before craft, 
ideology before critical thinking, and the social goals of the teacher before the 
educational needs of the student" (180). Those are fighting words, indeed. It is how 
Hairston picks her fight, though, that is deeply illuminating. While Hairston uses 
"diversity" as her concept of leverage, a closer look at her argument indicates that it is 
actually something else she's worried about: "Distressingly often, those who advocate 
such courses show open contempt for their students' values, preferences, or interests" 
(181).  Much later in her essay, she tips her hand and fully explains what she's driving at 
when she writes that: 
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But I fear that we are in real danger of being co-opted by the radical left, coerced 
into acquiescing to methods that we abhor because, in the abstract, we have some 
mutual goals. Some faculty may also fear being labeled 'right-wing' if they oppose 
programs that are represented as being "liberating." But we shouldn't be duped. 
Authoritarian methods are still authoritarian methods, no matter in what cause 
they're invoked. And the current battle is not one between liberals and 
conservatives. […] Make no mistake-those on the cultural left are not in the least 
liberal; in fact, they despise liberals as compromising humanists. (187 Emphasis 
mine) 
 
To put that in terms that are more familiar to this essay, Hairston is invoking the liberalist 
"honor thy student" maxim. She is very careful to express outrage at the social, political, 
and economic injustices of her time, and is at pains to indicate that the ends she desires 
are not so different than those she argues against. It is the method, though, that she cannot 
stomach--a very important aspect we will see again shortly. Her charge is essentially that 
social-epistemic rhetoric offers no satisfactory way to avoid adjudicating between 
conflicting conceptions of "the good" between students and teachers should they arise. As 
she writes in the spirit of reductio ad absurdum, "By the logic of the cultural left, any 
teacher should be free to use his or her classroom to promote any ideology. Why not 
facism? Racial superiority? Religious fundamentalism? Anti-abortion beliefs? Can't any 
professor claim the right to indoctrinate students simply because he or she is right? The 
argument is no different from that of any true believers who are convinced that they own 
the truth and thus have the right to force it on others" (188). However, Hairston is no 
vulgar relativist either, for one might suitably ask what Hairston might say when a 
student indicates their preference to simply not write at all. Exactly like Berlin, Hairston 
must consequently make an appeal to something transcendent to avoid the liberal anxiety. 
That element for her is writing: "students' own writing must be the center of the course. 
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Students need to write to find out how much they know and to gain confidence in their 
ability to express themselves effectively" (186). Hairston's strategy, then, is to try to 
remove any possibility that a discussion concerning eudaimonia might occur; something 
that would very likely lead to a situation in which competing notions of the good would 
come into conflict with each other. 
 As should hopefully be clear when we see Hairston's argument in this light, she is 
absolutely not advocating for an apolitical conception of the classroom, as many from 
different directions (including, perhaps, Hairston herself) have charged. Rather, her 
position is deeply political in the sense that it is liberalism itself that she is using as the 
political and ethical foundation of her argument. Interestingly, it is perhaps only because 
liberalism is itself so naturalized that it might seem, on the surface, as politically 
"neutral." Consequently, Hairston isn't so much responding to the critical pedagogy straw 
men that populate her essay, but rather the one and very same internal contradiction of 
liberalism that animates practically every other position out there: the anxiety over 
knowing. Further, Hairston's strategy here is actually illusory, as it fails to realize that the 
classroom, the project of writing instruction, and even the University itself still generate 
such conflicts between individual conceptions of the good. I will return to this 
observation in the final section, as it suggests the real problem is not how to avoid 
adjudication between conceptions of the good but rather what to do with such conflicts. 
 This very same issue would return with a vengeance less than a decade later. In 
his 2001 JAC essay "Private Satisfactions and Public Disorders: Fight Club, Patriarchy, 
and the Politics of Masculine Violence," Henry Giroux starts with a fairly standard 
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enunciation of the leftist critique of neo-liberalism. However, after noting that neo-
liberalism "not only consolidates economic power in the hands of the few, it also 
aggressively attempts to break the power of unions, decouple income from productivity, 
subordinate the needs of society to the market, and reinterpret public services and 
amenities as unconscionable luxuries" he makes a startling turn and writes that "[...] it 
does more. It thrives on a culture of cynicism, boredom, and despair" (3,4). For Giroux, 
this culture of neo-liberalism is one that precludes public discussion of social problems as 
social problems, and instead re-locates such intellectual work as directed toward the 
individual, personal self. It is here, then, that Grioux finds the movie Fight Club to be 
particularly dangerous, for while it seems to "offer a critique of late capitalist society and 
the misfortunes it generates out of its obsessive concern with profits, consumption, and 
the commercial values that underlie its market-driven ethos" it instead "defines the 
violence of capitalism almost exclusively in terms of an attack on traditional (if not to say 
regressive) notions of masculinity, and in doing so re-inscribes white heterosexuality 
within a dominant logic of stylized brutality and male bonding that appears to be 
predicated on the need to denigrate, and to wage war against, all that is feminine" (5). 
The rest of the essay is dedicated to an expanded reading of Fight Club along these lines.  
 Giroux's stated purpose in offering such a reading is to demonstrate how "such 
films function as public pedagogies by articulating knowledge to effects, purposely 
attempting to influence how and what knowledge and identities can be produced within a 
limited range of social relations" (6). His broader purpose, though, is to suggest that it is 
precisely this sort of reading that can be brought into the classroom to help "shed critical 
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light on how such texts work pedagogically to legitimize some meanings, invite 
particular desires, and exclude others" (24). Consequently, while Giroux notes several 
times that multiple interpretations of Fight Club are possible, he is arguing for a 
privileging of this sort of reading in the classroom for his stated purpose. It is this right 
here, then, that invites the honor-maxim response with Geoff Sirc performing the honors. 
In his response essay, "The Difficult Politics of the Popular" Sirc starts with a retelling of 
the infamous 1971 performance art piece “Shoot” in which young artist Chris Booden 
had a friend literally shoot him in front of a small audience. Sirc opens with this as a 
cautionary tale, noting that "[s]hoot became a kind of Rorschach test, with critics reading 
whatever meanings they wanted into the artist and his act" (421). Not to be outdone, Sirc 
then produces his own reading of Fight Club that expresses no small amount of disgust 
for, among other things, the film's violence, vulgar consumerism, and aesthetic 
shortcomings. However, Sirc finds this to be problematic because  
[s]o many clever readings are possible, after all. I resist it because my students 
loved this film. I teach first-year developmental students, young men and women 
of a wide range of colors. Except for one young white woman who was bored by 
the film (because the guys in the dorm watch it twice a week), all my students had 
very positive, interesting things to say about it. I resist my reading, then, because I 
like my students, and I don’t value them only to turn around and do a wholesale 
refiguring of their culture according to my preferred ideology (in the name of 
'critical literacy'). (424) 
 
In this exchange we see our familiar anxieties on full display. Giroux, for his part, seeks a 
strong platform on which to condemn what the movie Fight Club represents in his 
reading and to take that reading into the classroom. Sirc, the liberalist in this exchange, 
challenges this position by appealing to a plurality of morals that he sees in his writing 
students. In other words, Sirc inquires as to how Giroux can know that Fight Club is 
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offensive to his students. After all, if a plurality of meaning and morality is an ontological 
fact, Giroux must be able to demonstrate that his meaning and morality in interpreting 
Fight Club is transcendent and consequently objective. If he cannot, and this is precisely 
Sirc's challenge, then we have no basis from which to adjudicate between Giroux's 
interpretation and the interpretations of Sirc's students. The danger here for Sirc is "that 
academic revulsion over the popular can become yet another reason to deny validity to 
noncanonical, possibly transgressive materials." (428) What is striking here is what 
exactly Sirc is aiming to honor. His students, Sirc claims, are "comfortably in the post- 
symbolic, and so the popular culture they prefer—a hodgepodge of sound and vision, 
sometimes cool, sometimes clunky—rings truer, in its complexity of excess, than the 
traditional political" (432). In this light, we see that Sirc engages in a shift from honoring 
instrumentalist aims of students (a la Hairston, perhaps) to honoring the aesthetic aims of 
his "post-symbolic" students. While this is a horse of a completely different color, what is 
important to note here is that Sirc still relies upon a position of epistemological 
skepticism to block any attempts to interfere with Liberalism's foundational belief that 
the individual is the primary unit of reflection over the good. In other words, how can we 
know that the ideas of one person are better than someone else?  In the next section, I 
turn to the philosophical tradition of Pragmatism to reconsider how we might navigate 
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More than a feeling: justifying democracy, knowing democracy 
So far, I have argued that at the center of debates concerning the role of the 
instructor and the nature of their authority over students is an un-resolvable contradiction 
at the heart of political liberalism. This contradiction, very simply, works as follows: 
political liberalism creates a pluralism of ideas concerning "the good" while at the same 
time preventing any means of adjudicating between those conceptions when and where 
they conflict with each other. In the classroom, I refer to this allegiance to protecting the 
capacity for individuals to decide for themselves what "the good" is as the honor-maxim. 
Since political liberalism is so deeply embedded in our collective thinking about social 
and political life, any threat to this first principle of liberalism produces anxiety over 
facing the unsavory task of adjudicating between convicting conceptions of the good. 
This anxiety is epistemological in nature, for how can we know who is right and who is 
wrong? In the field of writing instruction, this has been the thorn in the side of attempting 
to reconcile the act of writing with political life. It is necessary to pause for a moment and 
consider what is at stake here.  
As I wrote above, it seems to me that the most controversial question to be faced 
is simply this: ought we in composition work to utilize our classes to disrupt the status 
quo, even if it is against the wishes of our students? After all, the shocking (and rapidly 
increasing) inequality of wealth in America has, sadly, not been news for a long time. 
What might be less apparent, though, is how bad things are for our students. By the fall of 
2010, unemployment figures for holders of a 4 year college degree, regardless of age, had 
doubled from their levels prior to the catastrophic economic downturn starting in 2007. 
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Worse, unemployment figures for 20-24 year olds with college degrees--supposedly 
those in the best position to obtain employment due to their "fresh" education--went from 
3.4% in 2007 to a staggering 9.6% by September of 2010 (Konczal). Further, these 
numbers do not take into account the level of under-employment (having a job but only 
working part time) nor inquire into the qualitative aspects of contemporary work--that is, 
how fulfilling might this employment be? Worse (and yes, it gets worse), while we have 
weathered economic recessions plenty of times before, the defining feature of this 
economic downturn is debt. For our students, the steep increases in the cost of post-
secondary enrollment has hit them particularly hard. This creates what can only be 
considered as a perfect storm of forces conspiring against our students. First, post-
secondary education of some sort is considered necessary for participation in the 
contemporary economy. However, this comes as state support for education is declining, 
meaning that students must increasingly shoulder the cost of this education themselves as 
individuals. Tragically, though, just as students are acquiring debt to obtain this 
education, the sort of employment they will need to repay this debt dries up. Is this not 
reason enough to say yes, we have to join the struggle directly? 
Sadly, no. This reality is not and will not be enough to change the minds of many 
instructors, administrators, and theorists. While things are definitely bad for everyone 
(save the very upper classes), having a terrible economy does not on its own resolve a 
larger epistemological conundrum of justification. In a broader sense, this problem has its 
roots in the split between objectivism and relativism, something that Richard Bernstein 
notes "has been with us ever since the origins of Western philosophy, or at least from the 
  290 
time of Plato's attack on the Sophists and on Protagoras's alleged relativism" (Beyond 8). 
It is worth quoting Bernstein at length here simply to illustrate just how closely this 
epistemological question aligns with the political/ethical/moral conundrum discussed 
above: 
The objectivist maintains that unless we can ground philosophy, knowledge, or 
language in a rigorous manner we cannot avoid radical skepticism. [...] The 
relativist not only denies the positive claims of the objectivist but goes further. 
[...] For the relativist, there is no substantive overarching framework or single 
metalanguage by which we can rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate 
competing claims of alternative paradigms. (8, emphasis mine) 
 
Perhaps even more pertinent to our task at hand is Bernstein's conception of what is at 
stake. As he writes, "With a chilling clarity Descartes leads us with an apparent and 
ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either there is some support for 
our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of 
darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos" (18). The 
anxiety of the objectivist, then, is the quest for certainty as the triumph over madness and 
chaos. The relativist frets over the possibility of stifling and oppressive authority. It is 
easy to see both of these positions and their attendant fears in full display in the previous 
section. 
It is here that one strand of Pragmatist philosophy suggests a way out of this 
conundrum by claiming that while objectivity is impossible, it is also not needed in order 
to avoid the madness and chaos of pure relativism. In other words, while it may be the 
case that "truth" is always a product of human intellect and is inherently fallible, it is still 
"good enough" to use as "truth." Our beliefs are, in essence, "truth-apt" and as such we 
need not be brought to our knees by the skeptic's question of "how do you know?" What 
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is lacking in the objectivist/relativism split is inquiry and its relationship to experience 
and belief, precisely the sort that was outlined in the first chapter. To briefly recall it, the 
very short version works like this: Once thinkers like C.S. Peirce rejected the spectator 
conception of knowledge and denied the Cartesian concepts of deep skepticism and 
introspection, experience became the crucial linchpin of all knowing. Their model for this 
was the scientific revolution and the way in which, instead of ideas having to correspond 
to authoritative traditions or personal / private reasoning, ideas were evaluated by a 
community of inquirers against a shared outer-world or "experience." Or, as Cheryl 
Misak helpfully puts it:  
The core of the pragmatist conception of truth is that a true belief would be the 
best belief, were we to inquire as far as we could on the matter. We shall see that 
'best' here amounts to 'best fits with all experience and argument,' not the kind of 
'best' that other pragmatists, James and Rorty, for instance, have flirted with--
consoling, best for our lives, or most comfortable. A true belief, rather, is a belief 
that could not be improved upon, a belief that would forever meet the challenges 
of reasons, argument, and evidence. (49) 
 
We might think of this as a sort of continual spiral in which a belief is brought into doubt 
due to the precariousness of lived experience. The decay of belief then spurs a mode of 
thinking aimed at reconstructing belief: inquiry. This inquiry continues until a 
reconstructed belief emerges that is able to withstand this doubt. This brings us back to 
the start: belief, but a different belief than what we originated with.  
Returning to the problem at hand, the prohibition against adjudicating between 
conflicting conceptions of the good is built upon an assumption that there exists no 
"objective" truth that is transcendent to the conflicting ends that could serve as a point of 
evaluation. In other words, we are always vulnerable to the fatal question of how do you 
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know? However, as Pragmatists will point out, such an objective, eternal and ahistorical 
"Truth" is not needed; local, slightly less grand "truths" produced through social inquiry 
work well enough. Once we rid ourselves of that faulty assumption, it becomes apparent 
that we can in fact engage in inquiring as to whether one person's conception of the ends 
of life are indeed better or worse than someone else's, especially where they come into 
conflict with each other. Putnam uses the example of female circumcision here, noting 
that some might "reject the idea that we can criticize traditional societies even for such 
sexist practices as female circumcision" and that "traditional societies are viewed by 
these thinkers as so superior to our own societies that we have no right to disturb them in 
any way" (183). Putnam describes it this way: "what I think we are seeing is the revival 
of the myth of the noble savage" (183). The problem with this idea is that it ignores the 
possibility that women living in societies that practice female circumcision would want to 
know about alternative ways of thinking about the practice and are incapable of deciding 
for themselves which might be better. In short, the "noble savage myth" blocks the path 
of inquiry. Similarly, James Garrison notes that the anxiety or fear over "indoctrination" 
via education is misplaced simply because it assumes a passive instead of active mind. 
The active mind, one that is capable of inquiry, is not a mere receptacle of information to 
be delivered hypodermically. Thus, since indoctrination is inevitable in the process of 
education, the real solution is "inoculation," or rather teaching students to utilize inquiry 
so that further attempts of "indoctrination" are never accepted wholesale (Paradox 267-8). 
In this way, the resolution of liberalism's contradiction is not to be found in simply 
avoiding pluralism, but to utilize pluralism as the necessary raw material needed to 
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sustain inquiry into political and ethical matters. When faced with the question of how do 
you know, we can respond that we know because beliefs generated through inquiry 
grounded in experience are good enough to use as “truth.”  
A writing classroom grounded on the search for warranted assertability (to use 
Dewey's favored term for "truth") through social inquiry yields an alternative viewpoint 
of the debates in the previous section. For example, while Hairston's defense of each 
individual student's own right to their ideas is laudable, what is lacking from her 
assessment is a realization that such beliefs of individual students are themselves 
products of inquiry and could be further developed. In this way, a writing classroom that 
embraces the political need not be "authoritarian" but could actually be useful in helping 
students articulate such individual beliefs through social inquiry. Concepts such as 
"ideology" might prove to be crucial for helping students engage in sustained critiques of 
problematized beliefs for the purpose of inquiry. Further, if we want to be a little more 
pointed--and I feel we should in the classroom--we might genuinely invite students like 
Sirc's to ask how their own favorable readings of Fight Club are, to quote Tyler Durden 
once again, "working for [them]?" Giroux's reading of Fight Club as public pedagogy 
could be terribly enlightening for Sirc's students. The contours of human intellect are 
complex and it may be conceivable that students might retain an aesthetic and visceral 
appreciation of Fight Club while also rejecting aspects of the film that may work against 
the students having a worthy and dignified place in the world. Respecting the experiences 
of students does not entail accepting them a priori. At the same time, respecting the 
experiences of students also means that they should never be taken for granted or 
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dismissed simply because they do not confirm our own theoretical viewpoints. Inquiry, 
when working well, favors only what best aligns to the experiences of the community, 
and it is more than possible that the instructors stand to gain just as much as the students. 
To return to the comment that sparked this essay, "honoring" a student by denying them 
the opportunity to grow intellectually is no honor at all. 
In the hyper-local view from the classroom, this notion of inquiry is really not that 
far off from what composition in its best moments already attempts. However, as 
theorists of composition, we're also responsible for the entire field of practice of writing 
instruction at the post-secondary level. From this vantage point, the notion of "inquiry" 
takes on a very different imperative, for the question is not just what are students learning 
in classes but for what reasons are they learning them? It is here that the political 
implications of inquiry, most fully articulated by John Dewey, become important. While 
the notion of "democracy" is without a doubt important in Dewey's work, what is often 
missed is why it is so important. Dewey lends himself no favors here, as the connection is 
rarely made visible in his prose. That is not to say that it is not there, though. In The 
Public and its Problems, Dewey famously--and cryptically--wrote that "[Democracy] 
will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of 
full and moving communication" (LW 2:350). This statement has generated a lot of 
interest and commentary; unfortunately, much of it has focused on the "art of full and 
moving communication" and not so much the "free social inquiry" part of the equation. 
This misses something subtle yet incredibly important, and that is what democracy was 
good for. As Hilary Putnam writes, "[For Dewey] democracy is not just one form of 
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social life among other workable forms of social life; it is the precondition for the full 
application of intelligence to the solution of social problems" (Renewing 180). In other 
words, "democracy" is a social and political arrangement done in the service of "free 
social inquiry" animated through "the art of full and moving communication." Putnam 
and others such as Richard Shusterman and Dewey's intellectual biographer Robert 
Westbrook have referred to this as the epistemological justification of democracy.   
 Going back to Berlin's assertion that social-epistemic rhetoric "supports 
economic, social, political, and cultural democracy," we can now finally see how exactly 
this might be justified. To start, we have to reverse the order of Berlin's assertion: 
economic, social, political, and cultural democracy supports social-epistemic rhetoric. 
This re-ordered assertion is something I'm in favor of, as inquiry focused on the 
intersections of language usage and broader social dynamics works better when situated 
in a University that has a diverse community of inquirers as its student body. The current 
privatization of the public research university is a direct threat to any such endeavor, as 
well as a death knell to the state of inquiry in our society (something that is already on 
life support).  
It is with this last point that I believe we can finally begin a conversation on why 
our system of writing instruction and education in general that is responsible for the 
Bartleby Syndrome must be changed. It must be changed because it creates a situation in 
which inquiry itself is brought to a standstill. Because of this, the cultural problems of our 
times fail to be resolved. As I have noted before, it is inquiry itself as a focus of writing 
instruction that would directly address the Bartleby Syndrome. The epistemological 
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justification for democracy provides us with a way to justify such forms of writing 
instruction. We require this as a society not simply because we are sentimentally attached 
to some romantic notion of "democracy," but rather because we have very strong reasons 
based on experience that suggest that the more voices we have in a democracy, the 
stronger we are able to continually find new solutions to old problems. New solutions to 
old problems is something we need now perhaps more than ever. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Pragmatist alternative I have described above provides a very compelling 
solution to a problem that has haunted those who attempt to reconcile the political with 
writing instruction. What this Pragmatist alternative shows us is that the skeptic’s 
question of how do you know as well as the honor-maxim are grounded on problematic 
assumptions that we need not assent to. Those who would remove the political from the 
classroom have long relied on the relativist’s position. This Pragmatist solution to 
providing justification for belief and “truth” when pure objectivity is a dead option 
radically changes the conversation, for we can turn the question around and ask with 
what evidence do those in favor of an apolitical classroom argue that such pedagogies 
contributes to a better world, especially in light of our current predicament. This 
conversation will not be easy, but it will at least be productive. Personally, I believe that 
the sorts of inequality we see in society today prevents us from producing "good student 
writing." Some may disagree with this, but I am genuinely curious as to how they might 
defend such a viewpoint. If "honoring" the students isn't really the issue here, then what 
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exactly is? My suspicion is that lurking behind the honor-maxim are spurious class 
allegiances that do not favor the majority of our students. This, though, is something we 
as a field will need to seriously discuss. 
For now, my rather modest hope is that others will agree with me that there is 
great potential here and will be persuaded to explore what Pragmatism can offer us. The 
project for composition in this next decade will not be to solve problems through 
reinvention of the proverbial wheel, but to ask why the worthy and intelligent solutions 
we have developed simply never seem to take hold. Certainly the labor structure of 
higher-education is one of the biggest obstacles we face, and there is no shortage of 
scholarship in that area. Beyond that, though, I also strongly believe that we have 
inherited certain philosophical legacies (liberalism, objectivism, relativism, etc) that 
severely limit the capacities of writing instruction. Pragmatism's long and rich tradition of 
working and re-working these ideas should appear on our horizon as a field far more 
often than it does. Should we need justification not just for a required first year writing 
class, but writing classes at every level that binds the act of writing to social and political 
life, then Pragmatism offers a compelling vision. It shows us that the forces of inequality 
prevalent today were not handed down to us from God or nature herself. Humans with 
unjustifiable power have written these laws, these rules, these policies, these 
philosophies--but we are writers, too. 
 






With any project of this size, there is an inevitable mess of material left on the editing 
room floor: arguments left behind, discussions abandoned, research discontinued. As a 
writer, I have agonized over these elements, knowing not everything that must be said 
can be said in one project. Much work remains to be done. My purpose in this 
dissertation has been to demonstrate the relevance and necessity of a Pragmatist 
perspective on problems facing post-secondary writing instruction. Part of this work has 
been to bring the work of Dewey and Peirce in line with contemporary problems we as 
literacy educators face. However, it is undeniable that another part of this work has been 
to reconstruct and re-imagine the ways in which Pragmatism can be of relevance to the 
teaching of writing in schools.  
 In pursuit of these two pieces of the project, I have taken up the question of 
college preparation and the effects it has on students as well as writing instruction at the 
postsecondary level.  I have demonstrated that a Pragmatist orientation, as outlined in the 
first chapter, allows a critique of writing in schools that places the outcomes of such work 
as continuous within a larger environment (including social, political, and economic 
aspects). This Pragmatist insight is important, as it shifts the discussion over the teaching 
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of writing away from individual students to an examination of the world itself that we 
live in. In short, as I have argued, to have good writing we first need a world in which 
good writing matters.  
 This critique was inspired and sustained by the real experiences I encountered 
while conducting qualitative research in a high school level college preparation 
classroom. It was while absorbed in this environment that I first sensed and felt the 
questions and problems worked out in this dissertation. The Bartleby Syndrome as I have 
referred to it, has served as the point of departure into a re-examination of just what 
college preparation does, why it does the things it does, and how we might understand the 
mechanism beneath it. While I have sought to understand these things, my work should 
not be seen as a statement on life in high schools, an exploration of the lives of students, 
or even a suggestion concerning best practices. Rather, it has served as a clarifying 
medium from which I could ground the theoretical work carried out here in some sort of 
actual experience. 
 From this fieldwork, I have worked through a Pragmatist critique of writing in 
schools at three different levels of analysis. The first concerned the actions and activity of 
individuals themselves, particularly in regard to understanding why some literacy 
practices happen (the Bartleby Syndrome, for example) instead of others. I then moved to 
a broader view by working through an understanding of "college preparation" as the 
context through which activity in the writing classroom happens. I ended by exploring the 
broadest context, neoliberalism, as a level of understanding through which many 
contradictions finally resolve. It is here that I have suggested Pragmatism's political 
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agenda, rooted in a concept of inquiry as the crucial component of democracy, provides 
not only justification for working against the status quo, but the method for outlining 
alternatives.  
 In focusing this way, there are several other discussions that have been given too 
little space to develop. As a final part of this dissertation, I will give a nod to them here. 
The first concerns "Pragmatism" itself. Pragmatism as a contemporary philosophical 
tradition is, as Dewey would have wanted it, flexible. Richard Rorty's pragmatism, for 
example, is something I have consciously avoided in this work simply because it is not 
the sort of "Pragmatist Philosophy" that is what the problems of our times in 2012 
require. I have consciously shaped my discussion of "Pragmatism" to place it back closer 
to where I see its original roots: within the tradition of left Hegelianism.1 Claims from 
Rorty, Hickman, and others, that the works of Dewey and other pragmatists will be 
waiting at the end of the long post-structuralist road, or are amenable to a post-modern 
world, are suspect to me. That said, this work, particularly in regard to disentangling 
Rorty's influence (and much of post-modernism itself) from Pragmatism, is very much in 
its infancy. While it may still be a minority opinion, even among Pragmatists, I feel this 
reassessment of post-modernism and an eventual move away from it will be the next 
movement within the Pragmatist tradition. 
 Along with that, Dewey's history with Liberalism, while a major part of the final 
chapter, still demands more attention. My move in placing Dewey's oeuvre within his 
outlook and understanding of liberalism is far from a mainstream conversation within 
                                                
1 See especially Timothy Brennan’s book Wars of Position for further elucidation of “left 
Hegelianism” 
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those who study Pragmatism. Outside of a few debates among Pragmatist political 
philosophers (for example, Festenstein, Talisse, etc)2, Dewey's work as a whole is still 
situated as something to be understood through the lens of works such as Experience and 
Nature or Art as Experience. While these are indeed important statements by Dewey, the 
direct political implications of Dewey's philosophy is obscured. In reclaiming some form 
of positive political maneuverability for Pragmatism, such historiographical work would 
yield important results.  
 In regard to liberalism and neoliberalism, I have consciously avoided retracing 
much of the important work already done with these topics in education. This is not to 
slight writers such as Giroux, Rikowski, Apple, Anyon, and others. In fact, deep in the 
recession and as I was conducting my fieldwork, it was these writers I turned to for 
inspiration. My project in this dissertation, though, has been an attempt to understand 
how and why neoliberalism, viewed from a perspective of organic unity and continuity, 
impacts writing instruction in very particular ways. My sense is that further explorations 
between political / social theory and literacy instruction will continue to yield useful 
insights.  
 Also, one thing alluded to in this work are the various ways composition as a field 
has sought to understand "not-writing." There is much more potential here for a more 
thorough investigation of composition's own understanding of what it means to not write. 
Additionally, one area I have chosen to side-step in this project is a discussion of 
psychology (and in particular, educational psychology) that has worked to understand the 
                                                
2 In particular, Matthew Festenstein’s book Pragmatism and Political Theory is an 
excellent departure for these discussions. 
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psychological concept of "motivation" in education, particularly in how it relates to the 
act of writing.3 Jim Garrison's book, Dewey and Eros, particularly in its treatment of 
desire, suggests there may yet be fruitful engagement between the two. 
 Finally, I have not delved much into the work already commencing in the area of 
dual-credit enrollment situations. Recent edited collections as well as recently written 
dissertations on the subject suggest an incoming wave of scholarship in this area. 
Additionally, further exploration of the association of writing instruction at the 
postsecondary level with the movement and development of "democracy" is also needed, 
simply because this history is a sort of "subconscious" of the field that might be useful in 
a tactical sense in employing/deploying such courses. While I have asserted that 
Composition as a field of practice cannot be understood apart from the social, political, 
and economic "left," a further exploration of this association is needed to fully understand 
the role that writing instruction might play in establishing a vision of the University that 
is worthy of having other forms of education align to it. To this, I have added but a flavor 
of scholarship out there that seeks to understand the evolving nature of the University 
itself in society.  
When I was first starting my graduate work, a professor of mine suggested that 
the real question academics must eventually face is simply this: who are you responsible 
to with your work? As a teacher myself, I have challenged my own students to consider 
who they are responsible to as writers and as members of the academic community. It 
thus seems appropriate to end this text with a consideration of that question. Recently, at 
                                                
3 For example, see Boscolo and Hidi’s work on “motivation” and writing. 
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a national conference for the field of composition, I encountered a whiz-bang 
technological gadget that projected, in hologram form, the text of Twitter "tweets" 
against a wall in the outline of people walking by. I grew fond of watching, from a 
distance, conference goers stand in awe of this gadget, seeing their shadows digitized and 
textualized against a beige wall--as if the technology had simply purified the human body 
into a clean, readable form. Many were simply agog with this delight. And yet, while 
walking around the morning before I left, I spotted a camp of homeless individuals 
underneath an interstate overpass not far from the convention center. Such contradictions 
are not hard to find. The hope placed in technological fixes, or market solutions, often 
merely mask the "old problems"--hunger, joblessness, discrimination, oppression, 
violence--that were never really solved in the first place. That we can project our 
thoughtless tweets but can't figure out what to do with rampant inequality is, perhaps, one 
of the cruelest ironies yet inflicted upon ourselves. My work as a scholar is responsible to 
those caught in this cruelty. The modest contribution I have hoped to make with this 
dissertation is to join the project of creating the necessary conditions through which these 
"old problems" of how to live together in worthy and dignified ways can be addressed. 
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